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REVISITING DUAL-CLASS STOCK
DOUGLAS C. ASHTON*
INTRODUCTION
"Through an evolutionary process, firms gravitate toward effi-
cient ownership structures."1 As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel have noted, "[t]he best structure cannot be derived from
theory; it must be developed through experience." 2 Such experi-
ence, shaped by common macroeconomic factors as well as firm-
specific and industry-specific factors, influences and guides
the corporate evolutionary process. Structural metamorphosis,
however, can be slow3 and unrecognizable until larger events pre-
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the helpful comments of James Anderson, Jeffrey Bainbridge, Jeffrey Baumon, Mark
Bonorigo, Reed Kleinle, Kenneth Lehn, and seminar participants at the American
Enterprise Institute for Publicy Policy Research and Georgetown University. I am
especially grateful to Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II and J. Gregory Sidak. The views
expressed in this Article are solely those of the author.
1 J. Gregory Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights
and the Price Elasticity of a Firm's Publicly Traded Stock, 25 GA. L. REV. 783, 796
(1991). "In particular, it is efficient to divide functions between investors and manag-
ers even though investors consequently must expend resources to specify and monitor
the performance of managers." Id. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (noting structural models
which divide functions between investors and managers have been dominant for over
sixty years). The dominance of the model does not necessarily mean that it is univer-
sally optimal. Rather, the model is refined by firms and outside forces as the firm
interacts within relevant markets.
2 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 5 (1991).
3 The airline industry is a prime example. The reevaluation of corporate govern-
ance structures in the airline industry following deregulation in 1978 required almost
ten years to complete. See Stacy Kole et al., Deregulation and the Governance of Air-
lines (1993) (unpublished working paper, University of Pittsburgh, Katz School of
Business). When more general structural change is effected at a fast pace, however,
we can expect to see resulting governance changes over time. Such was the case with
the 1982 antitrust decree that divided the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (AT&T) into eight separate firms and spun off two other telephone companies in
which AT&T had a minority interest. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP:
US TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COPETITIVE ERA 1 (Brookings Institution 1991);
United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Recently, sweeping new gov-
ernment price controls on the cable television industry set off an insider-selling spree
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scribe reevaluation, and sometimes abrupt change, of a firm's
ownership structure.4 We should be skeptical of claims that any
one structure (or even class of structures) is best for all firms be-
cause each firm has qualities which distinguish it from the larger
corporate population within which it operates.5 Likewise, we
should also be skeptical of claims that any one type of capital
structuring device, or combination of devices, is best. Different
firms require different capitalizations, which in turn require dif-
ferent capitalization devices.
Forays into capital markets (when internal funds are ex-
hausted) initiate the reevaluation.6 Firms must initially choose
in which top industry executives sold off millions of dollars of stock in their own com-
panies. See Alexandra Peers & Warren Getler, Cable Insiders Sold Shares Before
April 1 Rate Ruling, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1993, at C1 (suggesting this activity has
consequences on agency costs associated with holding shares in these firms).
4 Such triggering events may originate from a variety of sources, including capital
markets, product markets, corporate control markets, and regulatory bodies. For ex-
ample, the feasibility of debt or equity financing may be influenced by contracts with
original financing groups such as venture capitalists, or by the supply and demand
conditions already existing in the capital markets. Specifically, interest rates (both
short and long-term), market value, replacement costs, and general capital access dic-
tate to the firm which structuring mechanisms are available. Firm-specific triggering
events may also force the reevaluation. Examples of these events include: the devel-
opment of a new product line, the need to expand production beyond current capabili-
ties, or impending bankruptcy proceedings. Also, the attributes of the industry
within which the firm operates can trigger structural reevaluation, while simultane-
ously dictating the parameters of this choice. For example, certain industries by their
nature cannot be heavily leveraged. Thus, forays into equity markets are necessary
when substantial funding is needed. In the recent past, corporate control markets
have also played a significant role in triggering structural change. For example, in the
1960s and 1980s, American enterprises began defensively leveraging in reaction to
increased acquisition activity involving large amounts of debt financing. See VICTOR
BRUDNEY & MARviN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE
437 (1987).
5 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 12-13. "The choice of organization
... will depend on the size of the firm, the identity of the managers, and the industry
(or spectrum of industries) in which the corporation participates. The organization of
finance and control is equally variable." Id. An analysis of the shareholder-optimal
capital structure is also dependent on multiple variables and is extremely complex.
See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REv. 277, 344-45 (1990) [hereinafter Hu, Corporate Investment]. "There is
no neat formula that you can plug in to find the optimal capital structure." Id. (quot-
ing RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 437
(3d ed. 1988)). It is dependent on a broad range of factors including: tax effects, the
agency problems associated with different securities, and the costs of issuing securi-
ties, including those created by adverse selection. Antonio S. Mello & John E. Par-
sons, Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1887 (1992).
6 In what has been referred to as the "pecking order" of finance sourcing, firms
are thought to first utilize internal funds before resorting to outside financing. This
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between equity or debt financing, or a combination of both. With
respect to the use of equity instruments, subsequent choices will
focus on the type of stock to be issued. The options include the
issuance of preferred stock, cumulative preferred stock, convert-
ible cumulative preferred stock, exchangeable convertible cumula-
tive preferred stock, floating rate preferred stock, or common
stock.7 In most cases, the firm selects a capital structure that is
characterized by a combination of debt and equity, the equity por-
tion typically consisting of one class of common stock and one or
more classes of preferred stock.' Occasionally, a firm will issue
theory rests upon the notion that transaction, agency, and financial distress costs, in
addition to tax advantages and assymetric information, make internal financing less
costly. See Hu, supra note 5, at 343 n.189 (citing Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen, Fi-
nancing Constraints and Corporate Investment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Ac-
TIvrrY 141 (1988)).
7 The shareholder's rights under each of these equity instruments can vary signif-
icantly. Plain vanilla convertible preferred stock gives the investor a right to convert
the preferred share into a share of common stock at a fixed price. Preferred converti-
ble stock can also come in different forms such as that issued by Masco Tech., Inc.'s
Dividend Enhancement Convertible Security or DECs. Each DEC (noncallable for
three years) sold for the same price as the company's common stock and has an an-
nual yield of six percent. Four years after the stock's June 1993 issue date, each DEC
automatically converts into one common share. See Leslie Scism, Variants of Convert-
ible Preferred Stock Can Leave Investors With a Bad Taste, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1993,
at C1, C18. Floating rate preferred stock, on the other hand, is stock with floating or
variable dividends. The applicable rate of the dividend is determined by reference to
an external measure such as treasury bills or commercial paper rates. COOPERS &
LYBRAND, A GUIDE TO FINANCImA. I VEsTENTs 51-63 (1987). Meanwhile, convertible
exchangeable preferred stock gives the holder a right to convert a share of preferred
stock into a share of common stock and gives the issuer the right to force an exchange
of the preferred stock for the issuer's convertible debentures. See Henry T.C. Hu, New
Financial Products, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of
Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1273, 1294 (1991) [hereinafter Hu, Shareholder
Welfare].
The list of choices investors have in choosing an equity instrument will presuma-
bly continue to grow as firms innovate, and participants merge conventional forms of
"straight nest" and equity securities to satisfy the changing needs of investors and
firms alike. New equity products include: debt with premium puts, debt payable in
common stock, and debt with equity warrants. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra.
8 As new financial products are continually introduced, a shift will take place
from the traditional focus on optimal levels of "debtP relative to "equity," and corpora-
tions will begin to examine and manipulate the specific characteristics of each debt
and equity instrument. See Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 7, at 1298-99; ARE
THE DIsTINcTIONs BrwEEN DEBT AND EQU1TY DISAPPEARING? (R. KoPcKE & E.
RosENGRmN eds. 1989). Common stock is a prime example of this process as firms
have broken the stock down into its economic components, realizing that the optimal
division of voting rights will not always involve a traditional one-share-one-vote split.
Until stopped by regulatory and marketing difficulties, investment bankers
who had developed "unbundled stock units" sought to separate an issuers
1994]
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more than one class of common stock, so that one class carries
disproportionate voting rights and sometimes different dividend
rights.' Whenever a firm issues multiple classes of common stock,
one of which possesses disparate voting rights, the firm is said to
possess a dual-class capital structure.
Whether a corporation decides to issue a single set of pre-
ferred and common stock or to adopt a dual-class common stock
structure is an esoteric question that affects not only the firm's
capitalization, but also the firm's corporate governance. Whether
the firm adopts a dual-class structure when the stock originally
goes public' ° or does so through a recapitalization" determines
the extent of change that occurs to the existing shareholder-man-
ager relationship and the policing mechanisms in place to monitor
it. The extent of change is a function of whether shareholders are
disenfranchised (a dual-class recapitalization) or whether the
right to vote is never lost because it was never owned (a dual-class
capitalization).
The disenfranchising nature of dual-class-stock recapitaliza-
tions has caused many to view its use skeptically. 12 This skepti-
outstanding common stock into what was seen as its three economic compo-
nents. Holders of outstanding common stock would have had the opportu-
nity to exchange varying portions of their common shares for a package of
three new securities: a bond, a preferred share, and an equity appreciation
certificate.
Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 7, at 1299.
9 BREA=x & MYERS, supra note 5, at 286. An example of a complicated capital
structure is that of the General Motors Corporation. In 1984, General Motors had
three kinds of common stock: Ordinary Common Stock, Class E Stock, and Class H
Stock. In addition, General Motors had two kinds of preferred stock: E-Series Prefer-
ence Shares and H-Series Preference Shares. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1984 PROxY
STATEMENT/PRosPECTUS (1984). General Motors has since added a class of Preference
Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock or PERCs. See GEN-ERAL MOTORS CORP., 1991
ANNUAL REPORT (1992). For a more in-depth analysis of the General Motors capital
structure, the PERC issue, and some of the fiduciary questions such a capital struc-
ture raises, see Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 7, at 1294-97.
10 "When a company goes public with a disparate voting capital structure, it is
said to have undergone a 'dual-class capitalization.'" Peter N. Flocos, Comment, To-
ward a Liability Rule Approach to the "One Share, One Vote" Controversy: An Epi-
taph For The SEC's Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1761, 1762 n.5 (1990) (citing W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1268 (6th ed. 1988)).
11 "A recapitalization,' however, is a material readjustment in the rights of a cor-
poration's existing capital stock. Hence, when a public company reclassifies its single
class of common stock into two new classes with disparate voting rights, the firm is
said to have undergone a 'dual-class recapitalization.'" Id.
12 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1995). In 1988, the SEC announced the adoption of
Rule 19c-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Exchange Act Release No.
25,891 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,247, at 89,208-09
866 [Vol. 68:863
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cism has spawned regulation of dual class stock which is dispro-
portionate to the commonality of its use.13 However, for the
handful of public firms that find it desirable to change their cur-
rent equity structure to a dual-class system, the restrictions are
real.1 4 When optimal forms of structuring are impeded or prohib-
ited entirely, a firm's structure will be less than optimal and its
overall performance will suffer.5 Much to the same degree that
inefficiencies result when capital markets function imperfectly,
16
defects in a firm's capital structure eventually result in poor deci-
sion making. Profitable projects will go unfunded, capital costs
will rise, and eventually the firm's ultimate competitive posture
will suffer. These misallocations create costs which negatively im-
pact the competitiveness of those firms whose capital structure
(July 7, 1988), [hereinafter Adopting Release]. This rule prohibits the common stock
of a company from being or remaining listed on an exchange if the company issues
securities or takes other actions that would have the effect of nullifying, restricting, or
disparately reducing the per share voting rights of existing common stock sharehold-
ers. Id. An initial public offering of securities, however, is presumed not to be a disen-
franchising action. Id. Rule 19c-4(a)(1). For more on the history of Rule 19c-4, see
infra notes 106-89 and accompanying text (discussing history and present status of
Rule 19c-4).
13 See WIL F. SANDER, SHAREHOLDER VoTiNG ALMANAC 40 (1991). The number of
proposals containing dual-class recapitalization plans that have been put to a share-
holder vote has declined substantially since 1986:
Year Number of Proposals
1986 28
1987 18
1988 06
1989 01
1990 02
Between 1977 and 1987, however, at least 94 firms underwent dual-class recapitaliza-
tions, sixty-seven of which were made after 1982. Over half of these were from firms
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poul-
sen, Dual-Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence,
20 J. FIN. ECON. 129, 130 (1988).
14 See supra note 13.
15 Cf. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure
of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 868 (1993). "The evidence from LBOs,
leveraged restructurings, takeovers, and venture capital firms has demonstrated that
leverage, payout policy, and ownership structure (that is, who owns the firm's securi-
ties) do in fact affect organizational efficiency, cash flow, and therefore value." Id. The
history of corporations has been that firms failing to adapt their governance struc-
tures are ground under by competition. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 13.
See generally OLrVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMiC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
iN AERicAN BusInss (1977).
16 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
10 (AEI Press 1991).
1994]
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would otherwise include dual-class stock. Because such costs are
opportunity costs, they often go unnoticed.1 7
In the context of a publicly held corporation, there is no rea-
son why a shareholder's proportional entitlement to the residual
profits of the corporation must correspond exactly to the share-
holder's proportional voting power."1 If a disproportionate voting
structure is more efficient in financing and managing the corpora-
tion, then if permitted by law, the corporation should adopt such a
structure, rather than the one share, one vote structure. 9 The
value of the vote lost in a recapitalization will simply reappear
through the operation of the corporate governance contract. Simi-
larly, in the case of an initial public offering ("IPO"), the value of
the vote will be discounted and reflected in the price on which the
buyer and seller have agreed. Consequently, in an IPO the
purchasing shareholder suffers no real economic loss.
Some, however, believe that:
[viotes follow the residual interest in the firm, and unless each
element of the residual interest carries an equal voting right,
there will be a needless agency cost of management; that dispro-
portionate voting power will result in less than optimal decision
making, because those with disproportionate voting power will
17 The opportunity cost of a good or course of action is the best alternative that is
given up in order to produce the good or follow the course of action. J. VERNON HEN-
DERSON & WILLIAM POOLE, PRINCIPLES OF MICROEcONOMICs 44 (1991). A dual-class
structure, in some cases, may be the best alternative given up.
18 In the context of the closely held corporation, for example, many states explic-
itly permit classified stock and weighted voting techniques to assure that minority
shareholders will have representation on the board of directors. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 703 (McKinney 1986). Most of the remaining statutes implicitly validate
similar techniques by providing that a corporation may have one or more classes of
stock with voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation. See
CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 375-76 (discussing DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 151(a) (1991)). Additionally, close corporations with major block holders frequently
use voting agreements which are also generally permitted under state law. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (1991). Similar to vote buying, voting agreements (such as
standstill agreements) are not a one-time deal, and thus tend to have a longer dura-
tion. Robert J. Klein, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders'
Franchise Right, 44 STAN. L. REv. 129, 142 (1991). "In a public corporation, a stand-
still agreement is one between different shareholders, or between shareholders and
the corporation, in which the shareholders agree not to increase or decrease their
percentage ownership in the corporation without the consent of the other parties." Id.
at 142 n.78.
19 See Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. Cm. L. Rav. 119, 141 (1987) (discussing benefits of dual-class
stock); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 408-09 (1983).
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not receive shares of the residual gains or losses from new en-
deavors and arrangements commensurate with their control.20
Proponents of this position fail to recognize the versatility and
significance inherent in the voting mechanism itself. It does not
necessarily follow that an unequal relationship between voting
power and residual interest invariably creates larger agency costs
or inefficiencies. Specifically, decreasing the risk associated with
firm-specific capital investing while increasing the incentives for
firm-specific human capital investing may outweigh the values as-
sociated with meaningful outside shareholder voting power.
Moreover, once the parties can isolate the value of the vote from
the underlying share, the process of capital formation becomes
less inhibited. The vote and the value attached to it can be
manipulated to maximize the aggregate value of the firm's securi-
ties.21 Without that ability, firms forego the opportunity to benefit
some shareholders without hurting others. A simple application
of the Coase theorem is illustrative.
Ronald Coase observed that in the absence of transaction costs
the ultimate use of a resource will be determined not by the ini-
tial assignment of property rights between two parties, but
rather by which of two parties can put the resources to its higher-
valued use: The one who values the resource more highly will
have the means and incentive to induce the other party to ex-
change his rights to the resource.22
20 See EASTERBROOK & FISOHEL, supra note 2, at 73. Restrictions on vote buying,
cumulative voting, and the absence of tenure of office are also considered as devices to
assure that the residual claimants have the final say in corporate affairs. Id. at 72-76.
21 See Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and
Majority Rules, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 203, 205 (1988). In addition to a voting right and a
residual claim on the assets of the corporation attached to each share, there is also
what might be termed a "maximization right" affixed to each share of each class of
common stock. See Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 7, at 1287. A maximi.ation
right is defined as a right to expect management to act to maximize each share's
value. Id. While the proliferation of financial products has blurred the distinction be-
tween those securities which offer maximization rights and those that do not, there is
general agreement that securities designated as common stock embody such max-
imization rights. Id.; see also Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in
Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1072 (1983) (discussing
problems associated with agency costs and diversion of assets by controlling share-
holders to detriment of minority shareholders of same class); John C. Carter, The
Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 Wk. & MARY L. REV. 823, 831-41 (1988) (dis-
cussing agency costs).
22 J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1402,
1403 (1992) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1960)).
1994]
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For our purposes, we will assume that dual-class, common-stock
recapitalizations are an unrestricted method of capital structuring
on a given exchange. Since the vote attached to the share under
such a regulatory framework is not restricted in terms of ex-
changeability, the ultimate destination of the rights attached to
the vote will be determined by the initial arrangements made be-
tween the parties when the stock is first offered publicly, and then
later upon exchanges between existing shareholders, in which the
right to vote shifts to those who value it most. Those who value
voting rights the most are typically families or controlling share-
holder groups. Such groups may eventually bargain with other
shareholders in order to make an exchange in which capital is
raised without diluting their present control positions. 28
Bargaining between shareholders is an ongoing process that
firms can modify or reverse. Specifically, firms may decide to shift
from a dual-class structure to a single-class structure at a later
date,24 or simply choose to alter the dual-class structure currently
23 Early Delaware courts held that vote buying was illegal per se. See Macht v.
Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937) ("To allow voting
rights that are bought to be exercised is against public policy, and would be in fraud of
the other stockholders."). But see Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982)
(holding agreement involving transfer of stock voting rights is not illegal per se).
It is generally believed that, where vote buying is permitted, each side must bar-
gain in determining a reasonable value at which to consummate the exchange. See
Flocos, supra note 10, at 1773-74. See generally Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying
and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RIS. L. REv. 776 (1979) (suggesting vote buying
should be permitted).
24 For example, until 1993, the Magma Copper Company certificate of incorpora-
tion authorized 100 million shares of Class A and Class B common stock. The Class A
stock had one vote per share and the Class B had four votes per share. The certificate
of Incorporation essentially provided that, if a Class B holder transferred shares to a
transferee who, following such transfer, directly or indirectly owned 10 percent of
Magma's outstanding voting stock, then such shares of Class B stock would automati-
cally convert to Class A. This would result in a serious dilution in the transferee's
voting power. The certificate of incorporation additionally provided that the Class A
holders would be entitled to elect one board director if they constituted 20 to 40 per-
cent of the outstanding voting common stock, or two directors if they constituted more
than 40 percent of the outstanding voting common stock. At the time this structure
was devised, no Class A shares had been issued. Through a series of events, Magma
shifted from the dual-class structure, originally designed to allow the Newmont Min-
ing Corporation to retain a controlling interest, to a single-class structure, which
transformed the preferred stock as well as the Class B stock into a single class of
common stock. The stated purpose of the restructuring was to streamline and sim-
plify Magma's capital structure and was triggered by Newmont Mining's subsequent
divestment of its interest in Magma. The dual-class structure was originally imple-
mented when Newmont Mining Co., a controlling shareholder in Magma Copper Co.,
decided prior to a stock distribution that it wished to retain a controlling interest
870 [Vol. 68:863
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in place. 25 Thus, conclusions that dual-class structures constitute
a permanent alteration in a firm's ownership structure, and have
permanent implications on the corporate governance of the firm,
are erroneous.
26
"In jurisprudence, political theory, and economics, voluntary
exchange is generally regarded to be a good thing,"27 because, as
the Coase theorem implies, bargaining and the legal rules enacted
to facilitate it reduce transaction costs. 28 When an exchange has a
after the distribution. When Newmont ultimately sold its shares in Magma, there
was no longer any reason for the dual-class structure. Eighty-seven percent of the
shareholders voted to consolidate the firm's preferred stock and two classes of com-
mon stock into one class of common stock. See MAGMA CoPPR Co., 1993 Foimi 10-K
5-7 (1993). A second firm, The Signal Apparel Company, Inc., recently filed a proxy
statement indicating its desire to recapitalize from a dual-class structure to a single-
class structure primarily because of the changes that have taken place in the corpo-
rate control markets. TuE SIGNAL APPAREL COMPANY INC., 1993 PRoxy STATEMENT
(1993).
25 In 1991, the Nichols Institute recapitalized an existing dual-class structure, in
which one of the two classes traded on the American Stock Exchange, into a three-
class structure in which two classes of stock became publicly traded. See NICHOLS
INSTITUTE, 1990 PRoxY STATEMENT 13 (1990).
26 Some commentators support mandatory inclusions of "sunset provisions" when
a firm undergoes a recapitalization. Peter L. Simmons, Note, Dual Class Recapitaliza-
tion and Shareholder Voting Rights, 87 COLUmi. L. Rav. 106, 114 n.49 (1987). These
provisions would limit the duration of the disenfranchisement and are similar to pro-
visions commonly contracted for by venture capitalists in early stage financing as a
means of eliminating the permanency associated with dual-class stock. Id. These pro-
visions may be unhelpful because, "[sluch provisions... would not be implemented in
practice [and]... [tihe corporation would incur substantial costs in seeking triennial
approval [for renewing the dual-class structure]." Id. In addition, sunset provisions,
"expose [the corporation] to the risk of a hostile takeover at the time of the 'sunset' by
a bidder who seeks to take advantage of the company's temporary vulnerability." Id.
An aversion to bidders is thought to be the reasoning behind the introduction of dual-
class stock into the capital structure of a firm; thus, sunset provisions should be seen
as a direct affront to the rationale for most dual-class plans.
27 Sidak, supra note 22, at 1403. See generally ROBERT Noziox, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 84-87 (1974) (discussing voluntary exchange in political context); ICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 356-58 (1990) (discussing volun-
tary exchange in jurisprudential context); Robert Wilson, Exchange, in 1 THE NEw
PALGRAVE: DICnONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 808 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1992) (dis-
cussing voluntary exchange in economic context). Some commentators seem to indi-
cate that they believe the exchange is sometimes coerced, rather than voluntary. See
infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (discussing dual-class structure as hostile-
takeover defense).
28 See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER & THois S. ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 101
(1988); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982). Transac-
tion costs have been defined as the "costs of running the economic system" and are
distinguished from production costs. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 18. Transac-
tion costs can be further broken down into ex ante and expost types. Ex ante transac-
tion costs are the costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement. Ex
1994]
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more restrictive dual-class regulatory scheme, it imposes unneces-
sary transaction costs on those firms intending to recapitalize, be-
cause such firms are forced to delist and move to an exchange with
a more facilitative standard.2 9 Restrictions also impose societal
costs since they discourage individuals from investing capital and
energy in projects that they would have invested in if such restric-
tions had not existed. 0 Moreover, if the law was designed to facil-
itate bargaining, the property rights exchange would result in
ownership structures that were Pareto-superior improvements in
the management of the firm's productive resources.31 Some share-
holders in the firm could be made better off without making others
worse off.
3 2
post transaction costs, on the other hand, take several forms; for instance, the setup
and running costs associated with the governance structures to which disputes are
referred, and the haggling costs incurred if the bilateral efforts are made to correct ex
post misalignments. Id.
29 Others believe separating the vote from the underlying share creates an addi-
tional, unnecessary agency cost. EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 2, at 74. Be-
cause the American Stock Exchange currently allows firms to undergo a dual-class
recapitalization, the transaction costs involved in a delisting are not thought to be
extreme.
30 Entrepreneurs that are not assured of collecting on their firm-specific human
and capital investments because of governance structure limitations will hesitate to
make these investments. Rules that limit the opportunities for flexible adjustment of
governance structures to accommodate their needs weaken the incentives for entre-
preneurs to make personal time and energy investment. As such, society as a whole
loses.
31 An allocation of resources is Pareto-superior if it benefits one party without
subsequently making another worse off. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNomCnc ANALYSIS OF
LAw 12 (3d ed. 1986). See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRiN-
crPLEs AND EXTENSIONS 476 (1989); VILFREDO PARETO, MANuALE Di ECONOMICA POLIT-
ICA (1909). An alternative, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, also called potential Pareto-supe-
riority, asserts that a transaction is beneficial, even if some individuals are made
worse off, so long as those who benefit gain enough to compensate the losses sustained
by others. POSNER, supra, at 12-13. Whether they actually compensate for such losses
is of no consequence. Id. at 13. Because the conditions for Pareto-superiority are al-
most never satisfied in the real world, the operating definition of efficiency in econom-
ics is generally not Pareto-superiority, but Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Id. As such, it is
also a less controversial notion of efficiency. Id. at 13-14. See RONALD J. GILSON, THE
LAw AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 507 n.6 (1986). See generally B. Lock-
wood, Pareto Efficiency, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMCS 811
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
32 Cf Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 7, at 1276-86 (discussing corporations'
pecuniary goals). There are three primary conceptions of the basic pecuniary goals of
the corporation. Id. The first, and traditional conception, is based on the premise that
what is good for the corporation is good for the shareholders. Id. at 1279. Conse-
quently, if corporate welfare is furthered, such as through increased earnings per
share, shareholder welfare is presumed to be furthered as well. Id. Under the second
conception, shareholder wealth maximization is sought directly, rather than as a by-
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However, the support necessary to encourage efficient owner-
ship structuring has not been forthcoming. Courts, regulators,
and federal and state legislatures have placed various impedi-
ments on leveraged buyouts and restructurings, takeovers, and
equity restructurings. On the premise of corporate democracy 3
and representations of residual theory,3 4 the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the National Association of Securities
product of corporate welfare, by pursuing those actions which increase shareholder
dividends and stock prices. Id. at 1282. There is no focus on measures of corporate
performance and no concern for the corporation independent of the welfare of the
stockholders. Id. The third conception calls for managers to maximize what the share-
holders' wealth would be, if the stock market were perfectly omniscient and rational.
Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 7, at 1285. Under this theory, managers are
asked to ignore blissfully the irrationality and informational problems associated
with real stock markets and to decide corporate matters regardless of possible ad-
verse stock market reaction. Id. at 1285-86. The efficiency analysis for dual-class
stock and its use in ownership structuring holds true through the three above-men-
tioned pecuniary goal systems historically applied to the corporation. As Henry Hu
has noted, however, "[t]he simple cumulation of different types of interstitial products
and multiple classes of securities with maximization rights as well as the increasing
part they play in corporate capital structures now put far heavier burdens on a weak
tripartite theoretical structure." Id. at 1293; see id. at 1278-86 (extensively explaning
these conceptions as goals of modern publicly held corporations).
33 See Timothy K. O'Neil, Comment, Rule 19c-4: The SEC Goes Too Far in Adopt-
ing a One Share, One Vote Rule, 83 Nw. U. L. Ray. 1057, 1059-60 (1989). Proponents
assert that fairness and efficiency demand that the voting mechanism of shareholders
resemble the voting mechanism of the democratic political system whereby each citi-
zen is entitled to one vote. Id.; see Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A
Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUm. L. REv. 979 (1989)
(discussing impact of Rule 19c-4); Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder
Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
687, 721-24 (1986) (discussing one share, one vote controversy); cf David L. Ratner,
The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One
Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1970) (noting judicial adherence to one
share, one vote rule because of democratic tradition).
34 EASTERBROOK & FlscHEL, supra note 2, at 67.
[S]hareholders are the residual claimants to the firm's income. Creditors
have fixed claims, and employees generally negotiate compensation sched-
ules in advance of performance. The gains and losses from abnormally good
or bad performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand last
in line. As the residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incen-
tives (collective choice problems notwithstanding) to make discretionary de-
cisions. Shareholders are the only voluntary constituency whose relationship
with the firm does not generally come up for periodic renewal.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 304.
Labor suppliers in the intermediate product market, debt-holders, and consumers
can negotiate the terms of their relationship when contracts are renewed. Id. Some-
times, however, the contract between shareholders and the firm is adjusted by mak-
ing changes in the corporate charter. Id. at 305 n.9. But these changes are generally
initiated by management. Id.
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Dealers ("NASD") have similarly obstructed transactions in voting
rights. Y Currently, two of the three major exchanges have listing
standards that reflect almost a complete one-share, one-vote stan-
dard.36 The restrictive listing standard of the NASD (for NMS se-
curities)37 reversed a long-standing policy of unrestrictive regula-
tion of dual-class stock. Only the American Stock Exchange
("AMEX") has listing standards in place that expressly allow for
disparate voting recapitalizations, although prohibitory uniform-
ity exists in regard to nonvoting common-stock issues.
This Article critically analyzes the current policy positions of
the SEC, the NYSE, and the NASD (for NMS securities), which
administers the National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
matic Quotation System ("NASDAQ"). In addition, some of the
smaller self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") have recently ac-
cepted the restrictive dual-class policy proposal advocated by the
North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA")
as their own.39 For example, the Pacific Stock Exchange has sub-
mitted a proposal to the SEC with the intention of implementing
listing standards that follow the position of NASAA. Thus, my cri-
tique also includes the Pacific Stock Exchange. Relying on data
that indicate what type of firms are likely to utilize dual-class
common stock, I postulate that the NASDAQ (for NMS securities),
the smaller SROs, and the state securities administrators should
adopt or accept the dual-class standard recently proposed by the
35 Two SEC commissioners have asserted: "Voting rights are fundamental
rights." Letter from Mary L. Schapiro and Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioners, SEC,
to James R. Jones, Chairman, American Stock Exchange (Apr. 9, 1991) (on file with
the author).
36 See Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 982. The NYSE has chosen not to strictly
enforce its standard, opting instead for a case-by-case system of review. It should be
noted that while one share, one vote gives shareholders the ability to monitor manag-
ers in direct proportion to their stake in the venture, it has been recognized that a one
share, one vote rule does not assign effective votes in direct proportion to shares, since
under a majority rule someone with 50.1 percent of the shares has 100 percent of the
effective voting power. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One
Vote and the Market For Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 175, 176 n.1 (1988).
37 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURTEs DALERS, NASDAQ FACT BooK AND
COMPANY DIRECTORY 4 (1993). NMS securities are traded on the National Market Sys-
tem of the NASDAQ. Id. at 38. These securities are regulated differently than NAS-
DAQ Small Cap Securities. Id. at 143.
38 See Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 979.
39 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-
4, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 565, 589 (1991). NASAA has persistently advocated prohibiting
the sale of nonvoting and lesser-voting stock. Id. NASAA opposed Rule 19c-4 because
it did not adopt a strict one share, one vote position. Id. at 589 n.105.
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AMEX4" or the principles contained in the draft form of the NYSE
proposal as their own.41 The recommendations that the AMEX
and NYSE proposals set forth are further supported by recent de-
velopments in corporate finance and corporate governance. For
instance, the increasing activism of institutional investors in mat-
ters of corporate governance and the increasingly innovative
changes regarding debt and equity instruments have made reeval-
uation a necessity.42
40 See RULE 19c-4, PROPOSED RULE CHANGE BY AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, FILE
No. SR-AMEX-91-13 (June 11, 1991) [hereinafter AMEX 1991 Proposal].
41 AMEX Files Proposal With SEC on Disparate Shareholder Voting Rights, 23
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 906 (June 14, 1991). Under the AMEX proposal, a corpora-
tion could issue multiple classes of stock with disparate voting rights provided it ob-
tained either a two-thirds approval of all shareholders or a majority vote of all share-
holders unaffiliated with management or other controlling shareholders. Id.
42 See WILiAi J. BAUIOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TowARD CoMIPETOrroN IN LocAL
TELEPHONY 130-35 (1994); J. Gregory Sidak, Review Essay, Telecommunications in
Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1216-22 (1993). Deregulation in certain industries may
force dual-stock reclassification as well. See, e.g., BAUMOL & SmAx, supra; Sidak,
supra. For example, the seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) tradition-
ally have been prohibited from unregulated markets to avoid predatory pricing and
cross-subsidization. BAUMOL & SiDAm, supra, at 130-31; Sidak, supra, at 1216. Preda-
tory pricing will allegedly result if a rate-regulated monopolist enters a competitive
market because it will underprice its rivals and drive them out of business. Sidak,
supra, at 1216. Cross-subsidization is the predicted result when a RBOC acquires
control of an unregulated firm that manufactures telecommunications equipment.
BAUmOL & SmAK, supra, at 131. The RBOC will be tempted to make expenditures
that would benefit its manufacturing affiliate, but would be at its own expense. Id. If
the regulator is convinced that these expenditures are legitimate costs of the RBOC
activity, then he may permit the RBOC to recover the cost by an increased exercise of
market power. Id.
However, because of the loss of RBOCs' knowledge and services resulting from
the restrictions, a "bifurcation rule" has been proposed. BATJMOL & S1AI, supra, at
132-34; Sidak supra, at 1217-19.
The RBOCs seek to enter adjacent markets themselves, rather than sharing,
through confidential technology-licensing agreements, proprietary informa-
tion with separate firms that are not local exchange carriers. The RBOCs
... argu[e] that control by their management is necessary to exploit fully the
RBOCs telecommunications knowledge. The bifurcation rule permits an
RBOC to enter a currently-prohibited market, but only through a separate,
publicly traded corporation having two classes of stock-one with voting
rights but with a negligible claim to the affiliated corporation's residual net
cash flows, the other with negligible (or no) voting rights but with a claim to
virtually all the affiliate's residual net cash flows. While this capital struc-
ture permits the RBOC to exercise management control over the unregu-
lated affiliate, it still undermines the RBOC's ability to benefit from cross-
subsidization and predation.
BAUmOL & SIAx, supra, at 132-33.
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Part I reviews the concept of dual-class common stock and ex-
plains the forms it may take and the contexts in which it is often
used - recapitalizations and initial public offerings. This section
also includes an analysis of dual-class common stock and its inter-
play with corporate control markets. Part II sets forth a brief his-
tory of shareholder voting rights and focuses on the progression of
the dual-class, common-stock controversy. Part II further surveys
the current condition of regulatory policy among the major ex-
changes. Part III discusses the position taken by those who favor
adopting a minimum voting-rights standard. Special emphasis is
placed on the analysis and conclusions set forth by Professor Ron-
ald J. Gilson.43 Part IV analyzes dual-class stock from both a the-
oretical and empirical perspective and proposes five questions, the
answers to which lend support to a dual-class regulatory frame-
work such as that offered by the new AMEX and the NYSE
proposals.
I. DuAL-CLAss VARIATIONS AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY
ARE USED
A. Dual-Class Mechanisms
A dual-class recapitalization begins with a charter amend-
ment that must be approved (as all charter amendments must be)
by the voting shareholders. Once approved, an assortment of
mechanisms are available to facilitate the voting-rights exchange.
Four methods have commonly been used: exchange offers, special
distributions, voting-right alterations, and new public offerings."
Dual-class common stock that is distributed by way of an IPO, or
through a stock dividend to existing shareholders, is generally not
considered disenfranchising. Thus, its use is viewed less skepti-
cally and will only be discussed briefly. My focus will instead
43 See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 VA. L. Rav. 807 (1987). This article became the basis for many of the
solutions recommended by SEC Rule 19c-4. In particular, the SEC followed Gilson's
conclusion that there is a major conceptual distinction between nonvoting, or low-
voting, shares issued to existing shareholders in exchange for shares already out-
standing and the issuance of such shares in an offering to the world at large. Id.
44 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. Rav. 3, 40-42 (1988) (consisting of basis for
first three methods described in Part H of this article); George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary
Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MJN. L. REV. 865
(1983) (consisting of basis for fourth method descibed in Part II of this article).
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be on "dual-class recapitalizations," which are considered
disenfranchising.
It should also be noted that dual-class charter amendments
sometimes do not call for immediate implementation. Instead,
shareholders provide management with the power to install a
dual-class capital structure at some future date without the need
for further shareholder approval.45 When implementation is
delayed, the dual-class-stock proposal appears closely analogous
to poison pills, a popular and effective antitakeover mechanism. 46
Similarly, management can be granted the right to issue preferred
shares at will with the prerogative to establish the voting rights
when the shares are issued.47 "These so-called 'blank check pre-
ferred' shares allow enormous voting power to be conveyed to
'friendly parties' [or white knights] to prevent existing sharehold-
ers from consolidating power."48  Because of this similarity and
the general effects dual-class stock has on the governance rela-
tionships in firms, dual-class-stock use is commonly associated
with corporate takeovers and takeover defenses. Thus, this sec-
tion will also discuss relevant corporate control implications
where appropriate.
45 SANDER, supra note 13, at 4. These provisions occcured with unprecedented
frequency during 1986 when many companies rushed to get authorization in anticipa-
tion of Rule 19c-4.
46 The poison pill enables incumbent boards to thwart a potential acquirer's di-
rect appeal to the shareholders through a tender offer by issuing shareholders certain
rights to acquire additional company stock at a significant discount to its market
value. SANDER, supra note 13, at 4. Poison pills are implemented without a share-
holder vote. Id. The rights are triggered when a party acquires or offers to acquire a
significant block, usually 20 to 30 percent, of the company's stock. Id. All sharehold-
ers, except the party causing the triggering event, are entitled to exercise these
rights. Id. The effect is to dilute massively the potential acquiror's interest and
greatly increase the bidder's acquisition costs. Id.; see also Jeffrey Macintosh, The
Poison Pill: A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian Shareholders, 15 CAN. Bus. L.J. 276
(1989) (providing general discussion and critique of those plans); see Klein, supra note
18, at 137 (discussing use of poison pills). Poison pills are often called "Preferred
Share Purchase Rights Plans" and their use as an antitakeover deterrent has been
upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court as a legitimate exercise of business judge-
ment. See Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (involving plan
adopted as defensive mechanism to ward off possible future advances, not in reaction
to specific threat).
47 ICHAEL T. JACOBS, BREAx THE W LL STREET RuLE 137 (1993).
48 Id.
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1. Exchange Offers
For a recapitalization to be implemented by way of the ex-
change-offer method, the firm's voting shareholders must first au-
thorize a new class of common stock carrying several votes per
share. 49 Each shareholder then becomes free to accept or reject
the offer on a share by share basis. This is accomplished by voting
to exchange existing common shares for low-vote shares (often
called Class B) or by electing to keep the preexisting shares now
designated as supervoting shares (often called Class A).5 0 The ex-
change can also be structured so that shareholders must opt into
the higher voting shares.5 ' Often the supervoting stock receives
reduced dividend rights in return for the increase in voting rights,
or the low-vote shares simply receive an increased dividend
right.52 Generally, the supervoting shares are nontransferable
unless the transfer involves family members or trusts of the bene-
ficial owner. 53 Impermissible transfers result in a conversion of
supervoting shares into ordinary voting shares. 4
Ordinarily, the supervoting common stock votes with the low-
vote common shares in traditional matters that come before the
shareholders, such as a merger, a sale of substantially all the as-
sets, charter amendments, and director elections.55 Exchange of-
fers, however, may also be structured so that certain specified
events may only be voted on by the class of shareholders holding
either low-vote Class B or high-vote Class A shares. Such provi-
sions may take the place of increased dividend rights or simply
serve to lower the dividend increase incrementally.
49 Gordon, supra note 44, at 40. A ten to one ceiling in voting rights disparity has
been frequently used in modem day dual-class transactions. Id.
50 See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 572; Simmons, supra note 26, at 110-11.
51 See Letter from Eli Broad, Chairman of the Board, Kaufinan and Broad, Inc. to
Shareholders of Kaufinan and Broad, Inc. (June 19, 1985) (on file with the author).
52 See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 573.
53 Id. at 572.
54 Gordon, supra note 44, at 40 n.131. It has been noted that because of the non-
transferability of the super-voting shares, agency costs are kept at a minimum be-
cause only those who invest the capital necessary to acquire a dominant position in
the corporation have a right to the control the corporation. Flocos, supra note 10, at
1798; see Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979). Others hold
that agency costs rise because dual-class stock allows supervoting control sharehold-
ers to extract control rents from the firm's cash flows rather than using it to increase
the value of the firm, and thus increase the value of all the common shares. See
Flocos, supra note 10, at 1798.
55 Cf 1 GEORGE D. HoPuSTsN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE § 126 (1959)
(discussing voting powers of shareholders).
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For example, the E.W. Scripps Company implemented a capi-
tal structure that included two classes of common stock, one of
which (Class A) is entitled to vote only on matters required by Del-
aware law, and can only elect the greater of three or one-third of
the directors of the company. 6 Other matters are voted on only
by the shareholders who hold the Class B stock, which in this in-
stance constitute the high-voting shares.57 Both classes of stock
are held primarily by The Edward W. Scripps Trust.5
Incentives to exchange stock may also be provided by firms to
holders of existing stock. For example, the exchange offer may
designate an exchange ratio greater than one-to-one; that is, one
share of supervoting stock may be worth 1.1 shares of limited vot-
ing stock.5 9 In fact, various types of incentives can be included in
the dual-class mechanisms as well, tailoring each restructuring to
the specifics required by the parties involved.60 These incentives
56 THE E.W. ScmPps COMPA-Y, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT F-27 (1993).
57 Id.
58 At the end of 1992, The Edward W. Scripps Trust owned 67.6 percent of the
Class A common and 79.5 percent of the common voting stock of the company. Id.
Another example is supplied by the Fedders Corporation, which has a dual-class
structure that includes Class B stock entitling holders to ten votes per share in the
election of directors if more than 15 percent of the shares of common stock outstand-
ing on the record date are beneficially owned by a person or a group of persons acting
in concert, or if a nomination to the board is made by a person or group of persons
other than the board of directors. Tfm FEDDFmS CoRPoRAToN, 1990 PRoxy STATEmErr
1 (1990). The Class B stock has one vote in all other matters. While there is no estab-
lished public trading market for the Class B stock, the Class A stock is listed on the
NYSE and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. TH FEDDERS CORPORMATON, 1992 AN-
NUAL REPORT 12 (1992). The Fedders dual class structure also includes a provision
requiring the holders of Class A and Class B stock to vote together as a single class on
all matters except those involving business combinations, additional issuances of
Class B stock made in connection with stock splits and dividends, and any amend-
ments to the certificate of incorporation. Id. As per corporate distributions, the Class
B stock is entitled to dividends 11.11 percent lower than those declared on the ex-
isting common stock. Id. The end goal of the Fedders dual class structure is that the
Fedders family, holders of 21.12 percent of the existing common stock, receive exclu-
sive post recapitalization veto power over proposed business combinations and other
specified transactions.
59 Simmons, supra note 26, at 111 n.32.
60 Id. A company could reclassify the old common shares as an equal number of
Class A and B stock and require the stockholder to opt out of Class B. Id. Alterna-
tively, a company could restrict the voting power of shares until they have been
owned continuously for a specified period of time. Id. A company could also offer a
premium to those who relinquish their voting shares immediately. Id at 111 n.33.
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often compel observers to view the initial shareholder vote on the
recapitalization as coercive.6 1
Exchange offers became increasingly popular after 1984,
when they accounted for 46% of the recapitalizations in one sam-
ple, as compared with only 18% from 1976 to 1984.62 Because of
the disenfranchising effects associated with exchange-offer recapi-
talizations, however, SEC Rule 19c-4 was adopted to prohibit re-
capitalizations of this type.63
2. Special Distributions
When the firm structures the recapitalization as a special dis-
tribution, a charter amendment approved by the shareholders
starts the process.64 Special distribution supervoting stock will,
however, generally receive the same dividend rights as the low-
vote common stock. This marks a significant difference from the
exchange-offer recapitalization discussed above. Special distribu-
tion recapitalizations also do not require any unusual shareholder
decision making (other than ordinary decisions to buy, hold, or
sell) once the two classes of common stock are authorized. The
new common shares are simply distributed to the common share-
holders on a one-for-one ratio.65 As such, the distribution has no
immediate effect on the voting relationships within the entity.66
The potential for change lies within the transfer limitations
placed on the stock.6 7 The concentration of voting power begins as
shareholders dispose of supervoting shares because selling vio-
lates the transferability restrictions attached to each share; thus,
upon sale, the supervoting stock automatically converts into ordi-
nary common stock. Over time, as public investors adjust their
61 See Adopting Release, supra note 12. But see Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier,
646 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that reclassification plan that presents
"difficult choices" is not necessarily "inequitable").
62 Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 13.
63 Id.; see O'Neil, supra note 33, at 1058 n.7. SEC Rule 19c-4 prohibits the "issu-
ance of disparate voting right stocks pursuant to an exchange offer... structured as a
'one time opportunity to receive less than full voting rights stock in exchange for
shares of the existing class of common stock.'" See generally infra notes 106-89 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule 19c-4 and historical context in which Rule 19c-4
was proposed).
64 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 41.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 41-42.
67 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 572-73.
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portfolios by selling out of the company, the number of supervot-
ing shares held by non-insiders falls.68
3. Voting Rights Alterations
Under a plan to alter voting rights, two classes of stock each
acquire a designation based on the length of time the shares are
held - "long term" or "short term." Long-term shares are defined
as those acquired before the date the charter amendment is ap-
proved and held continuously thereafter, or shares subsequently
purchased and held for a designated period of time, typically forty-
eight months.69 All other shares are considered short term.70
Both long-term and short-term shares participate equally in divi-
dend distributions. Transfers that violate any stated transferabil-
ity restrictions convert a long-term designation to short term,
thereby divesting shares of their supervoting rights.71 Thus,
rather than an instantaneous transfer of voting power occuring on
the date of the amendment, the transfer occurs gradually.
This technique is unique, however, in that shareholders who
do purchase after the amendment are not forever prohibited from
owning supervoting shares.72 Rather, shareholders need only
purchase and subsequently hold shares for the designated time
period to obtain the high-vote designation.7" As such, the voting
rights attached to shares shift back and forth as shares are
bought, sold, and held.74 Because potential suitors must wait for a
prescribed period of time before their stock attains supervoting
status, they must either acquire an extremely large number of the
outstanding low-vote shares to gain control 5 or wait the length of
time required to procure the supervote designation.76 Although
68 Id.; see Gordon, supra note 44, at 41-42 (reviewing special distribution
method).
69 Gordon, supra note 44, at 42.
70 Cf id. (defining "long-term" shares)
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 42.
75 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 574.
76 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 42. Because such shares only have meaningful
voting rights after they have been held for the stated period of time, it seems that
time based dual class plans may raise some interesting issues under the Williams
Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988). For instance, when
does a shareholder meet the 5 percent threshold that triggers disclosure obligations?
See id. § 78m(d). In addition, commentators and the D.C. Circuit Court have identi-
fied language contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as harboring potential
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this method is not as effective in avoiding hostile takeovers as the
exchange-offer or special-distribution recapitalizations, this delay
itself is a serious deterrent.
Plans to alter voting rights have been introduced in a multi-
plicity of formats, often implemented when the firm initially goes
public. For example, Roper Industries, Inc., adopted a dual class
capitalization whereby the new limited voting shares sold to the
public (characterized as "phased-voting common") were entitled to
one vote per share for four years, after which the voting rights
would increase to five votes per share. 7 Those holding Roper
stock prior to the new offering were immediately vested with five
votes per share, thus conferring control to insiders for at least the
four-year period immediately following the initial public
offering.7 8
Rule 19c-4 expressly prohibited any dual-class transactions
under which shares acquire additional voting rights if held for
particular periods of time.
4. New Public Offerings
A public company that decides to raise capital by using dual
class common stock can simply issue a new class of common stock
with limited voting rights, rather than recapitalize. As long as the
characteristics of the shares are properly disclosed and any rele-
vant preemptive rights are honored, the issue is unexception-
able.79 Professor Dent explains:
Potential investors can appraise the new stock as well as any
other; they are no more likely to pay more than the stock merits
than they would be in any other case. Nor would existing share-
holders be injured. If they feel that the offering price of the new
stock is too low, they can protect themselves by buying some of it,
just as they could with a new issue of preferred stock or deben-
tures... Management has no reason to offer the new stock to
justifications for SEC regulation of dual-class transactions. See, e.g., Roberta S.
Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting
Rights, 36 CATH. U. L. RaV. 809 (1987); Seligman, supra note 33, at 717; Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d. 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
77 Ready for Trouble, MERGERS AND AcQurIsiONS, May/June 1993, at 38.
78 Id.
79 Seligman, supra note 33, at 741. This is the most popular method. Of the 87
firms who announced the creation of dual-class-common stock in the period 1976
through May of 1987, this method accounted for 53 of the issues, followed by 34 by
exchange offer, and 8 based on length of time or voting rights alteration. Jarrell &
Poulsen, supra note 13, at 135.
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the public at an inadequate price or to use the new issue to injure
the corporation .... Management would [only] have to be pre-
vented from allotting itself a disproportionate share of the new
stock at an inadequate price.... .8o
Similarly, a company can simply create voting and nonvoting
shares rather than accord superior voting rights to one class, un-
less state law requires that at least one vote be attached to each
share.s ' This method of positioning nonvoting stock into public
hands was permitted under Rule 19c-4 but is disallowed by the
exchanges, the smaller SROs, and state securities administrators
because of the nonvoting designation.
5. Initial Public Offerings
Initial public offerings, whereby common stock with limited
voting rights is initially issued to the public or reissued after a
privatizing transaction such as a leveraged buyout, are the chief
mechanisms by which dual-class common stock ends up in the
hands of the general public. For example, the following companies
have recently gone public with two classes of common stock:
Ampex Inc., Automotive Industries Holding, Burlington Indus-
tries, Cone Mills, Finish Line, [Nextel (formerly, Fleet Call)],
Granite Broadcasting, Infinity Broadcasting, International Fam-
ily Entertainment, John Nuveen, Kemet Corp., Lida Inc.,
Meadowbrook Rehabilitation Group, Petroleum Heat & Power,
Quantum Restaurant Group, Reliance Electric, RHI Entertain-
ment, Saga Communications, Scholastic Inc., and Univeral Hos-
pital Services. 2
Rule 19c-4 was based on the processes that created dual-class
stock and not necessarily the end result.83 Specifically, the SEC
80 Seligman, supra note 33, at 741.
81 Simmons, supra note 26, at 111 n.32. Of note is a recent plan, adopted by
Cannon Express (NASDAQ: CAN=), in which a dual-class plan was enacted through a
two-for-one split, which established a new class of non-voting stock. Cannon Express
Board of Directors Approves Dual Class Stock Plan, PR Newswire, Oct. 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, PRNEWS File. Under the plan, the company's
existing common stock was reclassified as Class A voting stock, and one share of non-
voting Class B stock was distributed for each share of voting stock outstanding. Id.
The plan received the approval of the NASDAQ primarily because the plan does not
change the relative voting power or equity position of any existing shareholder. Id.
82 See Ready for Trouble, supra note 77, at 38.
83 See Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 987. But see Flocos, supra note 10, at 1787
(a[Tlhe actual thrust of Rule 19c-4 involves effects, not process, and that with a few
narrow exceptions, all processes that create dual class stock are prohibited. Process is
in fact ultimately irrelevant in Rule 19c-4. ").
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believed that the IPO process was not disenfranchising and chose
not to place restrictions on dual-class-stock capitalizations.8 4 The
SEC instead focused on recapitalizations that actually changed
the status of current shareholders.' 5 Historically, the NYSE list-
ing standards have similarly exempted initial public offerings of
limited-voting-rights common stock from the normal prohibitions
associated with its use, although, as mentioned earlier, a complete
ban on common stock with nonvoting rights has been continually
enforced, regardless of the offering process involved.8 6
Putting the dual-class structure in place at the outset allows
founding entrepreneurs or family members access to the equity
markets without diluting control. The penalty is a lower per-
share value for the issued shares than would otherwise be the case
if votes were included, thus, the newly public company suffers an
increase in its cost of capital. Putting the dual-class format in
place at this stage also allows for an effective takeover defense
that negates potential overtures from the corporate control mar-
kets and the potential control premiums that can follow.
Yet, regardless of the method by which a firm implements a
dual class structure, dual-class use is consistently associated with
the broader category of takeover defenses. The connection is cer-
tainly not inappropriate. As such, this Article shall include a
summary of dual-class use and its association with the market for
corporate control.
B. Dual-Class Stock and the Market for Corporate Control
Firms constantly evolve as "they change their structure-set-
ting up new divisions, entering or leaving markets, buying or sell-
ing plants, acquiring or being acquired, increasing or decreasing
leverage, going public or private, selling stock or buying it back
(generally or from particular investors) ... changes [we call] cor-
84 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89, 218-19 (claiming Rule 19c-4 focuses
only on process by which disparate voting plans are created and their effect on ex-
isting shareholders).
85 See Adopting Release, supra note 12.
86 See Gilson, supra note 43, at 808 n.3.
[Vol. 68:863
DUAL-CLASS STOCK
porate-control transactions."87 At the same time, the larger corpo-
rate control market also evolves. 8
8
The influence that corporate-control transactions have on
agency costs and efficiencies is widely known. 89 Specifically, if su-
perior managers obtain control of a firm's assets, or if the share-
holders alter the incentive structure of existing managers, effi-
87 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 109. Shareholder voting power can
be aggregated into a control block through a purchase of shares by a bidder, who
thereby acquires a sufficient economic interest in the firm to make active monitoring
worthwhile. If the buyer improves the firm through displacement or other change in
management, it reaps a benefit as the stock price rises to reflect the improvement.
This is the so-called market for corporate control. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIB-
sTEiN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CoNsTrrUTioN 12 (1994). This market is associated
with large benefits to shareholders and firms alike. Merged firms often show signifi-
cant improvements in asset production relative to their industries which result in
higher operating cash flows. Additionally, mergers usually do not lead to cuts in long-
term capital or research and development expenditures. There is also a positive rela-
tion between postmerger increases in operating cash flow and abnormal stock returns
at merger announcements, indicating that expectations of economic improvement un-
derlie the equity revaluations of the merging companies. Paul M. Healy et al., Does
Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers? 31 J. FiN. ECON. 135, 137 (1992).
88 The evolution is inevitable because the control market is dominated by forces
that are financial (for example, the ratio of value given firms in the marketplace in
comparison to book value) and legal (for example, the receptivity of lawmakers-both
judicially and legislatively, to takeover activity and innovation), and is chiefly defined
by the creativity of the participants because advances in finance theory and takeover
law often define the parameters of whom an acquirer or target will be and how well
targets can be defended. Each of these attributes is itself characterized by instability.
89 While tender offers, merger bids, and proxy contests enable outsiders to obtain
control with the idea of capturing gains from implementing an improved set of invest-
ment and financing decisions, this does not mean that all corporate control transac-
tions produce gains. Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value of Differential Voting
Rights in Closely Held Corporations, 57 J. Bus. 443 (1984). As Easterbrook and Fis-
chel explain,
[Qirganizational changes come with no more guarantees than do new plants
and products. Any innovation may flop. Some changes in control may be
attributable to self-aggrandizement rather than to gains in the use of the
acquired firm's assets. If one firm wants to squander its money away by
paying too much for control, managers have no duty to turn the money away:
an auctioneer does not stop the auction at the "right" price in order to protect
bidders from paying too much.
EA=rERBROOK & FSCHEL, supra note 2, at 115. In a dual-class transaction, sharehold-
ers will not freely give up their vote; they will expect some value in return. The value
can be in the form of dividends, or may be more abstract (for instance, a realization
that the firm needs to initiate more investment of firm-specific human capital than is
currently possible under the existing structural framework). Managers involved in
such an exchange can pay too much, whether it be in the form of dividends, of making
their investment in the firm less liquid, or by raising the cost of capital to the firm and
thus lowering the values attached to the shares they own.
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ciencies as well as decreased agency costs may result." Two
transactions that have been designed to meet these ends are lever-
aged buyouts ("LBOs") and dual-class recapitalizations.
Much of the literature on dual-class recapitalization, how-
ever, has focused on its use as an antitakeover device (generally
thought to be value decreasing) rather than on its use as a method
of achieving Pareto optimalities (value increasing). LBOs, like
dual-class recapitalizations, have been discussed under a similar
perspective.
Such treatment is inappropriate. Kenneth Lehn, Jeffrey Net-
ter, and Annette Poulson explain that "[b]oth [transactions] are
antitakeover devices in that they can be motivated by the threat of
a takeover by outsiders. Similarly, both are a form of takeover,
since both involve a 'takeover' of voting control."91 Each transac-
tion also has more tangible similarities. Each consolidates control
among a relatively small, well-defined group and alters the rela-
tionships within a firm. For our discussion, however, the signifi-
cance of each transaction lies in the real differences that remain
between them. Specifically, the LBO consolidates control in a
small group of individuals who immediately end up with the
residual claims and the voting rights of the firm. By contrast,
dual-class recapitalizations give voting control to a small group of
shareholders by increasing the voting rights attached to their
common shares without simultaneously increasing their claims to
the residual interest.92 In fact, the residual interest held by the
small group often decreases post-recapitalization.9 3 Moreover, de-
pending on the format chosen for implementation, the voting
power shift in the dual-class transaction may not occur for some
time, while the control shift in an LBO is immediate once shares
are tendered.
These differences are important because they have conse-
quences for the manager-agent relationship they are designed to
disrupt. For example, in an LBO, the capital needed to purchase
the outstanding shares comes exclusively from inside sharehold-
90 EASTERBROOK & FISOHEL, supra note 2, at 112.
91 Kenneth Lehn et al., Consolidating Corporate Control: Dual-Class Recapitali-
zations Versus Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 557, 558 (1990).
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Springs Industries Inc. Proceeds with Stock Offering, BusInsss WinE,
Feb. 7, 1989. After a secondary public offering of 2 million shares of Class A common
stock, the Close family percentage ownership in Springs Industries, Inc. was reduced
from 57.7 percent to 46.3 percent. Id.
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ers and a vast array of bondholders. In addition, investment
banks often supply to the acquiring group "bridge loans,"94 mezza-
nine financing, and other senior debt. The inside shareholder
group holds the voting power, while the bondholders receive pro-
tection through explicit promises contained in bond indentures
and possibly equity options in the form of warrants.9 5 As such,
barring any special approval rights bondholders may have specifi-
cally contracted for or equity interests banks may have accepted,
agency costs are virtually nonexistent in a post-LBO firm. In com-
parison, agency costs remain in the dual-class firm after the trans-
action; whether they rise or fall depends on the characteristics
of the individual firm and the attributes of the supervoting
shareholders.
Important capital-structure differentiations are also evident.
While dual-class recapitalizations have no direct effect on lever-
age, LBOs result in dramatic increases in leverage.s6 Increases in
leverage decrease the leveraged firm's decision-making flexibility,
although the decision-making process itself becomes streamlined.
In dual-class firms, the effects are quite different. By reducing
management's accountability to shareholders, high-vote holders
enjoy an increased level of flexibility in their decision making.
94 See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (1987). Bridge loans are loans intended to serve as interim
financing, lasting only until the companies can find more permanent capital. Bridge
loans are funded by commercial bank loans, the sale ofjunk bonds or notes, or the sale
of target company assets. Id. Upon obtaining permanent financing, the borrowers re-
pay the loan. See id. Bridge loans led to billions of dollars of losses in the late 1980s.
See Caren Chesler, Executive Update; Business Abroad, INVESTO'rs Bus. DAILY, Sept.
23, 1993, at 4; Jacqueline Doherty, Bridge Loans, Bane of the '80s, Creep Back, CoRP.
FIN. WK., May, 10, 1993, at 1.
95 EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 2, at 6.
96 Research has found a median increase in leverage from 27 percent to 89 per-
cent of the total capital structure following an LBO. Laurentius Marais et al., Wealth
Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 155, 155-56 (1989). In
addition, debt to equity ratio increases from 0.457 to 5.524 percent (on average) have
been reported. See Kenneth Lebn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stock-
holder Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771 (1989). If shareholders
were entitled to appraisal rights when a dual-class recapitalization is approved by the
board and other shareholders, these results might be different. Regulatory models
that have included an appraisal right remedy have been suggested. See Flocos, supra
note 10, at 1800-14. To date, however, models formulated by regulatory bodies and
exchanges have not included an appraisal remedy. The effect of leverage on share-
holder optimality of corporate investment is controversial. Hu, Corporate Investment,
supra note 5, at 344-46 nn.195-200; see also The Economic Consequences of High Lev-
erage and Stock Market Pressures on Corporate Management: A Roundtable Discus-
sion, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Summer 1990, at 6.
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The decision process becomes constrained solely by the state law's
fiduciary standards and whatever policing power that product and
capital markets can provide. 7
Moreover, the dual-class transaction is more easily executed;
finding the necessary votes to amend the charter is more palpable
to most management teams than raising the large sums of money
needed to purchase the firm's outstanding shares. In addition, be-
cause of the low costs involved (at least in comparison with LBOs),
the dual-class recapitalization is a more practical device when uti-
lized defensively. When implemented at the time of the initial
public offering, the cost to the firm is negligible; the effects are
only reflected in the lower offering price shares fetch when the
value is discounted by the absence of a control premium.
Regardless of what stage of development the corporation is in
when the dual-class structure is adopted, the effectiveness of dual-
class stock as a takeover defense is widely accepted.98 It has been
said that nothing else comes close, notwithstanding state anti-
takeover statutes and poison pills.9 9 While such sentiments are
not entirely correct (for example, some of the time-based plans are
not ultimate bars to hostile advances), the effect of dual-class
stock can be extraordinary. Similarly, the LBO is regarded as an
extraordinarily effective defensive technique.10 0
The effectiveness of the dual-class recapitalization after a hos-
tile advance has been commenced is, however, much weaker. In
fact, if instituted after a hostile advance, the recapitalization is
likely to receive serious scrutiny from the courts. 10 '
97 The inflexibility is a result of the fixed nature of debt obligations.
98 Dual-class recapitalizations concentrate the voting power in a group of insid-
ers, which effectively blocks all hostile takeover attempts. To complete a hostile take-
over, the "bidder must either replace the target's board of directors or merge with the
[target] firm." Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 153, 156 (1988). Both of these avenues are foreclosed by dual-class plans be-
cause the voting rules generally follow one of two patterns which ensure insider veto
power: "(i) plans in which both classes vote together to elect directors, and (ii) plans in
which the classes vote separately to elect different directors. . . ." Id. Therefore, dual
class plans may be the most effective universal antitakeover device ever invented." Id.
Supermajority clauses can further reduce the number of shares required for veto
power. Id.
99 Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 984; see Gordon, supra note 44, at 4 ("[]f man-
agement and its allies hold the voting stock necessary to elect directors, a hostile bid
becomes practically impossible."); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLAcK, THE LAW
AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuIsrrIONS 147 (Foundation Press Supp. 1991).
100 It is also extremely expensive and disruptive by definition.
101 See Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (enjoining issuance without stockholder approval of supervoting pre-
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The dissimilarities surrounding these two transactions do not
end with the structural differences between them. Lehn, Netter,
and Poulson, who studied 380 firms that either adopted a dual-
class recapitalization or went private through an LBO from 1977
through 1987, found certain defining attributes that distinguish
dual-class firms from their leveraged-buyout counterparts and
more traditional targets. 10 2 These attributes include: higher
growth rates both before and after recapitalization; significantly
higher ratios of research-and-development expenditures to sales-
and-advertising expenditures (a result consistent with a growth
hypothesis); significantly higher market-to-book ratios; and signif-
icantly lower pre-transaction tax liabilities. 10 3 The last two of
these are commonly regarded as antithetical to firms traditionally
thought of as being susceptible to leveraged buyouts or takeovers.
Noting the effectiveness of LBOs and dual-class recapitaliza-
tions in shielding a firm from takeover and recognizing the in-
crease in LBOs and dual-class use in the 1980s, commentators
have frequently regarded each as unnecessary evils, chiefly be-
cause of their inherent disenfranchisement. In fact, the availabil-
ity of other defenses that result in less management control is
often held out as evidence that the purpose of the dual-class recap-
italization is management entrenchment. 10 4 In light of this con-
nection, it also has been said that Rule 19c-4 was effectively the
first substantive federal regulation of corporate takeover defenses
because its design precludes those disparate voting-rights plans
that most resemble a takeover defense.
In theory, the takeover rationale is indeed forceful. And while
this observation may be theoretically enticing, the empirical evi-
dence indicates that the emphasis is mistaken because, as previ-
ously mentioned, firms involved in dual-class recapitalizations
ferred stock dividend which would have made it impossible for Unilever to acquire
Richardson-Vicks without consent of Richardson family); Black & Decker Corp. v.
American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. DeL 1988) (shifting control to manage-
ment by defensive recapitalization constituted sale of control of takeover target, thus
treating competing bids unfairly); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In regard to defensive tactics in general, courts have
found defensive tactics invalid when commenced post-takeover. See Edelman v. Frue-
hauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Packer v. Yampol, CA. No. 8432, (Del. Ch.
Apr. 18, 1986) (Jacobs, V.C.); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Simmons, supra note 26, at 117.
102 Lehn et al., supra note 91, at 559.
103 Id.
104 Simmons, supra note 26, at 114.
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generally have characteristics that are not commonly associated
with target companies. As such, other reasons must have been
behind the resurgence of dual-class common stock use in the
1980s. 105
To address those and other issues associated with dual-class
stock, it seems wise to put the subject into some form of historical
context.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VOTING RIGHTS AND DuAL-CLss
COMMON STOCK
Despite persistent calls for a comprehensive federal corporate
statute, or at least federal minimum-standards legislation,106 and
the increasing influence of the SEC on the shareholder-manage-
ment relationship l 7 voting rights are still generally governed by
state law.' 08 While a survey of the specific regulation of voting
rights under state corporate law is beyond the scope of this article,
a brief analysis of the evolution of the one-share, one-vote proposi-
tion is appropriate.109
Neither common law nor the state corporation statutes ad-
dressed the one-share, one-vote issue; corporations were required
to follow a system of per capita voting-one vote per person rather
than one vote per share. 110 The common-law rule eventually be-
came irrelevant as state legislators in the mid-1800s developed
105 This is not to say that dual-class recapitalizations are never used as defensive
measures; in fact, many companies openly admit such purposes. The Signal Apparel
Company, Inc., adopted a plan that was expressly designed and advocated as a way to
promote continuity of management by discouraging LBO's or other forms of hostile,
non-negotiated takeovers of the company. THE SIGNAL APPAREL COMPANY, INc., 1993
PRoxY STATEMENT 1 (1993). But the marked increase in their use cannot be explained
away by simple reference to takeover activity.
106 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIAr CORPORATION
(1976); Joel. F. Henning Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. Rv. 915, 918 (1972); Donald. E. Schwartz, A
Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125, 1139 (1976).
107 See Karmel, supra note 76.
108 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
109 For a more thorough examination of the history of one share, one vote, see
Professor Joel Seligman's examination, supra note 33, on which my investigation
chiefly relies.
110 See Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 237-38 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1834); O'Neil,
supra note 33, at 1062; see also Jeffirey Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and
Limited Voting Common Shares-Their History, Legality, and Validity, 15 SEC. REG.
L.J. 37, 47-50 (1987).
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laws recognized as the precursors of today's enabling statutes."'
In the beginning, these statutes generally followed a mixed pro-
portionality theory of voting rights that authorized the issuance of
a limited number of shares with proportional voting rights, with
reduced voting power for the shares that exceeded some statutory
minimum."12 States quickly abandoned the practice of mandated
weighted voting, however, primarily because without a one-share,
one-vote standard to placate large shareholders, corporations had
difficulty raising capital.'13 Thus, after 1860, more and more cor-
porations shifted their voting structures to reflect the concerns of
the entrepreneurs and controlling shareholders who were trying
to raise capital and the larger stockholders who were not part of
the control group but wanted, at a minimum, the theoretical polic-
ing power associated with the corporate vote.'1 4 Eventually, a
one-share, one-vote rule became so broadly accepted that as late
as 1903, all preferred shares carried votes as well."z5
State corporation statutes of the period established the one-
share, one-vote principle as a default rule."16 Thus, while dual
class stock was not commonplace, its legality made it an accessible
format for capital formation. In the twenty years that followed,
corporate financiers began to take advantage of that accessibility
and dual-class stock gained in popularity."17 While a variety of
reasons have been noted for the preference for nonvoting stock
III Enabling codes are "corporation codes that supply standard contract terms for
corporate governance, which function as default provisions in corporate charters that
frms can tailor more precisely to their needs if they so desire." ROBERTA ROMANO,
TiE GENIs OF AiERIcAN CORPORATE LAw 1 (American Enterprise 1993).
112 See O'Neil supra note 33, at 1062; Kerbel, supra note 110, at 48.
113 See ONeil, supra note 33, at 1062-63; see also Kerbel, supra note 110, at 48-49
(explaining reasoning behind change).
114 Kerbel, supra note 110, at 48.
115 Id. at 49; WILLAm Z. Rip=Y, MAIN STREET AND WALL STmr 85-86 (1927).
While preferred shares continued to include voting rights equal to those of common
shares in the early part of the century, corporations gradually began granting rights
to preferred shares only in the event of certain contingencies (such as non-payment of
dividends). See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 568 n.12; Stevens, Stockholders' Voting
Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J. EcoN. 353, 354 (1926). Today,
it is common practice to grant preferred shareholders voting rights in the event of
contingencies. Carey & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 375-78.
116 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 568. New York's General Corporation Law of
1909, for example, entitled each shareholder to one vote per share "[u]nless otherwise
provided in the article of incorporation." Id. at 568 n.10 (citing 1909 N.Y. Laws, ch. 28,
§ 23, reprinted in J. ARNOLD, Nnw YORK BusInss CORPORATIONS 39 (4th ed. 1911)).
117 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 569; Kerbel, supra note 110, at 50 n.35;
Stevens, supra note 115, at 353, 355.
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during these years,11 one is quite pertinent even today: the desire
of management to raise additional equity capital without diluting
the voting position of certain shareholders. 11 9 As the use of non-
voting or limited voting common stock became prevalent, courts
generally acquiesced in their issuance on the basis of the concept
of freedom to contract. 120  General public policy arguments in
favor of a one-share, one-vote rule were not given much credence.
Public reaction, instigated by academics and government offi-
cials concerned with the growing power of the voting trusts and
the investment banking community, was not nearly so accommo-
dating.1 21 More specifically, in reaction to a sale by Dillon, Reed &
Company of Dodge Brothers debentures, preferred, and nonvoting
common stock (that enabled Dillon, Reed to retain voting control
for itself), support for prohibition gained momentum.1 22
118 Kerbel, supra note 110, at 50 (citing ARTHUR S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POL-
ICY OF CORPORATIONS 163-64 (5th ed. 1953)). Nonvoting stock was popular in the early
1900s due to:
(1) the investor-speculator's dual demand for a share in the huge profits
earned by industry during the period and the appearance of security greater
than that offered by the common share; (2) the desire of management to
raise additional capital when it was easy to do so while retaining full control
of the corporation; and (3) a vaguely felt or implied desire on the part of
bankers and investors to have something new.
Id.
119 See HovNmAN ENTERPRISES INc., 1992 PRoxY STATEMENT 11 (1992).
120 See Bartlett v. Fourton, 38 So. 882 (La. 1905); General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 87 N.J. Eq. 234, 241 (Ch. 1917); St. Regis Candies v. Hovas, 3 S.W.2d 429
(Tex. Comm. App. 1928), aff'd, 8 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Shapiro v. Tropi-
cana Lanes, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo. 1963); Benson v. Eleven-Twenty St.
Charles Co., 422 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1967); Deskins v. Lawrence County Fair & Dev.
Corp., 321 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959); Hampton v. Tri-State Fin. Corp., 495 P.2d
566, 569 (Col. Ct. App. 1972); Groves v. Rosemound Improvement Ass'n, 413 So.2d
925 (La Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 420 So.2d 443 (La. 1982). "Freedom to contract
allows the parties to structure their relations in a manner that ameliorates most of
the agency problems inherent in the large corporation. Freedom to contract has
guided corporation law since the first truly modern general corporation laws were
passed in the late nineteenth century." BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 87, at 21.
121 Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 982 (providing highly descriptive analysis of
influential role played by Professor Ripley). William Z. Ripley, Professor of Political
Economy, was the most prominent proponent of equal voting rights and wrote many
articles and speeches designed to stop transactions that disenfranchised sharehold-
ers. Equating shareholder voting rights with the voting system established by our
founding fathers for political government, his crusade eventually caught the attention
of federal officials, including President Coolidge. Id. at 982-83; Kerbel, supra note
110, at 57. And while Ripley's plea has been heeded in many quarters since then, at
the time federal legislative intervention was never seriously attempted. Flocos, supra
note 10, at 1785.
122 Kerbel, supra note 110, at 58.
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In response, on January 18, 1926, the NYSE first disapproved
an issue of nonvoting common stock.' 23 When the NYSE an-
nounced it would consider voting control in future applications for
listings, other organizations such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the New Jersey Public Utilities Commission, and the
Industrial Securities Committee of the Investment Banking Asso-
ciation soon followed with changes of their own.' 24 Notwithstand-
ing the momentum against dual-class stock and public pronounce-
ments of its demise,125 the NYSE carefully avoided making any
definitive policy statement for some time. In its absence, dual-
class use continued unabated. Between 1927 and i932, 288 corpo-
rations issued nonvoting or limited voting rights stock.' 26
On May 7, 1940, however, the NYSE adopted a formal listing
requirement relating to the use of dual-class stock.' 27 This stan-
dard remained in effect without incident for the next forty
years. 128 Similarly, the NYSE recommended that listed preferred
stock have minimum voting rights as well.' 29 Subsequent at-
tempts by listed firms to use dual-class stock were for the most
123 Seligman, supra note 33, at 697. Specifically, the Fox Theaters Corporation
had applied to list 800,000 shares of nonvoting Class A common stock. All voting
rights were to be held by the voting Class B common shares owned by the company's
president, William Fox. Id. at 697 n.68
124 Id. at 696. In April and May of 1926, the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the New Jersey Public Utilities Commission withheld approval of stock issues
that included non-voting common stock. At the same time, the Industrial Securities
Committee of the Investment Banking Association decided to discourage member use
of nonvoting common stock.
125 Ripley had proclaimed the demise of nonvoting common stock as early as
1926, stating "[nlonvoting common stock... bears every appearance of being dead-
dead beyond recall." Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 570 n.19 (citing RIPLEY, supra note
115, at 122).
126 DEWING, supra note 118, at 161. This number nearly equaled the number of
issuances between 1919 and 1926. Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 570.
127 See Seligman, supra note 33, at 699.
128 NYSE LISTED COAMANY MANUAL, § 313.00 (A), (C) (1985).
129 See Karmel, supra note 76, at 817 n.53; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL,
§ 313.00 (E) (1985).
For example, the preferred stock should have the right to elect at least two
directors in the event of a default on the equivalent of six quarterly divi-
dends. Likewise, 66 2/3% of the preferred stock, voting as a separate class,
must approve any charter amendment materially altering the rights associ-
ated with the preferred stock.
Karmel, supra note 76, at 817 n53.
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part rejected by the NYSE,130 and no serious challenges to that
policy would occur until 1984.131
The reexamination and the debate that resulted were trig-
gered by an issuance of restricted shares by General Motors
("GM") in conjunction with GM's acquisition of Ross Perot's Elec-
tronic Data Systems Corporation in 1984.132 This was ironic be-
cause the use of dual-class stock by such a large corporation is a
historic anomaly. Prior to 1984 the use of dual-class stock had
been confined primarily to small, "going public concerns" or fam-
ily-owned businesses.
The dual-class debate gained further speed and intensity fol-
lowing the subsequent issuance of disparate voting stock by some
forty-six other companies between the time of the GM issuance
and June 1987.133 Between March 1986 and May 1987 alone
thirty-four companies had issued disparate voting stock.1 3 4 The
130 See Seligman, supra note 33, at 699 n.78. (noting NYSE delisted Cannon Mills
in 1962, after company distributed shares of nonvoting common stock to its common
stockholders). But see id. (noting that NYSE more commonly enforced its one share,
one vote policy simply by threat of delistment). Occasional exceptions have arisen,
the most prominent being the 1956 listing of the Ford Motor Company despite its
dual-class capital structure. Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 569. The NYSE standards
also contained an exception called the "proportionate voting power" exception,
whereby the issuance of a second class of common stock with voting rights reasonably
related to that security's equity contribution would not warrant a delisting. Karmel,
supra note 76, at 817. "Reasonably related" is resolved on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
817 n.5.
131 Only thirty listed issuances of nonvoting or dual-class common stock were reg-
istered on U.S. secondary markets between 1940 and 1978, with never more than
eleven being made in any single year. Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value of
Control in Publicly Traded Corporations, 11 J. FiN. EcoN. 439 (1983).
132 See Hu, Corporate Investment, supra note 5, at 1294-95. (detailing specifics of
Class E common stock used in acquisition). The stock dividend, distribution, and ap-
preciation characteristics of the special class of General Motors stock are designed to
be more closely tied to the earnings of EDS, as a GM subsidiary, than to the fortunes
of the GM parent or any of its other subsidiaries. Because of the limited nature of the
shares, the shareholders have less incentive to monitor the performance of the larger
corporate concern. As such, the vote has less value to these shareholders than it
would to the shareholders whose shares are tied to the company's overall
performance.
133 See Manning Gilbert Warren I, One Share, One Vote: A Perception of Legiti-
macy, 14 J. CORP. L. 89, 92-93 (1988); ONeil, supra note 33, at 1064-65.
134 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 570 n.25 (citing SEC OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EcON-
OMIST, UPDATE-THE EFFECTS OF DuAL-CLAss RECAPrrALIZATIONS ON SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH 2 (JULY 16, 1987) [hereinafter SECOND SEC STUDY]). An earlier study by the
SEC found 65 dual-class structures created between 1976 and 1986; three-quarters of
these were adopted between 1983 and 1986. SEC OFFICE OF THE CHMF ECONOMsT,
THE EFFECTS OF DuAL-CLAss RECAPrrALZATIoNs ON THE WEALTH OF SHAREHOLDERS
11-12 (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter FIrST SEC STUDY]. These listings were allowed to
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significance of the GM acquisition was not based on the specifics of
the transaction itself. Utilization of dual-class stock in this man-
ner is rare. Rather, its significance was in the explicit challenge to
NYSE policy that it represented. 3 5 General Motors reached back
sixty years into the history of corporate finance and devised an
acquisitive structure that would move the exchanges, the SEC,
Congress, and academia into action.
In retrospect, it seems that only a large corporation such as
General Motors could have forced the issue. If a smaller concern,
one less important to the NYSE itself, had used a similar acquisi-
tion technique, the confrontation to listing policy could have been
more easily controlled. With the threat of a number of delistings,
however, the NYSE was forced to reexamine its policy.
Other factors were also at work. Specifically, the increased
activity in the capital and corporate control markets in the early
1980s and the well-known effectiveness of dual-class stock as a
takeover defense would most likely have been enough to elicit a
serious policy reexamination-defensive techniques commonly at-
tract attention.13 6 In addition, while many prominent firms de-
sired flexibility in fighting hostile advances for control, 137 an in-
creasing number of family-run or insider-controlled companies
needed access to capital only available in the public equity mar-
kets where share values were at record highs. Dual-class stock
was a means of gaining access without the control dilution that is
normally associated with new equity issuances. Moreover, the
occur because the NYSE implemented a self-imposed moratorium on delistings. Gail
Appleson, NYSE Opens Its Doors With Change in 50 Year Old Rule, REUTERS, July 4,
1986 (reported on wire service); Karmel, supra note 76, at 817 n.57.
135 Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value
and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QuANr. ANALYsIs
1, 22 (1986). The emergence of the over-the-counter market and other computer-
linked securities markets as substitute providers of liquidity have deprived the ex-
changes of any significant market power over listing firms. See id.; see also infra notes
374-83 and accompanying text (discussing effect of emergence of over-the-counter
market).
136 Professor Fischel has argued that dual-class stock should not necessarily be
regarded as a species of takeover defense. Fischel, supra note 19, at 149-51. Other
commentators, however, are virtually unanimous in associating the increase in dual-
class use with the increase in takeover activity during the 1980s. See Bainbridge,
supra note 39, at 571 n.28 (citing Seligman, supra note 33); Ruback, supra note 98, at
153; Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1671, 1713-15 (1985); Gordon, supra note 44, at 4.
137 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 241 (1985) (statement
of John Phelan, Chairman, NYSE).
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NASD and the AMEX, which had less-restrictive dual-class listing
standards, were becoming increasingly competitive in the market
for corporate listings.138
In light of those concerns, the NYSE appointed the Subcom-
mittee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Stan-
dards in June of 1984 to review its dual-class listing standards.139
At the same time, the NYSE imposed a delisting moratorium for
dual-class capitalizations and recapitalizations that contravened
the NYSE policies on voting rights.
140
At the time of the NYSE subcommittee review, it was AMEX
policy to accept applications from companies seeking to list two
classes of common stock possessing unequal voting rights, pro-
vided the issuer observed a ten-to-one limitation on the disparity
between the voting rights of the two classes and segmented its
board so that at least 25% of the directors were elected by the
holders of the lesser voting class; AMEX did, however, forbid the
listing of nonvoting common stock. 141 At the same time, the
NASD did not have an existing voting rights policy.
On January 3, 1985, the subcommittee recommended a new
listing standard by which listed corporations would be permitted
to issue common stock with unequal voting rights provided that
four conditions were met: (1) two-thirds of all shareholders enti-
tled to vote would have to approve the creation of the second class
of common stock; (2) if the issuer had a majority of independent
directors at the time the matter was voted on, approval by a ma-
jority of these independent directors would be required. If the is-
suer did not have a majority of independent directors, the ap-
138 Because the NASDAQ and the AMEX were increasingly recognized as effec-
tive and efficient exchanges, a listing on either of these exchanges created an alterna-
tive that no longer scared away blue-chip companies. Moreover, because the NASD
and the AMEX did not adhere to the one share, one vote policy of the NYSE, each
became a suitable alternative to the capital structuring limitations of the NYSE. In
1993, NASDAQ, the automated quotation system on which over-the-counter firms
trade, attracted a net of 400 new companies, compared with the NYSE's net of 274
new companies. Big Board Claims a Win In Its Battle With NASDAQ, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 29, 1993, at Cl; see also infra notes 372-95 and accompanying text (discussing
competitive situation existing among exchanges).
139 See Seligman, supra note 33, at 701-06 (providing extensive review of process
by which subcommittee reached its recommendations).
140 Karmel, supra note 76, at 817. Before this moratorium, the NYSE had de-
listed five firms for violating the one share, one vote rule. Jarrell & Poulsen, supra
note 13, at 131.
141 See AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 4; Seligman, supra note 33, at
703-05 (describing old AMEX listing requirements).
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proval of all such directors would be required; (3) the low-vote
shares could not have a voting differential of more than ten to one;
and (4) the other rights attached to the restricted voting shares
must be substantially the same as the rights of the high-vote
shares.142 Special provisions would be made for those firms al-
lowed in during the moratorium.143
The subcommittee claimed that its recommendations were
strongly influenced by two factors: first, the fact that sharehold-
ers should be allowed great latitude in determining the capital
structure of their corporation, even if others feel that a decision to
adopt dual-class common stock would be destructive in the long
run and that those shareholders should not be punished for mak-
ing that decision; and second, the fact that other safeguards, such
as independent directors and the NYSE requirement that corpora-
tions have independent audit committees, would prove ade-
quate.'" Many commentators suggested, however, that the rec-
ommendations were primarily based on factors which the
committee declined to mention; namely, the new realities of NASD
and AMEX competitiveness, as well as member dissatisfaction
with the inflexibility of the current rules as related to takeover
defenses. The NYSE subcommittee recommendations triggered
an almost immediate congressional reaction that ultimately
proved unsuccessful. 45
Following the dissemination of the subcommittee's recom-
mendations, officials of the SEC, NYSE, NASD, and AMEX
arranged for a series of meetings aimed at resolving the lack of
uniformity among the exchanges. Their discussions proved unsuc-
142 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND QUALrrATIVE LISTING STANDARDS 3 (Jan. 3, 1985).
143 Under the proposed rule change, a grandfather provision would permit
listed companies, which have created disparate voting rights since April
1984, two years from the date of effectiveness to achieve compliance with the
approval requirements. However, a company requesting to list under the
new rules would be required to obtain the requisite approval prior to listing
on the NYSE.
Karmel, supra note 76, at 818; AMENDNMTS TO SECTION 313.00 OF THE NYSE LISTED
ComPANY MANUAL, File No. SR-NYSE-86-17 (proposed Sept. 16, 1986).
144 Id. at 4-5; see Kerbel, supra note 110, at 64.
145 See Hearings on the Impact of Takeovers on Shareholders, Before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985). Senator Alphonse D'Amato and Congressman John Dingell each ex-
pressed fear that anything less than a one share, one vote rule would trigger a "race to
the bottom" among the exchanges. Karmel, supra note 76, at 819.
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cessful. 146 In fact, shortly after the discussions concluded, the
NYSE proposed a new, revised amendment to its Listed Company
Manual 147 that proved to be even less restrictive than the original
subcommittee recommendations.
The proposed standard for voting rights required delisting
only if the recapitalization was not approved by a majority of in-
dependent directors and a majority of the shareholders. 148 As was
the case under the previously proposed amendment, under this
proposal listed companies that created disparate-voting-rights
stock during the NYSE moratorium would have two years from
the date of the proposal's approval to comply with the amend-
ment.149 Companies thereafter applying for listing would have to
comply with the rule before listing would be approved. In addi-
tion, no exchange approval would be necessary if the disparate
voting class was outstanding when the company first went public,
or if disparate voting stock was distributed pro rata among the
distributor's common shareholders in a spin-off transaction in
which the distributor was not the issuer.1 0
In response to the second NYSE proposal and the failure of
the three SROs to reach a consensus on a minimum rule, the SEC
took action itself in June 1987. The commission's efforts produced
Rule 19c-4. Rule 19c-4 was designed to prohibit the NYSE, the
AMEX, and NASDAQ from listing, or continuing to list, the secur-
ities of an issuer that takes action resulting in the nullification,
restriction, or disparate reduction of the per-share voting rights of
holders of the company's outstanding common shares.1 51 The SEC
received 1100 comment letters and elicited testimony from seven-
146 The discussion focused on a mandatory one share, one vote rule that would
cover all three of the exchanges. However, such negotiations resulted in little pro-
gress or uniformity. Arthur Levitt Jr., chairman of the AMEX, openly advocated a
uniform one share, one vote requirement. The NASDAQ followed the recommenda-
tions of a review they commissioned from Daniel Fischel, in which it was concluded
that there were no reasons to prohibit dual-class stock. The NYSE's view, set forth in
testimony before Congress, was that the current competitive environment on the na-
tional exchanges precluded the NYSE from retaining one share, one vote unilaterally,
although it did note the Exchange's belief that one share, one vote was good policy and
that the Exchange still believed in it. AmEND Ers TO SECTION 313.00 OF THE NYSE
LISTED ComPANY MANUAL, File No. SR-NYSE-86-17 (proposed Sept. 16, 1986);
Karmel, supra note 76, at 817-19; see also Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 576-77.
147 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,209.
148 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 998 (1986).
149 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,209-10.
150 Id. at 89,210.
151 Id. at 89,208.
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teen people on Rule 19c-4. Of those comment letters, 1000 sup-
ported adopting the rule. Eight hundred were submitted by indi-
vidual members of the United States Shareholders Association,
which advocated a one-share, one-vote standard with no excep-
tions.152 The SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 on July 7, 1988.153
Rule 19c-4 has often been incorrectly described as a "one-
share, one-vote" rule. It clearly was not. In fact, the rule was
aimed entirely at those transactions that were deemed to disen-
franchise shareholders. The rule expressly prohibited the ex-
changes and NASDAQ from listing, or continuing to list, the se-
curities of an issuer that takes action resulting in the nullification,
restriction, or disparate reduction of the per-share voting rights of
holders of the company's outstanding common shares or resulting
in the creation of a ceiling on the voting power of any one individ-
ual shareholder. New issues were unaffected and could be listed
without exceptional regulation of voting rights. 5 The rule also
permitted corporations to issue nonvoting common stock or a spe-
cial class of common stock with limited voting rights, as long as it
did not dilute the voting power of existing shareholders. 5 Fi-
nally, the rule enabled a corporation to issue common stock with
lower voting rights when engaging in a business merger or acqui-
sition, as long as the firm made the merger or acquisition for a
bona fide business purpose.15'
Rule 19c-4 generated debate not only regarding the desirabil-
ity of dual-class stock, but on the larger issues of shareholder-be-
havior theory and the proper role of the federal government in cor-
porate governance and securities regulation. Notions of
federalism permeated the criticisms of the rule. There was wide-
spread belief that the Commission's intervention into areas tradi-
tionally left to state regulation was improper. Thirty-two of the
commentators who expressed opposition to the adoption of Rule
19c-4 during the SEC's request-for-comments stage questioned
the Commission's authority to adopt a rule in the area of qualita-
152 Id. at 89,210 n.23.
153 The final SEC vote on the Rule was four to one. Jeff Davis, director of the
Directorate of Economic Policy Analysis, and SEC Chief Economist, Kenneth Lehn
also opposed the rule. ONeil, supra note 33, at 1065 n.61; see Lowenstein, supra note
33, at 984-85 (summarizing Rule 19c-4).
154 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d) (1995).
155 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,209; Karen D. Bayley, Rule 19c-4:
The Death Knell for Dual-Class Capitalizations, 15 J. CoRP. L. 1, 7 n.34 (1989); 17
C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d) (1995).
156 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,212.
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tive listing or authorization standards. The opposition included
the ABA and the Business Roundtable. 157
The Business Roundtable 158 eventually filed suit in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to vacate the rule
on the basis of a theory grounded in corresponding notions of fed-
eralism. When the court vacated the Commission's rule on June
12, 1990,'"5 dual-class stock regulation was once again handed
back to the exchanges and the states.
Since the time of the Business Roundtable decision, the NYSE
and the NASD have adopted enforced listing standards that em-
body the spirit of Rule 19c-4, with the NASD doing so only for
NMS securities. While the NASD embraced the rule shortly after
the Business Roundtable decision, the NYSE actually did so in De-
cember of 1989 before the case was heard. The NYSE has not in-
sisted on member compliance with its standard. Instead, the
NYSE has only provided issuers with interpretive advice on com-
pliance when requested.160 The lack of enforcement by the NYSE
has placed the NASD in a difficult position, because, unlike the
other primary markets, most of the blue sky exemptions for NAS-
DAQ and NMS stock are contingent on the continued application
of a voting-rights standard analogous to Rule 19c-4.16 1 Thus,
while the NYSE is in a position to change current listing stan-
dards in favor of a less restrictive rule, the NASD's ability to
change its standard is somewhat restrained. This is precisely
what is currently transpiring. On June 9, 1992, the NYSE pro-
posed a new listing requirement that would allow its listed firms
to establish unequal voting rights. Institutional Investor Services
has summarized this proposal as follows:
The proposal would allow listed companies to adopt dual class
voting structures if such a move receives approval from: (1) a ma-
157 Bayley, supra note 155, at 14.
158 The Business Roundtable is an organization of almost 200 leading publicly-
held corporations.
159 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
160 Memorandum from Caite McGuire on Current Issues and Projects to SEC
Market Regulation Professional Staff 13 (May 14, 1993) (on file with the author). For
instance, Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation recapitalized the company's
common stock into two new classes on June 24, 1992. Currently, both classes are
listed on the NYSE. Mitchell Class A common stock has full voting rights while
Mitchell Class B common stock has no voting rights, except those required by state
law. MITCHELL ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 1992 AN UAL REPORT 32
(1993).
161 Id.
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jority of directors on an independent committee; (2) a majority of
the board; and (3) both a majority of outstanding shares and a
majority of affected but disinterested shares. Only in cases when
management gains controlling positions as a result of a dual
class offer would companies be required to have boards composed
of a majority of independent directors. Boards however, are
given the right to determine who is independent. In addition, the
proposal does not restrict the short-term economic incentives
often used in dual class exchange offers.162
Unlike the NYSE, the AMEX had not adopted Rule 19c-4
before the decision by the court of appeals, and unlike the NASD,
the AMEX had a preexisting voting-rights policy.' 63 As such, the
immediate effect of the Business Roundtable decision for the
AMEX was a reinstatement of the original policy before Rule
19c-4 was encated, a policy commonly referred to as the "Wang
formula."' 64 Instead of merely reinstating that policy, however,
the AMEX decided to take a fresh look at its listing policy in light
of the significant experience acquired by the exchanges during the
nearly two years that the principal marketplaces uniformly ap-
plied Rule 19c-4.165 On September 13, 1990, the AMEX appointed
a Special Committee on Shareholder Voting Rights to recommend
an appropriate listing standard. 16
6
162 THE INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES PROXY VOTING MANuAL 7.20 (3rd
ed. 1993).
163 AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 4.
164 Id. (describing "Wang Formula"). Specifically the Formula:
[pirohibit[s] the listing of nonvoting stock, but generally allowts] the listing
of limited voting stock provided the issuer observes a 10:1 limitation in the
voting disparity between the classes and segments its board so that at least
25% of the directors are elected by the holders of the lesser voting class.
Id.
165 Id. at 4-5.
166 Id. The eleven member Committee was directly charged by AMEX Chairman
James R. Jones to recommend the best policy without regard to the competitive posi-
tion of the Exchange. Jones indicated that he wanted the committee
to study the issue of what shareholder voting rights standard the American
Stock Exchange should adopt... taking into consideration its unique posi-
tion as the primary U.S. exchange for mid-range and emerging growth enter-
prises... bear[ing] in mind such matters as past practices... relating to
shareholder voting rights and corporate governance issues in general, the
changing structure of corporate America, the experience in applying Rule
19c-4... the appropriate relationships between SRO listing guidelines and
state laws governing corporate structure, the impact of Court decision over-
turning Rule 19c-4 and the role of the SRO's in protecting shareholder
interests.
AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 5-6.
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Adopted on April 11, 1991, the proposed AMEX policy (cur-
rently awaiting SEC approval) is based on the following four prin-
ciples identified in the report issued by its Special Committee on
Shareholder Voting Rights:
The desirability of flexibility in creating capital structures for
listed companies, the effectiveness of shareholder approval in in-
suring that a proposed multiple class capital structure is fair, the
role of independent directors in protecting the interests of public
shareholders, and the importance of adequate disclosure in in-
suring that purchasers of low-vote shares in the secondary mar-
kets understand the risks, and benefits of what they are
purchasing.' 67
The proposed rule seeks to provide a balance between flexible
capital structuring and managerial accountability. 168 It requires
that companies seeking to recapitalize into a multiple-class struc-
ture or to issue additional shares of higher-voting-class stock must
first obtain favorable votes from two-thirds of their outstanding
shares or a majority of shares unaffiliated with management or
the controlling group. 169 In addition, the AMEX decided that a
multiple-class company should have at least one-third of its board
composed of independent directors or provide that holders of the
lesser voting class be entitled to elect exclusively at least 25% of
the board. 170
167 Id.
168 Id. at 3.
169 Id. at 25.
The term "affiliated" will... in certain cases, be extremely fact-dependent.
For example, even related family members may bitterly disagree over the
future direction of a company and it would make no sense to aggregate the
votes of warring family factions if a company is seeking to determine
whether it had the support of a majority of the unaffiliated shareholders ....
Generally though, the Exchange would consider officers, directors, their rel-
atives or 10% holders to be "affiliates" of management.
Id. at 26.
A disinterested majority approval rule is recognized as a positive approach to
regulation, even by commentators opposed to dual-class use. See Seligman, supra note
33. Seligman pointed out that "[ihf majority approval means a majority of disinter-
ested stockholders, there is a greater likelihood that bargaining would reach a fair
approximation of the probable discounted loss... [it] would likely result in compensa-
tion to shareholders for probable stock price losses through higher dividends, more
stock, or other means." Id. at 723.
Moreover, in order to obtain a two-thirds vote, management will, in all but a few
cases, need to garner substantial support from institutional and other public share-
holders. AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 6.
170 Id. at 27. Thus, the AMEX Proposal ensures some independent representation
on the board of a multiple class issuer, unlike Rule 19c-4 which compelled no such
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The rule proposed by the AMEX also has a number of excep-
tions and incorporates the concept of grandfathering for existing
dual-class firms. For example, foreign issuers are entirely ex-
empted. In addition, dual-class capitalizations, as opposed to
dual-class recapitalizations, receive an exemption from the share-
holder voting requirements.' 7' Issuances by way of dividends,
splits, acquisitions, financings, and issuances of low-voting or non-
voting stock by existing dual-class companies are not subject to
additional shareholder approval requirements.' 72
The proposal also provides exemptions for post-recapitaliza-
tion issuances of high-vote shares. While such additional post-
transaction issuances of high-vote shares are rare, due to the
SEC's existing proxy rules requiring companies to disclose all
planned uses of new securities, 173 the exemption is a thoughtful
addition to the regulatory frameworks that historically have been
advocated to police attempts of post-recapitalization shareholder
dilution.
Rule 19c-4 did not specifically cover subsequent issuances of
high-voting shares by firms authorized to issue high-vote shares
in the recapitalization. The AMEX proposal does so by construct-ing a general prohibitory theme, followed by an express exception.
Specifically, the proposal provided a twelve-month "window" for
high-vote issuances by companies that have just secured share-
holder approval to recapitalize into multiple-class structures.' 74
As long as the stock involved and the kind of transaction in which
it is to be issued are fully described in the approval proxy, the
proposal allows additional issues of high-vote shares to be effected
in the twelve months following the original approval.' 7 5 In addi-
tion, the proposal would allow dual-class firms to issue additional
high-vote stock constituting up to 2% of their voting power in any
one year, subject to an overall cap of 5% in each five-year period,
without obtaining shareholder approval.' 7 6
requirement. Id. at 11; see Victor Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly
City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597 (1982) (discussing obstacles in-
dependent directors encounter); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Signifi-
cance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445, 449 n.10 (1991) (dis-
cussing limitations of using outside directors).
171 AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 28.
172 Id.
173 FEDDERS CORPORATION, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1993).
174 AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 12.
175 Id. at 13.
176 Id. at 12.
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Finally, the proposed rule provides grandfathering for ex-
isting dual-class companies. The rule exempts existing AMEX
dual class companies that listed on the exchange before the adop-
tion of the Wang formula in 1976, from the independent director
requirement.1 7 7 Additionally, existing Wang formula companies
are exempt from any additional shareholder approvals for the is-
suance of additional high-vote stock.1 7 8
Questions concerning whether the exchange should require
pro-rata sharing of a control premium among all shareholders, or
whether purchasers of low-vote shares in the secondary market
have adequate notice that they are buying shares with an "im-
paired" vote, are questions the AMEX has chosen not to answer,
choosing instead to defer to legislative action.1 79
This brief illustration of the historical context in which dual-
class stock has been used and the regulatory models constructed
symbolize the uncertainty and conflict which currently exists in
the area of dual-class regulation among SROs and the SEC. The
current case-by-case posturing of the NYSE has only exacerbated
the uncertainty. For its part, the SEC continues to assert that
voting rights are fundamental and that a majority of current
shareholders should never be permitted to diminish or eliminate
the voting rights of an opposed minority. After the Business
Roundtable decision, however, SEC opposition is no longer of par-
amount importance. 180
Today, the regulation of voting rights is primarily governed
by the rules of the SROs and state law.' 8 ' No state departs from a
one-vote, one-share default rule,8 2 although state blue sky laws,
administered by state securities regulators, often impose restric-
177 Id. at 14.
178 Id.
179 AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 15.
180 Letter from Mary L. Schapiro & Richard Y. Roberts to James R. Jones, supra
note 35.
181 See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 574. Exceptions include companies reorga-
nizing under the Bankruptcy Act, registered public utility companies, quasi-govern-
mental agencies (i.e., Student Loan Marketing Association), and certain registered
investment companies. Id. at 574 n.42.
182 As of 1991, two states had departed from this default rule. See Bainbridge,
supra note 39, at 574. In 1995, both states repealed their respective statutes. See
also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.180 (Vernon 1991) (permitting limitation or denial of vot-
ing rights) (repealed 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2014 (1991) (requiring all holders of
voting stock to have right to vote in election of directors, although otherwise permit-
ting variations in voting rights) (repealed 1995); see also Bainbridge, supra note 39, at
574 n.42.
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tions on the sale of some shares with disparate voting rights.-8 3
Furthermore, eighteen states have adopted regulations prohibit-
ing the issuance of common stock with unequal voting rights. 8 4
As such, it is apparent that state securities administrators
represent an important supplement to exchange-based regulation.
An interdependency exists between Blue Sky Rules and the ex-
changes.18 5 State exemptions are the very foundation upon which
the use of dual-class stock vests.1 6 Thus, state exemptions
granted to the NYSE and the AMEX listed firms are of great im-
portance. Nothwithstanding the influence that the states and the
exchanges have, the SEC must eventually capitulate and take ac-
tion on the current AMEX and NYSE proposals being drafted.
Should the SEC, and its new commissioner, Arthur Levitt, Jr.,8 7
move toward approving the pending AMEX rule, the NYSE is sure
to respond. 88 Either way, dual-class stock is positioned for seri-
ous reevaluation.
III. TiE CALL FOR A MINIMM VOTING-RIGHTS STANDARD
The arguments in favor of a minimum voting-rights standard
have been varied and sometimes incongruent. Models advocating
complete prohibition of dual-class recapitalizations are rare. In-
stead, most commentators have focused their efforts on developing
a less restrictive minimum voting-rights standard aimed at limit-
ing the disenfranchising effects associated with dual-class recapi-
183 See id. at 574 n.43 (listing states that have restrictive legislation). States that
have restrictive legislation include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska. Id.
184 Seligman, supra note 33, at 713 n.113.
185 Id. at 714.
186 It has been noted that state administrators, such as those in California, have
"a pathological distaste" for certain uses of dual-class stock, and frequently refuse to
permit the issuance of this type of security. See Chris Rauber, Meadowbrook Issue
Boosts Management, S.F. Bus. Tmnas, Dec. 20, 1991, at 1. For firns listed on the
various exchanges, state blue sky law exemptions remain. Periodic reports indicating
that state administrators and legislators are preparing to lift exemptions for dual-
class firms have thus far been unfounded.
187 Arthur Levitt, Jr., has already taken a public stance on the issue. In 1985, he
told a House Subcommittee that abandonment of the "one share, one vote" rule by the
NYSE would be damaging to the securities markets, and predicted that between 200
to 300 major corporations would adopt dual classes of stock if the NYSE abandoned
its long-standing policy. Karmel, supra note 76, at 819-20. He also posited that a
significant number of firms would transfer from the AMEX, which he then chaired, to
the NYSE. Id.
188 Desmond Dodd, Is the Big Board Preparing a New Voting Rights Rule, 18
CoRP. FnANCING WL 1 (May 11, 1992).
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talizations. The SEC, in formulating Rule 19c-4, reiterated its
commitment to that theme by summarizing the primary reasoning
behind the rule as follows:
The adoption of a minimum voting rights standard is necessary
to ensure management accountability;... the Rule will protect
shareholder interests in connection with contests for corporate
control; ... the Rule will protect shareholders from being disen-
franchised, while permitting companies to utilize disparate vot-
ing rights plans for capital raising purposes; and... the Rule
would prevent a 'race to the bottom' for listing standards among
SROs. 189
This reasoning is firmly rooted in the traditional theory of share-
holder passivity as originally described by Berle and Means
whereby the powerlessness of the shareholder is held to be an in-
evitable result of the diffusion of ownership.1 90 These rationales,
as well as others that have been set forth in advocating restrictive
listing requirements, can be analyzed distinctly. Such an analysis
will best present the arguments against the use of dual-class com-
mon stock. This article shall critique those arguments in Part V.
A. The Collective Action Rationale
Shareholder passivity is explained by what is commonly re-
ferred to as the collective action problem. 19 ' The collective action
problem in turn is illustrated through certain recurring share-
holder behaviors known as "free-riding" and "rational apathy."
189 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,211. In contrast, the recent AMEX
proposal sought to strike a balance between the accountability of management to
shareholders and the need for companies to have appropriate flexibility in establish-
ing a capital structure best suited to achieving specific goals and objectives. Id. at
89,210.
190 Shareholders are believed to be powerless to effect the success or failure of
proposals that come before the larger shareholder group regardless of their impact on
the future prosperity of the firm. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 397. The
dual-class recapitalization makes the Berle and Means model a structural reality. Id.
But see Flocos, supra note 10, at 1769 n.32 (MThe Commission's discussion in the Re-
lease of both freerider and rational apathy, collective action problems constitutes one
paragraph and footnote; a remarkably small proportion of the 27 page document, and
disappointing given the SEC's heavy reliance on these factors as the basis for its im-
portant regulation.").
191 See Klein, supra note 18, at 132. Klein states: "Though a change in manage-
ment may be beneficial to shareholders as a group, the costs for an individual share-
holder to gather the required information and communicate that information to other
shareholders will generally exceed the benefit to the initiating shareholder. This is a
collective action problem." Id. See generally, MANCUR OLSON, THE Looic OF COLLEC-
TIVE AcTION (1980) (discussing collective action problem).
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Free riding and rational apathy occur when shareholders remain
inactive, yet secure the benefits which result from the activism of
other shareholders (typically institutional investors or those seek-
ing to obtain a controlling block of shares).192 This passive behav-
ior is thought to manifest itself when dispersed shareholders in
large corporations realize that the costs associated with agent
monitoring are solely incurred, while the returns are shared pro
rata.193 Such behavior is deemed to be rational because the aggre-
gate cost to shareholders of informing themselves of potential cor-
porate actions, independently assessing the wisdom of such ac-
tions, and casting their votes will greatly exceed the expected or
actual benefits from informed voting. 94 Consequently, since any
single shareholder's vote is unlikely to affect the outcome of a par-
ticular proposal, many shareholders choose to take an apathetic
approach to corporate voting - they vote without carefully re-
viewing the proxy materials or by adopting a singular voting ap-
proach (that is, they vote for management). 95
Those who oppose dual-class common stock assert that the
use of such stock exacerbates collective action, free riding, and
passivity problems that ultimately lead to disenfranchisement.' 9 6
This argument rests on empirical studies which demonstrate that
192 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 392-93 (1986); see also Flocos,
supra note 10, at 1768-69 (providing example of free-riding problem in context of nui-
sance or pollution case).
193 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rxv. 811, 821 (1992) [hereinafter Agents Watching
Agents]. Much of corporate law can be read as a response to the intersection of the
problem of diverging interests between managers and shareholders and the problem
ofminimizing agency costs. Rock, supra note 170, at 453. "Boards of directors, deriva-
tive suits, and the private enforcement of proxy regulations can be understood as
mechanisms for surmounting shareholders' collective action problems in constraining
management." Id. at 453 n.27. It is often said that "a shareholder who owns I per-
cent of a company's stock must believe that the expected benefits are more than 100
times the cost, before monitoring is worthwhile!" See Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in
Corporate Governance Reform: 13(d) Rules and Control Person Liability, in MODERN-
IZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERsPEcTIvEs 227 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert Kamphias eds., 1992) [hereinafter Next Steps in Corporate Governance
Reform].
194 CLARK, supra note 192, at 390-91. Moreover, while the shareholder may gain
from opposing or affirmatively voting for the transaction, he will gain even more if
other shareholders bear the cost of doing so. Flocos, supra note 10, at 1768.
195 Agents Watching Agents, supra note 193, at 821. This is not always unreason-
able because it may make sense for a shareholder to vote for a known incumbent (or
the ideas they represent) rather than for an unknown or for the views proposed by an
unknown. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 36, at 177 n.2.
196 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 44-45.
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the ownership composition of firms recapitalizing with dual-class
stock is often characterized by large family or management owner-
ship groups' 97 and below-average institutional holders.198 Be-
cause of these ownership arrangements, it follows that a large
proportion of public shareholders would have to vote against any
proposed governance measure for it to be defeated. 199 Moreover,
with lower than average institutional holdings, the outside-share-
holder group is thought to exhibit a high share turnover rate as
well as to suffer the consequences of dispersed holdings.20 Thus,
the costs of opposition are higher than normal because communi-
cation and coordination expenses rise in proportion to the extent
of shareholder dispersal.20 1 According to the SEC and its support-
ers, because there is no compulsory cost-sharing mechanism, in-
sufficient incentive exists to organize an opposition and the indi-
vidual shareholder will simply free ride.20 2 The hypothesized end
result is that the larger shareholder group fails to vote against or
197 Id.; see also M. Megan Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Com-
mon Stock and Shareholder Wealth, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 313, 332 (1987) (examining 44
publicly traded firms that created classes of limited voting common stock during
1962-1984). Partch found that "p]rior to the creation of the limited-voting class, in-
siders on average own 48.6 percent of the firm's equity. Approximately 21 months
later, insider average proportionate ownership of votes is 58.6 percent and the aver-
age proportion of equity owned by insiders falls to 43.7 percent." Id. at 332.
198 Studies have shown that in many, if not all, of the recapitalized firms, signifi-
cant family/management blocs are committed to the recapitalization. In addition,
only a handful of these firms have significant stock ownership positions (blocs of 5
percent or more) held by institutions or by individuals not allied with the manage-
ment group. An OCE study conducted in 1987 reported that the average (mean) insti-
tutional ownership for a sample of 87 firms was 19.9 percent. A post NYSE morato-
rium sample found that this number had increased to 23.9 percent. See SEC OFFIcE
OF CHIEF ECONOMIST, UPDATE - THE EFFECTS or DuAL-CLAss REcAPITALIZATIONS ON
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: INCLUDING EVIDENCE FROM 1986 AND 1987, tbl. 4 (July 16,
1987); see also JAMES B. HEARD & HOWARD D. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 10 (1987) (indicating such figures are below average).
199 Gordon, supra note 44, at 46 n.149 (suggesting that when small number of
institutional investors each owns significant blocks of stock, "[i]t is easy to monitor
the level of expenditures of each institutional investor in a particular proxy contest").
"Moreover, since such investors will be 'repeat players' in a successive series of proxy
contest, reputation effects and the desire to secure reciprocal assistance of other in-
vestors will help overcome free-rider problems." Id. (citing ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATION (1984)).
200 Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 989. One study found that when a large
number of disaggregated shareholders exists in any given corporation, the chances of
a dissident gaining victory in a proxy vote are reduced. John Pound, Proxy Contests
and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 237, 258 (1988).
201 See Gordon, supra note 44, at 46.
202 Flocos, supra note 10, at 1768.
[Vol. 68:863
DUAL-CLASS STOCK
disapprove the charter amendment that ultimately disen-
franchises the group. Because opponents of dual-class shares find
disenfranchisement to be undesirable, they point to collective ac-
tion and free-riding pr6blems and the notion of shareholder pas-
sivity as reasons for prohibiting dual-class recapitalizations.
Moreover, some have asserted that recapitalization is void
notwithstanding shareholder approval because the transaction it-
self violates management's duty of care. Peter Simmons explains:
By reclassifying the stock, management attempts to retain office
in violation of the business judgement rule. The defense enables
management to circumvent the usual restraints imposed on it
and to gain complete and permanent control over the corpora-
tion. Additionally, the plan decreases the value of the corpora-
tion to the shareholders by depriving them of... acquisition [pre-
miums] and by subjecting their investment to greater risks. A
court should therefore infer that . . . [the] purpose is . . . en-
trenchment and hold the reclassification to be a violation of man-
agement's duty of care.203
Because the shareholders more often than not vote to approve a
dual-class recapitalization, Simmons maintains that the affirma-
tive vote cannot be fully informed and consequently should not be
enforced by a court.20 4 He asserts that the affirmative share-
holder vote is really uninformed consent because shareholders un-
dervalue their voting rights and, as a consequence, acquiesce to
managerial recommendations regardless of the cost to them indi-
vidually.2 5 To date, courts have not agreed with such sentiments
and have uniformly upheld dual-class recapitalizations. 0 6
Regardless of the judicial treatment of dual-class recapitaliza-
tion plans, many have accepted the passivity rationale and the
conclusions that flow from it. Notions of shareholder passivity
serve as the foundation, as well as the common element, on which
many of the following rationales rely.
203 Simmons, supra note 26, at 112.
204 Id. at 118.
205 Id. Simmons believes that individual shareholders are unlikely to seek infor-
mation on the effects of the recapitalization. Id. at 119 n.83.
206 See Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Kers-
ten v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Iowa 1985); Societe Holding
Ray D'Albion S.A v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc., No. 6648, 1981 WL 15094 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 16, 1981).
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B. Agency Costs/Managerial Accountability
Rationales for a restrictive regulatory regime are commonly
framed in terms of the agency relationship and agency costs.2" 7
Michael Jensen and William Meckling define the agency relation-
ship as a "contract under which one or more persons (the princi-
pal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent."20 8 The relationship between the stock-
holders and managers of a corporation perfectly fits the definition
of a pure agency relationship.20 9
Because both parties are utility maximizers, the interests of
each party do not always correspond. The deviations in the utility
functions create agency costs, which have been defined as "the
sum of... the monitoring expenditures by the principal,... the
bonding expenditures by the agent, [and] ... the residual loss.
.. "210 Agency costs include contracting costs, transaction costs,
moral-hazard costs, and information costs.2 ' Traditionally,
agency costs have been contained through external and internal
monitoring mechanisms, such as the voting rights that attach to
certain common shares. Therefore, unbundling the voting rights
and profit claims has potentially significant consequences on the
level of agency costs. 1 '
When a firm goes public by way of a dual-class capitalization,
agency costs are created.2 13 When a firm undergoes a dual-class
207 The theory of agency is concerned with the problems or costs involved when a
principal desires to accomplish a task but because of asymmetrical resources or infor-
mational endowments must rely on an agent to perform the task. MICHAEL A. CREw &
PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, PUBLIC UTILxrY ECONOMICS 129 (1979) ("The problem facing
the principal is to choose appropriate incentives and set behavioral limits for the
agent so as to balance the agent's better knowledge of uncertain states of the world
against divergences in preferences between principal and agent."); Stephen A. Ross,
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 Am. ECON. REV. 134,
134-39 (1973).
208 Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
209 Id. at 309.
210 Id. at 308.
211 Michael C. Jensen & Clifford Smith, Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor In-
terests: Applications of Agency Theory, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE
(Ekkehard Altmann & Marti Subrahmanyam eds., 1985).
212 Douglas H. Blair et al., Unbundling the Voting Rights and Profit Claims of
Common Shares, 97 J. POL. ECON. 420, 422-23 (1989).
213 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 209. The authors indicate that
[ilf a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner, he will make operating
decisions which maximize his utility.... If the manager owns only 95 per-
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recapitalization, however, existing agency costs are dramatically
increased.
In principle, the SEC and other adherents to Rule 19c-4 be-
lieve that separating the vote from the equity interest (for exam-
ple by allowing vote buying) or negating the policing power of the
vote (by way of debilitating proxy rules or by use of a dual-class
capital structure) increase the agency costs involved in share own-
ership. This result occurs because the consequent loss of manage-
rial accountability causes agency costs to rise. It is said that such
plans lead:
to entrenched, inefficient corporate managements acting in their
own best interest instead of the best interest of the company and
its shareholders. [Such management behavior seriously
would [sic] undermine investor confidence in the nation's equity
markets, which would lead eventually to investors removing
their capital from those markets.2
14
It is certainly undeniable that after the recapitalization, one
distinct group of shareholders controls the voting power within
the firm.21 5 By definition, shareholders no longer have the ability
to express disapproval for managerial misbehavior by voting the
directors off the board, although egregious managerial acts are
still actionable under state fiduciary duty laws. In addition, the
voting power obtained by the control group may negate the inde-
pendence of any outside board members, who traditionally are
held out as the best representatives for the shareholder group at
cent of the stock, he will expend resources to the point where the marginal
utility derived from a dollar's expenditure of the firm's resources on such
items equals the marginal utility of an additional 95 cents in general
purchasing power... and not one dollar.
Id. at 312. These activities are limited by the monitoring mechanisms set up by share-
holders. Id.
214 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,211.
215 In a sample of 45 dual-class firms, managerial super-voting stock holdings
were strong enough to give management of the median firm enough votes to elect
either the entire board of directors, or a majority thereof, depending on the voting
rules for board elections and any preferred stock that may be part of the ownership
structure. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting
Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. Fni.
EcoN. 33, 44 (1985). Managers median holdings constituted 58.7 percent of the supe-
rior voting stock and 13.4 percent of the inferior voting stock, and mean holding of
59.2 percent and 20.8 percent, respectively. Id. These holdings give officers an aver-
age of 54.8 percent of the total voting rights in board elections, but only 27.6 percent
of the cash flows. Id. at 45-46. Partch found that within approximately 21 months of
the recapitalization, insiders' average proportionate ownership of votes rises to 58.6
percent from 48.6 percent. Partch, supra note 197, at 314.
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large.2 1 6 Furthermore, control of the voting mechanism is ex-
pected to decrease the number of shareholder proposals presented
to shareholders for approval and, in turn, decrease the effective-
ness of shareholder proposals as a monitoring mechanism. In
light of this, managerial accountability to shareholders suppos-
edly decreases because traditional methods of policing behavior
are absent in the firm after recapitalization.
C. Coercion
So, why do shareholders vote affirmatively for a structure
that appears to have detrimental consequences to their existing
ownership stake, even when those shareholders are institutions
that are not thought to suffer from the previously mentioned pas-
sive activity problems? One common explanation is that share-
holders are coerced to approve the proposal by managerial gim-
micks called "sweeteners." The term refers to a situation in which
dominant shareholders impose a wealth transfer from public
shareholders to themselves by bundling the transaction with an
unrelated proposal that shareholders may independently desire,
such as an incremental dividend increase or increased marketabil-
ity for their shares. 217 Gilson explains:
If a public shareholder believes the transaction will succeed, and
will thereby effect a wealth transfer from him to the insider
group, then obviously it is best for him to participate in the
transaction and at least get the ten percent dividend increase.
Even if the shareholder believes the transaction will not succeed,
he will participate in the transaction anyway so long as the
shareholder believes his action will not affect the overall result.
By participating, the shareholder gets the ten percent dividend
increase; the decision of other public shareholders not to partici-
216 See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 33, at 721-22. The AMEX proposal and the
NYSE recognized this as a substantive issue that had to be dealt with; each decided to
require a minimum number of independent directors to be on the board of any listed
multi-class issuer firm. Modern dual-class proposals have followed suit and are often
structured to alleviate such concerns. See, e.g., supra note 58 (discussing Fedders
Plan). The NYSE proposal was criticized, however, because it gives boards the right to
make the independent determination. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
217 See Gilson, supra note 43, at 833-40; Ruback, supra note 98, at 153; Gordon,
supra note 44, at 47-54. In addition, Gordon notes that "management can play
'chicken' by credibly threatening to pursue less than optimum strategies for the firm if
the recapitalization proposal is defeated... [or] management can exploit defects in
the regulatory process to increase the likelihood of approval." Id. at 47. Such behavior
is likely, however, to violate state fiduciary law standards. See Seligman, supra note
33, at 720.
[Vol. 68:863
DUAL-CLASS STOCK
pate in an unfavorable transaction can be relied on to prevent
the feared wealth transfer.218
The coercive aspects of the transaction are thought to be success-
ful because a high percentage of the outside shareholders must
vote against the recapitalization to deny implementation. Be-
cause the costs of activism are too high, it is unlikely that the
transaction will be defeated, thus resulting in free-riding and ra-
tionally apathetic behavior.219 By putting a "sweetener" in the
deal, success is ensured, even when the deal itself is not in the
best interests of the shareholders.2 0 In effect, rational sharehold-
ers are exchanging a right to a dividend increase for a vote that is
rendered meaningless after recapitalization.22 1
Proponents of the coercion explanation fail to find solace in
the help that institutional shareholders might offer. 22 Generally,
this failure has been based on the perceived short-term focus of
institutional shareholders. It is commonly asserted that institu-
218 Gilson, supra note 43, at 833-34. As long as shareholders are dispersed, all
shareholders will follow this strategy and the transaction will be approved. In his
study of nineteen firms, Professor Gordon found that the majority of outside share-
holders voted affirmatively for the recapitalization transaction in seventeen of the
nineteen firms. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 80-85.
219 Id. at 46. Ownership of 40 percent (and likely significantly less) would give the
dominant group sufficient votes to approve the transaction because five-sixths of the
public shares would have to vote against the transaction for it to fail. Empirical evi-
dence indicates that such figures are often present. For instance, Partch found that
immediately prior to the dual-class recapitalization, the average percentage of shares
controlled by officers, directors, and their associates was 48.6 percent. See Partch,
supra note 197, at 314. In a study by Gregg Jarell and Annette Poulsen, average
insider holdings were 43.7 percent of outstanding shares and the median holdings
were 46.2 percent. For the average firm before the NYSE moratorium, insider hold-
ings were 49.4 percent, with the median equal to 51.5 percent. Jarrell & Poulsen,
supra note 13, at 141.
220 Some believe that shareholders in the same circumstances, but acting collec-
tively, would choose not to vote affirmatively for the exchange. Ruback, supra note 98,
at 154.
221 "Voting rights have a realizable value only when they can influence the out-
come of an issue, either as a 'swing vote' or as part of a control block of shares." Sim-
mons, supra note 26, at 118 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 402-03).
222 See Simmons, supra note 26, at 120. Additionally, dual-class opponents have
asserted that institutions are unlikely to challenge dual-class proposals despite the
fact that institutional shareholders often have the financial stake and voting power to
do so. Id.; see also EnwARD S. HIiuAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 146-
54 (1981) (discussing institutional investors and voting); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning
Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249,
297-301 (1983) (discussing institutional investing).
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tions have no incentive to forego short-term profits for long-term
protection against managerial abuses.223
In addition, the systemic failings of the pension-plan manag-
ers in the proxy process have been put forward in support of the
coercion explanation. Some believe that because managers con-
trol the proxy agenda and can often put considerable pressure on
corporate and public pension-plan managers to vote for specific
proposals, they can coerce large numbers of voteholders into favor-
ing a recapitalization, even when it is against the shareholder's
interest.224
As a result of the coercive vote in favor of the recapitalization,
dramatic increases in agency costs, resulting from risk increases
associated with the lower-voting shares and the loss of policing
power, are hypothesized. 2 5 The economic prophesy is that the
market value of the shares will be substantially reduced once the
dual-class proposal is implemented. 26 The call for regulation is
framed in terms of alleviating potential shareholder wealth losses.
D. The Corporate Control Market
Many proponents of Rule 19c-4 and similar regulatory
schemes felt that by preventing the inevitable disenfranchisement
associated with dual-class recapitalization, they would preserve
the opportunity for noninstitutional shareholders to share in po-
tential control premiums at a later date.22 7 The SEC has explic-
itly stated that "the Rule will protect shareholder interests in con-
nection with contests for corporate control.... "2
Theoretically, part of any reduction in the value of a share in
a newly recapitalized firm can be attributed to an opportunity cost
- the loss of a control premium. Professor Henry Manne explains
the concept of the control premium by unbundling the franchise
and residual interest contained in a share of stock:
223 Simmons, supra note 26, at 120.
224 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,212.
225 Simmons, supra note 26, at 115-17.
226 Id. at 116.
227 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,211. "[S]hareholders experience large
wealth gains as a result of LBOs. In contrast, shareholder wealth is, at best, unaf-
fected by dual-class transactions." Gilson, supra note 43, at 822.
228 See supra note 190 and accompanying text; see also Blair et al., supra note
212, at 420 (suggesting marketable voting rights may facilitate value-increasing take-
overs thus increasing welfare).
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[a]s the price of a voting share declines because of any recogniza-
ble inefficiency in the management of the company, the possibil-
ity of capital gains from improved management increases accord-
ingly. Control will be worth more, and the vote portion of the
share package will appreciate at the same time that the price of
the share package is declining. The vote therefore becomes valu-
able largely as a result of the potential for appreciation of the
underlying share interest; when the potential gain in shares is
lowest, the value of the vote will tend towards zero.2
2 9
The loss of the control premium befalls shareholders in the dual-
class firm because such a class structure enables management to
prevent all post-recapitalization corporate acquisitions of which
they disapprove, regardless of the decline in the price of voting
shares that often precipitates hostile overtures.23 0 Because only
common stock with limited voting rights can be sold, acquisition of
a controlling interest becomes improbable after recapitalization
unless participation by high-vote shareholders is ensured.23 1
Thus, the potential acquisition value or premium is thought to
shift to management when it gains majority voting power. A re-
duction in the likelihood of a takeover is thought to alter manage-
rial incentives. The implication being a reduction in overall non-
controlling shareholder wealth, because managers may deviate
from investment and financing decisions that maximize the value
of the firm. 2
The main impact of a firm's security voting structure will
be in its influence on the market for corporate control.233 Because
229 Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1427, 1430 (1964).
230 See Simmons, supra note 26, at 115 n.61. "The value of votes is twofold: they
represent both the value of the right to control management... and the present value
of the right to payment from an acquirer that represents the increased value to that
bidder of the ability to obtain corporate control (the control premium) .... " Id.
231 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing fact that time-
phased plans make this possibility at a minimum, more probable). Also, it should be
noted that several firms with dual class structures have been acquired. See R. Fer-
rara et al., Tender Offers: Toughing it Out, in MERGERS AN AcQuisITIONS IN THE
1980s: ATTACK AND SuRvivAL 285-86 (R. Ferrara ed. 1987) (noting several firms with
dual-class structures have been acquired); William L. Megginson, Restricted Voting
Stock, Acquisition Premiums, and The Market Value of Corporate Control, 25 FIN.
REv. 175, 175-76 (1990) (reporting on study of 152 British firms that had two or more
classes of stock outstanding and noting that forty-three of initial 152 firms were sub-
sequently acquired). See generally infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (provid-
ing Affiliated Publications, Inc., and McCaw Cellular as examples).
232 Lease et al., supra note 89, at 448.
233 Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 13, at 132.
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most firms undergoing a dual-class recapitalization were con-
trolled by insiders before the transaction, however, the market for
control exerts little influence.23 4 The insider voting power insu-
lates the firm from hostile control activity.235
Some commentators have voiced concern that majority share-
holders will expropriate or consume substantial amounts of corpo-
rate wealth. For example, large-block or controlling shareholders
could pay themselves an excessive salary, negotiate "sweetheart
deals" with other companies they control, invest in projects with a
negative net present value, or simply withdraw corporate
funds.236  Empirical study, however, indicates that majority
shareholders do not use their voting power to expropriate or con-
sume substantial amounts of corporate wealth.237 Furthermore,
firms with majority shareholders survive in large numbers, some-
thing that one would not expect to observe if majority sharehold-
ers systematically consumed corporate wealth.238 In part, those
conclusions are based on the large shareholdings themselves: "ma-
jority shareholders typically hold more of the stock, 64 percent on
average, than would be rational if their sole objective were
expropriation."23 9
A discussion of the market for corporate control and dual-
class stock would not be complete without briefly considering oc-
casional calls for establishing a market for corporate votes. For
instance, in the 1980s, Wall Street professionals suggested the
creation of a market in which investors could buy and sell votes
separately from shares.240 The voting rights acquired in such a
234 ROMANO, supra note 111, at 12 n.33.
One explanation that is consistent with the substantial inside holdings and
stock price evidence is that the managers of the [dual-class] firms ... were
able to block takeovers before the recapitalization as well as after ....
[Hence], these empirical results [obtained by Partch, Gordon, and Jarell and
Poulsen], may not be useful in forecasting the impact of a recapitalization on
a typical publicly held corporation. Such typical firms have substantially
less inside ownership and are subject to takeover bids.
Ruback, supra note 98, at 172. Ruback anticipates a decline in the stock price of a
typical firm upon recapitalization. Id.
235 Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Sharehold-
ers in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 317, 318
(1988).
236 Id. at 318.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 344.
239 Id.
240 Blair et al., supra note 213, at 421.
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transaction would be temporary; they would revert to the seller
after some specified period, not unlike the plans to alter voting
rights described in Part II of this paper.24 ' It is argued that such
a market would improve the efficiency of the market for corporate
control and facilitate certain hostile takeovers.242
E. Public Policy and the Moral-Political View
The vague concepts of public policy and moral concerns have
also been held out as rationales for restrictive dual-class regula-
tion.243 Such proponents base their opposition on a belief that vot-
ing rights are non-negotiable, basic, and immutable and thus rep-
resent something that cannot simply be voted away.2 4 It has
been said that voting rights operate as a "minimal, fail-safe con-
straint on the integrity, diligence and competence of those who
manage publicly traded corporations."245 Under this view, the
corporation is correlatively analyzed as a nation-state or body pol-
itic. 246 As such, it is hypothesized that the legitimacy of the corpo-
rate enterprise (like a nation-state) will be undermined if voting
rights are permitted to be bargained away. 47 Michael Jacobs ar-
gues that disassociating voting power in elections from economic
risk undermines capitalism because the decision-makers are bet-
ting with someone else's money, and thus violating the golden
rule: He who has the gold sets the rules.248
This notion of voting rights has become an immutable part of
our corporate theoretical culture. Nevertheless, the right to vote
is generally more highly valued by a certain group of theoreticians
than by shareholders.2 49 In fact, many of those who strive to save
241 Id.
242 Id. "The efficiency benefits of market-determined assignments of voting rights
can be extended [to new firms] as well as existing securities if transactions in voting
rights are allowed... improving the welfare of outside shareholders." Id. at 422.
243 See Flocos, supra note 10, at 1785-93 (summarizing moral-political basis of
one share, one vote).
244 See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 1007-12.
245 Id. at 1008.
246 See Flocos, supra note 10, at 1788-93 (analyzing moral-political view and its
relation to contractarian approach).
247 Id.
248 JACOBS, supra note 47, at 139.
249 See Paul W. McCracken, The Corporation and the Liberal Order, in THE CoR-
PORATION: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY, (Michael Novak & John W. Cooper eds., 1981)
(citing OPINION RESEARCH CORP., 1978 SHAREHOLDER ArrrruDE SURVEY (1978)). The
following chart indicates the primary reasons different classes of stockholders
purchase stocks:
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the corporate franchise openly admit that the value of corporate
voting to shareholders is small and speculative, thus generally go-
ing unrecognized.25 °
Notwithstanding the potential equities that may occur in the
bargaining process, advocates for restrictive regulatory measures
often base their opposition on concerns of a more grand scale. For
example, Joel Seligman has argued that regardless of whether the
bargaining process is able to secure a fair deal for shareholders, "if
the basic economic effect of dual class voting structures is a loss in
management efficiency, a payment to shareholders will not com-
pensate society for that economic cost."25
1
IV. PUTTING DuAL-CLAss STOCK IN PERSPECTIVE
A. A Theoretical Primer
The process of capital formation clearly benefits from a calcu-
lable legal system composed of formal rules. There are two funda-
mentally different approaches to the nature of the corporation;
first, the contractual theory, and second, the concession (or regula-
tory) theory. These two theories, and derivations of them, contin-
uously battle to decide the content of these rules.252 The conflict is
ongoing because enterprises are continuously striving for better
forms of organization and more efficient production. The financial
PRIMARY REASON INDICATED FOR BUYING STOCK
Type of Add to Make Money Participate in
Stockholder Income Grow Mgt. Decisions Other
Professional 14 76 05 06
White Collar 16 74 06 06
Blue Collar 17 69 10 08
Housewives 19 72 08 04
Retired 34 60 06 04
Id.; see also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE Ac-
COUNTABILITY FOR THE SENATE COMMITEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AF-
FAIRS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 65-68 (Comm. Print 1980) (noting SEC staff report has
stated that, "[t]he majority of commentators expressed the view that shareholders
have little interest in participating in corporate governance-they are interested pri-
marily in the economic performance of their corporation"). In addition, a 1978 study of
approximately 500 dispersed public shareholders reported that 93.3 percent viewed
the decision to purchase stock as an investment rather than an ownership decision.
See Larry D. Soderquist & Robert P. Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and
Corporate Responsibility: New Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819, 835-
37; see also Flocos, supra note 10, at 1794-95.
250 Simmons, supra note 26, at 119.
251 Seligman, supra note 33, at 723.
252 See BUTLER AND RIBSTEIN, supra note 87, at 3-43 (describing theories in
detail).
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innovations that result implicate many of the core principles of
corporate law. Since the exchanges are an intricate part of this
system and do not enjoy monopolistic power, they must also adapt
their rules and be prepared for the consequences their actions
have on their own competitive position and the competitive posi-
tion of the firms they list.
Depending on the individual governance matter at issue, the-
orists with opposing views of the corporation may or may not be
discernably opposed. Regardless of the individual issue, however,
predetermined theologies of the corporation tend to drive the ana-
lytical process. In corporate governance, academics have histori-
cally enjoyed a formidable role in the rulemaking process. As a
result, their highly influential role and the dominant themes they
create have the potential to shape the corporate governance con-
troversies of the day. For instance, Paul W. McCracken noted
over ten years ago that:
there is a considerable element of scholasticism in the current
discussion, much of it stridently polemical in nature, about the
basic rightness or legitimacy of the modem corporation.... A
foundation stone of the case for the view that corporations are
somehow "getting away with something" is the assertion that
corporations have been created, and accorded certain privileges
[i.e., limited liability], by the state. They have received some sort
of "concession" from the state, and they should therefore be oper-
ated for the public benefit, not "just for the benefit of the owners
and managers," as it is often put.2 53
Those sentiments identify a theology still commonplace today, a
theology that identifies the corporation as a sociological and polit-
ical institution rather than an economic institution.5 4 It is a
theology in which Orwellian quotations are relevant because the
distinction between capitalistic and political institutions is
253 McCracken, supra note 249, at 36-37.
254 Id. at 38. The result has been a plethora of rules designed to constrain the
amount of harm that can fall on the "other constituencies" as a result of corporate
decision making. Scholars buttressed by implicit or explicit reference to market fail-
ure have developed a view of corporate governance in which workers and other con-
stituencies with a long term stake in the firm have direct access to governance power
structures. For example, such views often advocate express appropriation of seats on
the board of directors. For a summary of such views as a background to a discussion of
the law and economics of corporate governance, see WmLAIusoN, supra note 15, at
300.
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blurred,255 a theology in which equality is demanded regardless of
the efficiencies and incentives that are smothered.
When differences pervade the debate at this level, compro-
mise on smaller issues becomes a lengthy and difficult process.
Because dual-class-stock use implicates so many other areas of
corporate governance, the conflict regarding its use has been
drawn out and its resolution delayed to an even greater extent
than would otherwise be the case.
For example, when voting rights are viewed as immutable,
any voting rights exchange not tied to the underlying shares are
viewed with skepticism and commonly becomes characterized by
notions of lust for power (superbia), lust for wealth (cupiditas),5 s
or some other manner of ill-intentioned managerial self-interest,
regardless of the other advantages that may represent the reali-
ties of the exchange.257 In the end, such instincts compel one to
move toward a heightened legal regime, designed to control such
impulses, often with a patchwork set of rules that clearly take into
account the interests of those other than managers and owners.
Such regimes ignore the real efficiencies and incentives that can
result.
2 58
In the context of antitakeover laws, current rules are com-
monly designed to protect corporate constituencies other than
shareholders. 259 In the case of dual-class common stock, however,
255 Michael Jacobs, in his book on investment and shareholder activity, cites to
George Orwell's famous quotation in Animal Farm: "All animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others" at the beginning of his discussion on unequal
voting rights. JACOBS, supra note 47, at 138 (citing GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARE
(1946)). However relevant to a discussion of political rights quotations from Animal
Farm may be, it is entirely inappropriate in a discussion on corporate governance.
256 MICHAEL NovAE, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 37 (1991).
257 It is as if entrepreneurs, who are seeking to expand through the use of equity
capital, while seeking to avoid control dilution, suddenly can not be trusted; as if suc-
cess corrupts the moral discipline they needed to build the enterprise in the first
place. Id. at 32. And while it is true (particularly with reference to the mid-1980s)
that some disparate voting rights plans were proposed by management with dubious
intent, such instances are not systematically present over the years. Flocos, supra
note 10, at 1768.
258 Michael Jacobs notes "[flor the most part .... corporate governance issues
have been debated on the basis of fairness rather than economics. Suprisingly few
shareholder activists have put forth a legitimate case for how their corporate govern-
ance agenda would be in the economic interests of all owners." JACOBS, supra note 47,
at 73.
259 See Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STET. L. RE v. 121
(1991) (noting that some believe constituency statutes are necessary and beneficial);
see also id. at 121 n.2 (listing other articles discussing benefits of constituency stat-
utes). But see Henry A. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Cor-
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the same voices that have supported antitakeover amendments
and other corporate rules empirically detrimental to shareholder
interests suddenly rise in support of shareholder interests when
the topic shifts to unequal voting rights. Others who viewed the
shareholder voting process as venerable now seek to substitute
their judgement for that of the shareholders on the most momen-
tous vote of all - disenfranchisement. SEC action similarly illus-
trates this dichotomy. A certain degree of hypocrisy is evident in
comparing Rule 19c-4 with the Williams Act and the regulatory
system designed to govern proxy use. In recognition of this, the
AMEX proposal on dual-class stock 260 queried what may be the
fundamental questions of the debate:
If shareholders are incapable of choosing whether and how to ex-
ercise their franchise, then what is the rationale for continuing
the proxy process and allowing the same shareholders to vote on
issues of lesser or greater consequence? If, on the other hand,
the proxy process works, then it is the ultimate act of disen-
franchisement for a government agency or a self-regulatory or-
ganization to administratively determine once and for all what is
"best" for shareholders, and to deny them the ability to make
that choice for themselves.2 6'
As former SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., has noted, the
perspective taken by Rule 19c-4 and the one-share, one-vote advo-
cates "smacks of Central American 'democracy': if you don't like
the results of the election, stop having the elections."262
B. From Theory to Practice: An Empirical Perspective on the
Use of Dual-Class Common Stock
In light of the empirical evidence previously discussed, we
know that dual-class recapitalizations are generally implemented
in corporations with certain pre-existing ownership characteris-
tics. 263 Successful implementation does not necessarily mean,
however, that dual-class use is desirable. Many consider success-
ful implementation to be the result of coercion, which implies a
poration, 55 BRoOY L. REv. 767, 798-800 (1989) (discussing problems with constitu-
ency statutes); William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. Cin. L.
REv. 385 (1990) (criticizing constituency statutes).
260 See supra notes 163-88 and accompanying text (discussing AMEX proposal).
261 AMEX 1991 Proposal, supra note 40, at 24.
262 A.A Sommer, Jr., One Share/One Vote-The SEC Stumbles, DIRECToies
MoN rrHLY, Oct. 1988, at 1, 3.
263 See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
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negative connotation to dual-class stock. Yet, coercion can only
exist if the dual-class recapitalization decreases the shareholders'
value despite the shareholders' affirmative vote for it. Coercion
serves as a proxy for explaining how an affirmative vote can take
place when the transaction itself is inefficient.
If coercion were a part of the voting process, after recapitali-
zation one would expect decreases in the value of low-vote com-
mon stock and increases in the value of high-vote common stock.
Because the empirical evidence is at best mixed, the analysis be-
comes more complicated. The decision whether to regulate the
ability of shareholders to amend the voting rights contained in
corporate charters turns on surrogate issues. First, are there
sound economic reasons for firms to adopt voting structures other
than single-class common stock? Second, which firms are likely to
use a dual-class stock structure? Third, are policing mechanisms
available or incentives present to align the interests of the high-
vote group with those of shareholders who hold low-vote shares
after a dual-class structure is implemented? Fourth, do the incen-
tives available to the exchanges lead them to adopt efficient listing
rules for member firms? Fifth, are the theoretical problems asso-
ciated with dual-class stock amenable to institutional-investor
correction? The answers to these questions should provide a
proper framework for analysis, and together they should identify
the optimal regulatory model.
1. Are There Sound Economic Reasons for Dual-Class Stock?
As Professor Gilson explains, "[tihe justification offered for...
[a dual class] recapitalization ... is Rawlsian: that centralizing
control in those receiving the class with superior voting rights
somehow will increase the value of the company and, as a result,
will increase the value of the shares with limited voting rights."264
Theoretically, value increases originate in the economics of the
new shareholder/manager relationship and the dynamics of in-
sider control. Empirical studies on dual-class common stock sug-
gest that the Rawlsian hypothesis is not false.265 In fact, specific
264 Gilson, supra note 43, at 810. 'The philosopher John Rawls has argued that
the distribution of income and wealth is just if there is no alternative distribution that
would make the worst off people in society better off." POSNER, supra note 31, at 436.
(citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).
265 A number of researchers have examined the market valuation of voting rights
in dual and multiple share firms. See, e.g., Lease et al., supra note 89; Haim Levy,
Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock, 38 J. FiN. 79 (1983); De-
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theoretical rationales in support of the dynamics of dual-class use
have already been identified.
First, it has been stated that a dual-class structure can pro-
tect outside shareholders from coercive takeover tactics or from
selling their shares at less than value because they lack the infor-
mation possessed by the inside shareholder group.266 One diffi-
culty that dispersed shareholders face when confronted with a
hostile tender offer is that they are unable to act collectively; this
inability hampers their ability to negotiate. By definition, the
dual-class capital structure increases the power of inside share-
holders or the control group because it forces bidders to deal di-
rectly with a collusive group,2 67 thus augmenting the power of all
shareholders.
Professor Fischel and others have noted that the end result of
this bargaining arrangement (which is similar to that resulting
from the use of poison pills) is not likely to decrease the number of
control transactions but to increase the price paid per transac-
tion.268  There is some evidence that the implementation of defen-
Angelo & DeAngelo, supra note 215; Partch, supra note 197; Vijay M. Jog & Allan L.
Riding, Price Effects of Dual-Class Shares, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 58 (1986); Gordon,
supra note 44; FmST SEC STuDY, supra note 134; SECOND SEC STUDY, supra note 134;
Marcia H. Millon & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Voting Rights and Shareholder Wealth:
The Issue of Limited Voting Common Stock (1987) (unpublished manuscript, South-
ern Methodist University) (on file with author); Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 13;
Kenneth Lehn et al., supra note 91; Megginson, supra note 231.
266 Gilson, supra note 43, at 811. For examples of empirical research analyzing
this theme in regard to other takeover defenses, see Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B.
Poulsen, Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments
Since 1980, 19 J. FiN. EcoN. 127 (1987); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill
Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377 (1988); Peter Dodd & Richard
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: Unhealthy Competition versus Federal
Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of
the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. LAw, ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Larry Y. Dann & Harry
DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and The
Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (1983). See also Michael C. Jensen
& Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (summarizing literature on takeover defenses). For a review of
the literature on event studies of takeover laws, see RoMANo, supra note 111, at 60-66
(reviewing literature and studies in takeover laws).
267 See Lease et al, supra note 89, at 448.
268 Fischel, supra note 19, at 138-39; Lease et al., supra note 89, at 448. Strangely
enough, "[diespite the SEC's professed concern with the defensive use of dual-class
transactions, the Commission nonetheless specifically exempted from the reach of
Rule 19c-4 the two most effective antitakeover tactics in existence today-the poison
pill and the corporation's strategic defensive use of control-share acquisition stat-
utes." Flocos, supra note 10, at 1781. This was done despite the fact that poison pills
produce a loss averaging 0.34%; 1.51% when adopted by a firm which has been the
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sive tactics which allow management to negotiate with hostile bid-
ders may actually increase premiums paid in successful offers.269
There is also some evidence that benefits can result from increas-
ing managerial voting power while maintaining low marginal vote
ownership. Thus, the transfer of negotiating power to the insiders
has the potential to maximize value exchanges which would be
unattainable under one-share, one-vote structures.2 70
Furthermore, judicial review ensures the participation of the
low-vote shareholders in control premiums. As Professor Selig-
man has explained, "[w]ith dual class capitalization, courts will be
aware that a proposal adopted... ha[s] the collateral consequence
of enriching its managers. "2 7 1 This factor is likely to inspire skep-
tical judicial review.2 72
Second, the dual-class transaction eliminates the risk to man-
agement that shareholders will terminate their employment or
sell shares to a purchaser of control who might change the use of
subject of takeover speculation, 2.3% if the speculation has been recent (or a contest is
in progress), and 2.6% if the sample is confined to Delaware firms. EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 196-97. Jarrell and Poulsen note significant negative
changes associated with the announcements of antitakeover amendments, greenmail
payments, and poison pills ranging from 1% to 3%. Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 13,
at 132. In contrast, these authors cite 0.64% as the amount lost when firms recapital-
ize with dual-class stock. Id. at 197.
269 Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 13, at 132-33.
270 "Whether [owners] with voting control are free to turn down any bid for the
firm, no matter how lucrative, is an interesting fiduciary duty question." Gordon
supra note 44, at 4 n.3 (posing that question); see also Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,
460 P.2d 464, 472 (Cal. 1969) (holding breach of fiduciary duty in transfer of control
bloc to holding company, which is then taken public, rather than initiating a transac-
tion in which all shareholders could participate).
271 Seligman, supra note 33, at 720.
272 Id.; see Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding
shareholder who controlled firm's Class B voting shares and dominated directors,
management and affairs of the firm, to rigorous fiduciary standard). The shareholder
must prove not only good faith but also "inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation" of a decision to redeem the limited voting rights stock. Id. at 42 (quoting
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)); Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A-2d
624, 628 (Del. 1977) (noting actions of management which serve to prejudice interests
of subordinate security holders will be given close judicial scrutiny); see also Adolf A.
Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control," 39 HARv. L. REV. 673, 677-79,
682-90 (1926) (reviewing aspects of older case law suggesting that control of corpora-
tions by managing shareholders results in "rendering them analogous to trustees, im-
posing many of the duties which trustees normally have toward their cestuis que
trust"); see also Flocos, supra note 10, 1781-82 nn.93-95, 1784 n.106 (extensively list-
ing case law dealing with supervoting preferred, supervoting common, and reverse
recapitalizations whereby firm moves from two classes of stock to one).
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the firm's assets or rid itself of the current management team.273
The "idea is that managers, by making [a] firm-specific invest-
ment of their human capital, have thus implicitly contracted for
future payments." 27 4 The greater the managers' belief that they
may be denied a return on their firm-specific investments, the less
willing they will be to make them in the first place.
It has been stated that [o]ne's time, energy, strength, and at-
tention are, in a sense, one's capital."27 5 In firms characterized by
concentrated ownership structures, the firm-specific human capi-
tal investment may be considerable. This type of investment is
especially significant when entrepreneurs or families who have
devoted a significant amount of effort in the developmental stages
of the firm's existence hold control.2 7 6 Because such investments
may not be valuable to other firms, continued association and con-
tinued investment with the firm is necessary to induce further
firm-specific investment. Corporate governance rules that de-
crease the likelihood that those entrepreneurs will collect the re-
turn on their investments will necessarily weaken the incentives
to invest personal time and energy. Enabling those individuals to
hold high-voting-rights stock can thus promote and protect en-
trepreneurial investment while the firms they manage gain access
to the capital markets. In the end, society benefits because capital
for expansion is supplied to firms and incentives are put in place
for management acquisition of firm-specific skills. 7
In addition, when a family ownership group is present2 78 both
before and after recapitalization, the consolidation of control asso-
273 Fischel, supra note 19, at 137.
274 See Gilson, supra note 43, at 812. The term "human capital" reflects a recog-
nition that investment must be made in people before they become competent.
GEORGE F. WiLL, STATECRAFT As SouLcRAFT: WHAT GOVERNIiENT DOES 125 (1983).
275 NovAK, supra note 256, at 43.
276 DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 215, at 34, 63-68 (noting "substantial fam-
ily involvement" in 30 of 45 firms studied).
277 Notions of firm-specific human capital investment provoked the use of golden
parachutes in the event of a hostile control transaction. As Professor Fischel notes,
however,
[Tihe difference between insider control and golden parachutes is that in-
sider control protects managers from transfers of control while golden
parachutes compensate them in the event a transfer occurs. [While] [bloth
techniques have costs and benefits ... g]olden parachutes may be difficult to
negotiate.... [have] enforceability [that] is suspect... [and) create a moral
hazard.
Fischel, supra note 19, at 137-38.
278 See Flocos, supra note 10, at 1778 n.73 (indicating family owned or dominated
firms often typify dual-class firms). For example, the Washington Post, Dow Jones &
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ciated with a recapitalization is unlikely to increase agency costs
because of the unique social relationships among the group mem-
bers.2 79 Intrafamily relationships as a mechanism of oversight
within the family management team can be particularly force-
ful;28 0 it is said that friends and family can apply sanctions that
are unavailable to outsiders. 28 1 Family monitoring incentives are
thought to be "traceable to explicit and implicit contracts that tie
family welfare to company profitability, through the quasi rents
that relatives earn from employment at a family-controlled firm or
through family ownership of common-stock cash flows." 282
It was previously suggested that antitakeover methods such
as poison pills can achieve the same results as dual-class recapi-
talization without disenfranchising shareholders. Such compari-
sons are faulty, however. For instance, one critical difference be-
tween the two approaches lies in the character of approval
necessary for implementation.2 8 Whereas the board of directors
can issue poison pill preferred stock without shareholder approval
as long as the corporate charter authorizes the procedure,284 dual-
class stock issuance requires specific levels of shareholder ap-
proval. Moreover, the principal goal of the poison pill (normally
instituted before the takeover bid) is to protect shareholders of the
target company from a transaction by which the acquiring com-
pany secures control and freezes out the remaining shareholders
Company, Hershey Foods Corporation, Kaufman & Broad, Inc., Ford Motor Company,
The New York Times Company, Inc., A.C. Nielsen Company, the J.M. Smucker Com-
pany, The Gap, Inc., Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., Helene Curtis, Adolph Coors Co., DuPont,
Turner Broadcasting, the E.W. Scripps Company, and the Pulitzer Publishing Com-
pany are all family owned or dominated firms with dual-class capital structures that
are recognized as generally supplying familiar and successful products. Id.
279 Flocos, supra note 10, at 1777; T. COPELAND & J.F. WESTON, FNANCIAL THE-
ORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 340 (3d ed. 1988).
280 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 208, at 306; see DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra
note 215, at 54 (noting family members who controlled 44% of vote of Tasty Baking
Company conducted one day proxy fight and replaced one relative with another as
Chairman of Board).
281 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 305.
282 DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 215, at 54; see also Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 208, at 306-07.
283 GILSON, supra note 31, at 639.
284 Id. at 640. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that sufficient authority to
adopt a poison pill exists in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1991) as well as in DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). See, e.g., Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 500 A2d
1346, 1357 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del.
1985).
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at a low price.2 5 The goals of dual-class stock are different. Fi-
nally, because adoption of a poison pill does not ensure the same
degree of protection to those investing firm-specific human capital,
dual-class stock becomes a more valuable option.
A third benefit of dual-class stock is that it generally allows
holders of the supervoting stock (depending on the ratio of votes
per share, and the number of shares held) to diversify their firm-
specific stock holdings without losing control.2 6 As Professor Gil-
son notes, "by selling off some of their equity position, a control-
ling group can reduce the excessive unsystematic (and otherwise
potentially undiversifiable) risk that they bear as a result of their
large investment in the company."28 7 As such, the high-vote
shareholders will be less risk averse to investment projects be-
cause outside holders have taken on some of the firm's risk
through the purchase of the low-vote common shares.28 8 Without
the added source of funding and the resulting diversification,
these projects might have been replaced with less risky projects.
Dual-class stock enables the high-vote shareholders to better
match their levels of risk aversion with those of the public
shareholders.
If a firm characterized by large firm-specific holdings is not
permitted to adopt a recapitalization plan, control shareholders
may be forced to diversify their capital investment into products
whose profit streams are negatively correlated over time with
285 GiLSON, supra note 31, at 639.
286 Id. at 812.
287 Id. Research has shown that, on average, insiders tend to decrease their hold-
ings in the recapitalized firm. See Partch, supra note 197, at 332. One study found
that approximately 21 months after the dual-class recapitalization, the average pro-
portional ownership of equity owned by insiders was 43.7%, as opposed to a 48.6%
pre-transaction. Id.
288 Thus, if 25 shareholders hold all the voting stock in a corporation, and
that stock is reclassified as 50% voting and 50% non-voting, these same
shareholders will retain voting power in the same proportions as existed
before the transaction, but they will have simultaneously gained liquidity on
50% of their investment.
GLSON, supra note 31, at 124 n.60. While shareholders could, in fact, diversify their
portfolios to some degree, they would still have a great deal of investment, both
human capital and capital, in the firm. As such, the transaction described above may
initiate greater risk taking while at the same time spur human capital investment.
Also, overall low vote share liquidity increases because there are more low vote shares
in the public domain. Shareholders want riskier projects because they reap the bene-
fits of them; the downside risk is limited to the loss of their investment. Id.
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their primary product.2 8 9 In this way control shareholders can
avoid the secular variability associated with business cycles and
demand or cost shocks, thereby lowering the risk that is tied to the
single firm.290 This type of diversification is costly to noncontrol
investors, who can simply diversify their portfolio to receive the
same benefits. In addition, such diversification will not always re-
quire a shareholder vote.2 9 '
A fourth reason dual-class transactions may be beneficial is
that dual-class use shifts control into the hands of those who value
it most, creating a Pareto-optimal exchange. For example, placing
voting rights where their value is highest enables exchanging
shareholders to realize potential control premiums in the form of
current dividends on their low-voting stock, while high-vote hold-
ers get the vote which they consider more valuable than divi-
dends. As previously mentioned, because the value of the vote can
be tied to a potential control premium, the recapitalization actu-
ally implements a control premium exchange that might not
otherwise have taken place. The value that passes is the present
value of an unknown control premium. The value is unknown be-
cause it is uncertain that the current shareholders would have
ever realized the gain associated with a future control premium.
Empirical research indicates that the high-voting shares typi-
cally increase in value after the recapitalization.292 One study ex-
amining 152 British firms that have two or more common share
classes with different voting rights outstanding between 1955 and
1982 found that, on average, the superior voting shares have mar-
289 Debra J. Aron, Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size, and Diversification, 19 RAND
J. ECON. 72, 73 (1988).
290 Id.
291 See EARL W. KITNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 30 (1973).
A stock purchase, because it involves shareholders directly, does not require
the formality of a vote in most states.... The shareholders of the acquiring
corporation are not entitled to vote on the purchase. Nevertheless, the Rules
of [the NYSE and Amex] require a vote if the acquisition will increase the
outstanding shares of the acquiring corporation by 20 percent or more, or if
the directors, officers, or major shareholders of the acquiring corporation
have an interest in the acquired corporation.
Id. Appraisal rights are not required by most state statutes in stock acquisitions. Id.
292 See Lease et al., supra note 89, at 444. Research has shown that in firms with
two outstanding classes of common stock, the class with superior voting rights traded
at a premium of about 5 percent of the other. Id. But, in firms that have also included
a class of voting preferred stock, the class of common stock with the superior voting
rights traded at a significant discount to the class of common shares with inferior
voting rights. Id.
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ket prices that exceed those of the otherwise equivalent restricted
voting shares by 13.3 percent.2 93 This same study noted, in sum-
marizing the results of eight other studies, that "the overall pic-
ture that emerges from these studies is that shares of stock with
superior voting rights sell at a premium over those with inferior
voting rights, and that corporate insiders tend to concentrate their
personal holdings in the shares with superior voting rights."294 As
Peter Flocos has noted, however:
the fact that fully voting stock generally trades at some premium
relative to inferior voting stock indicates that the insider group
possesses some sort of realizable value that outsiders do not. Yet
this fact alone says nothing about whether the recapitalization
transfers wealth to the control group at the expense of public
shareholders. As Professor Gordon recognizes, the differential
likely reflects the pre-existing control premium of the insider bloc
as well as any wealth transfer to that bloc pursuant to the recap-
italization. Since the exact value of that premium is not known,
one cannot necessarily conclude that the recapitalization trans-
fers wealth to the insiders.2 95
Another reason given for issuing dual-class shares relates to
the perceived time preferences of different corporate shareholders.
For example, a firm that issues dual-class shares may be attempt-
ing to amplify the voting rights of a distinct group. That group
may be more likely to act in the long-term interest of shareholders
who are perceived as valuing the firm as an entity. 96 This ampli-
fication (whether empirically beneficial or not) aligns this share-
holder group with small portfolio investors who "find it un-
economical to purchase the advice of market professionals... and
cannot reasonably hope for trading profits ... [thus] if they are
rational, [they] will follow a buy and hold' strategy."2 9 7 Recently,
shareholders of the American Family Corporation approved a
dual-class recapitalization implemented through a plan to alter
voting rights; the express purpose of the recapitalization plan was
to reduce the voting influence of "speculative investors."
293 Megginson, supra note 231, at 186-87.
294 Id. at 176. But see DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 215, at 57 (finding com-
parable compensation among multiple common stock classes in twenty of thirty dual-
class firms contained in sample of acquired dual-class firms).
295 Flocos, supra note 10, at 1780 n.88 (citing Gordon, supra note 44, at 32 n.99).
296 Doug Sword, Scripps Offering to Insure Liquidity, Family Control, CINCINNATI
Bus. COURIER, Mar. 28, 1988, § 1, at 1.
297 MAcEY, supra note 16, at 13.
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A dual-class transaction can also decrease the costs involved
in supplying firm-specific information to the market itself or to po-
tential bidders in the market for corporate control. As Professor
Fischel explains, "[in situations of asymmetric information-
where managers have information that outside investors do not-
managers may have to employ costly signaling devices to commu-
nicate their private information."298 We can think of dual-class
transactions as a signaling device that shows the market that the
firm has valuable opportunities that need to be externally fi-
nanced. Fischel calls this the "shareholder interests explanation
of recapitalizations." 299
2. What Type of Firms Will Use Dual Class Stock?
In light of the increase in dual-class use in the 1980s, we are
better able to discern what type of firms are likely to use dual
class common stock. Professor Ronald Gilson singularly recog-
nized that the desirability of dual-class stock primarily depends
on the characteristics of an individual firm.30 ° He described two
types of firms: "question marks" and "cash cows."3 01
Gilson defines "question marks" as companies in an early
stage of development that suffer from capital shortages; their mar-
kets are growing quickly, they may have only recently gone public,
and the founding entrepreneurs still retain a dominant ownership
position. °2 Generally, such companies suffer from a tradeoff be-
tween cost of capital and loss of control; decision makers need cap-
ital but do not wish to lose the control that comes with it. Engag-
ing in a dual-class recapitalization before raising additional equity
capital allows a dominant shareholder group to secure capital for
investments with a positive net present value without forcing
298 Fischel, supra note 19, at 138. Examples of this include, dividend payout
changes, share repurchases, and high debt to equity ratios. Managers may take an
action which will prove costly if future cash flows turn out to be low. From this, inves-
tors may infer that the entrepreneur believes that cash flows will be high. The exist-
ence of information asymmetries between management and investors has been docu-
mented in previous studies of insider trading. See David H. Downes & Robert
Heinkel, Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues, 37 J. FIN. 1, 2-3
(1982); Jeffrey Jaffee, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1975);
Myron Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the
Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972).
299 Fischel, supra note 19, at 147.
300 Gilson, supra note 43, at 824. Such an explanation is the antithesis of the
"management entrenchment" explanation of recapitalizations.
301 Id. at 824, 828.
302 Id. at 827-28.
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them to bear a disproportionate amount of the cost or lose propor-
tionate control.3 03
The Lehn, Netter, and Poulsen study, comparing firms that
undergo a leveraged buyout (LBO") with those that undergo a
dual-class recapitalization, supports this "question mark" con-
cept. 0 4 Noting a "growth hypothesis" measured both in terms of
the average growth rate over the preceding five years and the one
year preceding the transaction,3 0 5 they found that sales growth
and employee growth are both significantly higher than before the
recapitalization. In addition, they found that dual-class firms
spend significantly more on advertising and R&D than LBO firms.
The authors also measured post-transaction growth opportu-
nities by calculating the percentage changes in capital expendi-
tures following the recapitalizations on a one-year-before to one-
year-after, two-years-after, and three-years-after format. They
found significant industry adjusted growth in capital expendi-
tures, standardized by sales, in all three measurement periods. 0 6
Such statistics indicate that, after the transaction, dual-class
firms increase capital expenditures significantly more than the
firms that have undergone an LBO. The results indicated that 47
percent of the dual-class firms accessed the public equity markets
after the transaction, with 41 percent of those issuances occurring
within three years after the dual-class recapitalization.3 0 7 On the
basis of those statistics, the authors concluded that, owing to a
continuing demand for external financing, growing firms are more
likely to consolidate control through a dual-class transaction than
an LBO.
Gilson finds further support for the "question mark" explana-
tion based on empirical share price data after the transaction.
Specifically, he notes early insignificant price changes result (on
303 Id. at 828.
304 Lebn et al., supra note 91, at 569-78 (comparing 380 firms that adopted either
dual-class recapitalization or went private through LBO during 1977 to 1987 and con-
cluding that choice between dual-class recapitalizations and LBOs is governed by firm
attributes that make one organizational form more desirable than another).
305 Id. The growth hypothesis included the following: dual-class firms have a
higher growth rate than LBO firms, both before and after the transaction, and dual-
class firms use the public capital markets after the transaction to raise capital. Id. at
558-59, 564-65. The study measured growth in several ways: average annual in-
crease in sales, employees, research and development costs, advertising intensity, and
capital expenditures Id at 571.
306 Id. at 577 tbl. 4.
307 Lehn et al., supra note 91, at 576.
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average) from dual-class recapitalizations: the impact on share-
holder wealth is small, whether positive or negative. He explains:
[Tihe market demands of the company's competitive environ-
ment already serve to align the interests of management and
shareholders. The gain from the dual class transaction . . .
should be reflected in an increase in the value of control shares,
not public shares. The market price of the preexisting single
class of common, however, reflects the value of non-controlling
shares so that, consistent with the data, the dual class transac-
tion should have little impact on the value of those shares [the
lack of voting power already being accounted for in the share
price]. 30 8
The Partch study adds support to this hypothesis as well. Partch
found that "shareholder wealth does not appear to be [signifi-
cantly] affected by the creation of a class of limited-voting-right
common stock."30 9 The downside to the expansion is that the firm
must bear increased cost of capital; the post-recapitalization issu-
ance will raise less money than it would have had voting rights
been attached.
A further negative implication associated with dual-class
stock has to do with its use by corporations that Professor Gilson
labels "cash cows." Cash cows are characterized as stable compa-
nies with high market shares, in slow-growing mature indus-
tries.31 0 They generally have large positive cash flows.3"' The
308 Gilson, supra note 43, at 829-30.
[Blecause the dominant shareholder group, unlike presumably diversified
public shareholders, already bears substantial unsystematic risk, the cost of
failing to increase market share falls more heavily on them than on public
shareholders. Thus, one would expect the investments to be made regard-
less of the shareholder vote on the dual class transaction and, as a result,
the valuation impact of the availability of positive net value investments al-
ready would have been incorporated into the company's stock price.
Id. at 830 n.62.
309 Partch, supra note 197, at 333. The entire Partch sample earned statistically
significant positive abnormal returns of 1.237% on the announcement date, and
2.125% over all event days examined. Id. at 326-27 tbl. 4. However, Partch suggests
that these are misleading because a positive abnormal return does not fairly describe
the sample; only roughly half of the returns are positive, and it is impossible to reject
chance as an explanation for the proportion of positive and negative results. Id. at
328. From announcement through approval, the entire sample experience insignifi-
cant negative abnormal returns of 1.775%. Id. at 327 tbl. 4.; see also Gilson, supra
note 43, at 819-20 (comparing abnormal return event time studies on dual-class com-
mon stock transactions of Partch, Jeffrey Gordon, and Gregg Jarrell and Annette
Poulsen).
310 See Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Fi-
nance and Takeovers, 76 AMER. EcoN. REv. 323 (1986) (discussing agency costs of free
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post-transaction economic benefits that this article has previously
discussed would be absent if a "cash cow" were to implement a
dual-class structure.312
For instance, in the post-transaction "cash cow," the opportu-
nities for managerial misbehavior are greater than in the post-
transaction "question mark." Jensen explains:
[Clash cows are subject to particularly severe conflicts of interest
between managers and shareholders. Managers want to increase
the amount of assets under their management even if that re-
quires undertaking investments with negative net present value,
while shareholders prefer that the free cash flow be distributed
to them so that they can then invest the funds more profitably on
their own.3 1
3
If a manager/shareholder group were to obtain control of this type
of company, managerial incentives would become perverted: cost-
cutting and self-interested distributions, rather than investments
with a positive net present value would result.3 14 If excess capac-
ity exists in the industry,31 5 such managers are apt to resist down-
sizing and exit.3 1 6 At best, the decision to initiate shutdown is
reached slowly and drains shares of value as product markets ulti-
mately force the manager to act. The removal mechanisms neces-
sary to rid the firm of inefficient management are limited after the
transaction, however. Dual-class use in the cash cow context is a
cause for concern.
Empirical evidence indicates that "cash cows" do not com-
monly undergo dual-class recapitalizations. In fact, research has
shown that "cash cows" will generally undergo an LBO when a
restructuring is to take place if there is not a dominant share-
holder group before the transactions. The result of the LBO trans-
cash flow situations where firms with large positive cash flow will often invest in
money losing capacity rather than initiate shutdown decision).
311 Id.
312 Agency costs are especially large for entities of this type. See Jensen, supra
note 310, at 323.
313 Gilson, supra note 43, at 824 (citing Jensen, supra note 310, at 323).
314 Gilson, supra note 43, at 826-27.
315 The world-wide tire industry is an example of this type of industry. Jensen,
supra note 15, at 847-48; see also Peter Huber, The Telephones, Competition, and the
Candice-Coated Monopoly, 16 REG., 34, 37 (1993) (noting excess capacity also exists in
long-distance telecommunications industry). Sprint alone has far more capacity than
it could possible hope to utilize in the near-term; it was capable in 1990 of supplying
146 percent of the market. Id.
316 Michael C. Jensen, A Revolution Only Markets Could Love, WALL ST. J., Jan.
3, 1994, at A6.
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action includes the sharing of gains with public shareholders. In
those circumstances, Gilson notes, "[a] dual class transaction sim-
ply could not achieve the gain[s]" that come with centralizing con-
trol.317 Thus, if implemented in the "cash cow," the dual-class re-
capitalization would serve only to entrench management, whereas
an LBO results in gain sharing with public shareholders."
The shareholders in typical "cash cows" should avoid such an
inefficient and costly control shift. Because management lacks a
significant share of the corporation's voting power,318 and the
shareholders do not receive any gain from an affirmative vote for a
dual-class implementation, the proposal should be blocked for lack
of public shareholder support.31 9 If a majority of votes is affirma-
tively cast in favor of the recapitalization, Gilson believes that
some form of coercion must be at work.
320
Therefore, it is clear that the benefits associated with a dual-
class transaction are tied to the ownership structure in place
before the transaction, which, in turn, is often a product of the
stage of growth in which a firm finds itself. As previously dis-
cussed, the pretransaction corporate entity is thought to have a
concentrated ownership structure-large family or insider hold-
ings and high-growth product markets. When this is the case,
Pareto optimalities can result from implementing the dual-class
structure. When this is not the case, dual-class-stock use will
often be detrimental to shareholder welfare.
C. Efficient Markets and Separation Theory
An efficient market-one that quickly incorporates the value
of new information about a firm into stock prices-will price,
among other things, corporate charter terms.3 2 ' The weak form of
the efficient capital market hypothesis, which has been subject to
rigorous empirical scrutiny, has established that current price
movements fully reflect any information contained in previous
317 Gilson, supra note 43, at 826-27.
318 While the average CEO of the 1,000 largest firms (measured by market value
of equity) held 2.7% of his or her firm's equity in 1991, the median holding was only
0.2% and 75% of CEOs own less than 1.2%. KEviN MURPHY, ExEcuTrVE CoMPENsA-
TION IN CORPORATE AmERICA (United Shareholders Association, 1992); see also Jensen,
supra note 15, at 864 (providing additional statistics).
319 Gilson, supra note 43, at 827.
320 See id. at 832-40 (analyzing shareholder coercion explanation for dual-class
transactions).
321 RomANo, supra note 111, at 72; see also JmEs H. Lom & MARY T. HAmi-
TON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97 (1973).
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stock prices, thus the history of securities prices does not yield ex-
ploitable trading opportunities. 22 The semistrong form (similarly
tested) tests how much time market prices require to adjust to
price-relevant information that is released to the public. 23
Because efficient capital markets price securities on the basis
of the cash flows that are expected to accrue to them and the riski-
ness of those cash flows, purchasers of limited-voting-class shares
in an IPO would price the shares based on the security's voting
rights, returns, and risk.3 24 In effect, they "price protect
themselves."325
Jensen notes that the owner/manager will bear the wealth ef-
fects of those agency costs because of the equity market anticipa-
tion. "Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the
owner-manager's interests diverge somewhat from theirs, hence
the price they will pay for shares will reflect monitoring costs and
the effect of the divergence between the managers' interest and
theirs."326 In addition, because the purchasers in an IPO have no
preexisting association with the issuing firm, they cannot be co-
erced to buy those shares.3 2 7
Thus, investors purchasing stock in firms that initially capi-
talize with dual-class stock will pay less for their shares: a reflec-
tion of the security's voting rights, returns, and risk. 3 2  The inves-
322 See JAMEs H. LORIE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORms AND EVIDENCE 56
(2d. ed. 1985); Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The
Emergence of Close Substitutes For The New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75
CORNELL L. REy. 1007, 1013 (1990); Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Re-
view of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 401 (1970) (proposing division of
ECMH into "weak," "semi-strong," and "strong" forms). The ECMH has been widely
accepted by scholars, regulators, andjudges. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Invest-
ments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and
Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 N.W. L. Rv. 987, 987 (1992).
323 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 555 n.26 (1984). "These studies typically ask whether
trading activity that follows the release of such information can earn investors abnor-
mally high returns and focus on the security's price history before and after the test
period." Id. The results of these tests indicate "efficient price responses to a wide
variety of publicly released information." Id.
324 Ruback, supra note 98, at 169.
325 Id. at 170.
326 Id. at 313.
327 Id.
328 RoiaNo, supra note 111, at 87. "Some commentators use imperfect informa-
tion arguments to advocate a substantial mandatory component in corporation codes.
They contend that shareholders are inadequately informed about charter terms com-
pared to manager-drafters and thus will mistakenly invest in firms with disadvanta-
geous charter terms, a situation that could be avoided by prohibiting the offending
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tors do not lose wealth because of such discounting. Conversely,
this means that founders will bear the cost of retaining voting con-
trol. Whether that cost negates the gain intended by the use of
the low-vote or nonvoting shares is not certain.
For example, some do not accept the inevitability of the
owner/manager wealth loss that Jensen hypothesized.32 Apply-
ing separation theory,330 Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black main-
tain that founders can gain by going public with a nonvoting or
limited voting class of stock.331 They assert that when the separa-
tion theory applies:
so that proposed corporate action affects shareholder wealth only
by its impact on the value of corporate stock, and when markets
are informationally efficient, shareholders will not hold their
views about a proposed corporate action with different intensities
.... Cast in terms of public choice the implication is that all
voters hold their views with equal intensity, in which event pub-
lic choice theorists have demonstrated that a majority decisional
rule is inefficient. 332
Gilson and Black maintain, however, that when a founder or
founding group wishes to reserve control because of extensive
human-capital investment, but needs access to outside equity
markets, the separation theory does not apply. More specifically,
they assert that
because a corporate action will impact the founders not only
through its effect on the value of the corporation's stock, but also
through its impact on the value of the founders' human capital,
... separation does not apply between the founders and the pub-
lic,.., because control has a private value to the founders that it
provisions." Id. at 71; see, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1464-70 (1989); see also Lynn Stout, The Unimpor-
tance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988). The efficiency of U.S. capital markets under-
mines the initial contract information asymmetry arguments of mandatory rule advo-
cates; at least at the initial offering stage of firm evolution. See Romano, supra note
111, at 72.
329 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 99, at 130-33 (discussing separation theory
and voting rules); GILSON, supra note 31, at 510-12.
330 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 99, at 132. The separation theorum states that
the determination of an optimal portfolio of risky assets is independent of the individ-
ual's risk preferences. See James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards
Risk, 25 REv. OF ECON. STUD. 65 (1958) (originally setting forth separation theorem).
331 GILSON & BLAck, supra note 99, at 133.
332 Id. at 130.
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does not have to the public. Separation only applies amongst the
public shareholder group. 333
In this situation, the founders may gain by going public with a
nonvoting or limited voting class of stock because the public, for
whom separation does apply, will not value control as highly.334
Some proponents of the enabling structure of corporation
codes and efficient markets, however, are not as vociferous in their
support of midstream charter amendments. 5 For example, some
believe that firms should not be permitted to opt out of the code
provisions that make management behavior subject to fiduciary
standards or preexisting provisions for voting rights.336 Generally,
those sentiments are based on the perceived decreases in share
value associated with the absence of traditional policing mecha-
nisms. 37 The general proposition appears to be that such de-
creases tend to effectively fall on a firm's current shareholders.
D. Industry Specificity
Capital formation does not function uniformly across time or
industries. A variety of variables are to blame, some of which are
political, others more market-based. For example, with all of the
recent talk about price controls by the Clinton administration,
debt markets have collapsed for small biotech companies. Equity
capital is the only form of capital such firms can obtain. 3 8 Recent
tax policy is also illustrative.339 For example, under the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1993, investors who buy stock in some small
333 Id. at 133.
334 Id.; see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 208, at 305-07 (indicating that foun-
ders would bear cost of retaining control and will end up no better off for their efforts
at separation).
335 It can be said that even in the IPO context, the limited voting rights offering is
really a recapitalization, because the transaction would involve an exchange of found-
ing shares of the pre-transaction single class of voting stock for shares of a new class
of voting stock and a class of limited voting or non-voting stock. The limited stock
would then be sold to the public. GiLsoN & BLACK, supra note 99, at 132 n.1.
336 RoMANo, supra note 111, at 72 (discussing this debate at length); see Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLmJ. L.
REV. 1395, 1399-1404 (1989) (discussing debate on contractually opting out of code
provisions); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing same
debate).
337 See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing loss of management
efficiency in dual class structure).
338 Jeanne Saddler, Small Businesses Debate Provision on New Budget Bill, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at B2.
339 Id.
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companies (excluding service providers, farms, mineral-extrac-
tors, and certain others) and hold it for at least five years can cut
their capital gains taxes in half.3 40 Because new, high-technology
firms are often the type of companies interested in implementing a
dual class structure, tax benefits such as those may spur market
interest in equity ownership and thus in dual-class stock.
More theoretical differences between debt and equity use as-
sociated with transaction-cost economics are also relevant to this
discussion because the asset characteristics of investment projects
are often closely associated with specific industry groups. The
governance structure attributes of distinct industries and indus-
try segments are similarly distinguishable. 4 '
The transaction-cost approach maintains that some projects
are easy to finance by debt and, in fact, ought to be financed by
debt: projects for which physical asset specificity is low to moder-
ate.342 Where asset specificity is high, equity financing, which af-
fords more intrusive oversight and involvement through the board
of directors and, in publicly held firms, permits share ownership to
be concentrated, is the preferred financial instrument. 43
The conclusion is that asset-specific firms in growth markets,
whose structure contains firms with owner/managers with limited
resources and an aversion to proportionate control dilution, may
find that a dual-class structure is Pareto optimal.34 Allowing
those firms to use the dual-class option enables them to access
capital markets without sacrificing the incentive intensity of the
entrepreneurial ownership group. 45 More restrictive regulatory
measures can thus cause harm by decreasing the value of firms in
340 I.R.C. § 1202 (1995); see also Saddler, supra note 338 (noting that company
must not have aggregate gross asset value of $50 million both before stock issuance
and immediately afterward).
341 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 135, 168 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds. 1989);
Kenneth Leln et al., Capital Structure, Dividend Policy, and Corporate Governance in
the U.S. Communications Industry, 1984-1992, (forthcoming 1994).
342 Williamson, supra note 341, at 168. Debt will be 'utilized if the ability to
exploit potentially profitable investment opportunities is limited by the resources of
the owner .... [and] the marginal wealth increments from the new investment
projects are greater than the marginal agency costs of debt, and these agency costs
are in turn less than those caused by the sale of additional equity." Oliver Williamson,
Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FN. 567, 578 (1989) (citing Jen-
sen & Meckling, supra note 209, at 343).
343 Id.
344 Id. at 167-68.
34 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 209, at 305-60.
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specific industry groups and causing them to suffer from a compet-
itive disadvantage as compared with competitors who may have
originally capitalized with dual-class stock or have chosen to list
on an exchange that permits the use of dual-class stock.
Some recent events warrant mention. In the broadcasting,
publishing, and telecommunications fields, dual-class stock is fre-
quently used. 4 6 Historically, its use has been associated with
what is often called editorial integrity. Dual-class stock is also fa-
vored by entreprenuers in high-tech industries, such as cellular,
wireless, and cable telephone.
Telecommunications, broadcasting, and media industries are
the current leaders in merger and acquisition activity.34 7 Dual-
class companies have played a large role in that activity. For ex-
ample, the New York Times recently purchased Affiliated Publica-
tions, owner of the Boston Globe. Between the two companies
there are seven different classes of authorized stock.348  The
purchase was structured so that Affiliated Class A (low vote) and
Class B shareholders received a combination of Class A New York
Times shares (low vote) and cash. In addition, three Affiliated di-
rectors will be given seats on a new eighteen-member New York
Times board. The acquisition was ratified by 75 percent of the
holders of the New York Times Class A and Class B shareholders,
346 Douglas C. Ashton, Dual-Class Stock, Telecommuncations, and the SEC, 18
REG., (forthcoming 1994). For example, Turner Broadcasting, Dow Jones and Com-
pany, The Washington Post Company, The New York Times Company, Times Mirror,
Nextel Communications, Affiliated Publishing, McCaw Cellular, Liberty Media,
Viacom, Pulitzer Publishing, Media General, Vanguard Cellular, Westwood One, In-
finity Broadcasting, and a host of other smaller concerns have dual-class capital
structures. Many of the publishing firms are thought to use dual-class structures in
order to preserve editorial integrity. Id.
347 Randall Smith, AT&T, MeCaw Deal Could Spur Others, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
1993, at C1. "[Glommunications megadeals had already fueled a 29% increase in
merger activity over the 1992 level .... Counting AT&T/McCaw, U.S. merger activity
... is up 64% from last years level .... [1993's volume] is the busiest since the record
year of 1989 .... "Id.
34 The New York Times Class A shares trade publicly and have limited voting
power. They can select five of the fourteen members of the Times board and can vote
on stock and asset acquistions and other matters required by law. The New York
Times Class B Shares, which are not publicly traded, vote on most matters required
by law and have the power to select nine members of the Times board. Times Class B
shares are freely convertible into Times A shares on a share-for-share basis. See Al-
lan Sloan, Even With Creative Accounting, Free Meals Are Hard to Come By, WASH.
POST, Aug. 3, 1993, at B3; AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS INC., 1992 ANuAL REPORT 21
(1993); THE NEW YORK TMES ComPANY, 1993 PRoxy STATErmNT 3 (1993).
1994] 939
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
approximately 80 percent of the Class A Affiliated shareholders,
and more than 93 percent of the Affiliated Class B shareholders.
The merger of Infinity Broadcasting and Westwood One,
which gives the combined companies a 40 percent share of the
U.S. radio-network business, involved no less than five classes of
common stock. One of the classes involved, Westwood One Class
B stock, was entitled to fifty votes per premerger share compared
to Westwood One Class A shares that were entitled to only one
vote.349
On an even grander scale, Bell Atlantic, TeleCommunications
Inc. ("TCI"), and Liberty Media recently announced plans to
merge into a single dual-class firm.350 The merged company will
have a second class of common stock that, for a time, will have
lower dividend rights. This Class B Bell Atlantic stock must be
converted into Class A Bell Atlantic common stock after a five-
year period. This deal has the effect of merging five classes into
one, in a two-step process. Both TCI and Liberty Media shares
trade publicly.351
The dual-class capital structures used by TCI and Liberty Me-
dia enabled TCI to quickly spin off programming operations to
Liberty Media to calm congressional fears that the company was
growing excessively powerful with its major holdings in both cable
systems and programming.352 Two years later, TCI and Liberty
Media merged in a strategic move hastened by an ill-fated bid to
merge with Bell Atlantic. 53 The structure of these deals provides
a case study in the value of creative capital structuring.
349 See 1991 WESTWOOD ONE, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1992) (noting Westwood
One has dual-class structure, one class of which trades on NASDAQ); 1992 INFINTY
BROADCASTING CORP., FoRM 10-K F-3 (1993) (noting that Infinity Broadcasting, Inc.
has three classes of common stock, one class of which trades on NASDAQ); see also
David J. Jefferson, Infinity to Merge Radio Network With Westwood, WALL ST. J., Oct.
12, 1993, at A4.
350 Bell Atlantic utilized a NYSE exemption on dual-class prohibition which facil-
itated the all-equity deal leaving Bell Atlantic with a dual-class structure. Bell Atlan-
tic, TCI, and Liberty Media Announce Merger, BuLL. (Investor Relations, Bell Atlantic
Corporation), Oct. 18, 1993.
351 Johnnie L. Roberts et al., TCIAgrees To Repurchase Liberty Media, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 8, 1993, at A3.
352 Id.
353 Id.; see Laura Landro & Johnnie L. Roberts, QVC Is Near Agreement With
BellSouth on $1.5 Billion in Paramount Bid Funds, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 9, 1993, at A3.
Due to antitrust concerns, Liberty Media ultimately had to sell its stake in QVC to
Bell South in order for QVCs bid to move forward). Id.; see also Johnnie L. Roberts &
Randall Smith, QVC Wants Liberty Media To Sell Its Stake, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1993,
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In the battle for Paramount Communications, a single-class
firm, no less than five of the firms involved had dual-class capital
structures: TCI, Comcast, Viacom, Liberty Media, and Turner
Broadcasting.354 The complexity of Turner Broadcasting's capital
structure rivals that of TCI's. It has five classes of stock: three
preferred, two common. 55 Viacom, like TCI and Liberty Media,
has two classes of common stock that are both publicly traded.
The liquidity this affords is extremely useful when there is heavy
merger and acquisition activity or when a dual-class firm finds it-
self in a bidding war. Recent events, triggered by a Delaware
court decision 5 6 that forced new, higher offers from both Viacom
and QVC, are illustrative.
Viacom, who initially proposed a friendly agreement with
Paramount Communications, Inc., was forced to raise its offer for
Paramount a number of times in response to a series of bids by
QVC. Viacom has also used its Class B shares in a bid to acquire
Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.357 The combined company
eventually emerged as the winner in the battle for Paramount.358
The use of the Class B low-voting stock in the Blockbuster
purchase has enabled Sumner Redstone to maintain a hold on 61
percent of the voting power of the new company. 59
Cable concerns such as Century Communications, Continen-
tal Cablevision, Adelphia, Jones Intercable, and Cablevision Sys-
tems are also dual-class companies, some of which have used their
dual-class structures for more modest strategic planning.360
at A3. Liberty Media Inc. owned 22% stake in QVC Network, Inc. which had offered
to acquire Paramount Communications, Inc. Id.
354 See Anita Sharpe, The Mavericks Who Stalked Paramount: Turner Stymied
By Own Board in Failed Bid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at BI; Key Players in the
Paramount Battle, WAIL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1993, at B1.
355 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1993).
356 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1993).
357 Johnnie L. Roberts & Randall Smith, Viacom Bid Doesn't Appear To Win Par-
amount Race, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at A3. At one time, the tender offer by
Viacom included both its Class A shares and its Class B shares. Id. The latest offer,
however, only included its Class B shares. Id.
358 Randall Smith, The Paramount Takeover: Wall Street's Final Analysis: Might
Made Right, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1994, at B1.
359 Roberts & Smith, supra note 357, at A6.
360 For instance, Century Communications had used their limited voting shares
in purchases of independent telephone companies. PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE GEO-
DESIC NETwoRx H, 1993 REPORT ON Co1mPsR rrIoN IN THE TELEPHONE INDUsTRY, 2.57
n.202. Comcast, the nation's fourth-largest cable company, recently paid $1.1 billion
for Metromedia's cellular interests and acquired a major stake in Nextel. Id. at 2.65
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Visionaries in those industries realized early on that capital
structuring could be a key part of their strategic planning. More-
over, they realized that successful firms in high-tech, high-growth,
and highly regulated industries would require periodic external
financing for internal expansion, as well as greater flexibility to
engage in strategic acquisitions and consolidations.3 6 '
Thus, while dual-class structures add flexibility to a firm's
overall decision-making capabilities, dual-class use keeps the key
decision makers (such as Sumner Redstone of Viacom, John Ma-
lone and Robert Magness of TCI, and Ted Turner of TBS) in con-
trol of the firm's voting power. This enables those firms to take
advantage of new developments in technology or changes in regu-
lation faster than single-class rivals, whose actions may require a
more extended or costly voting process.3 62 In telecommunications,
where technology breakthroughs and court decisions create in-
stantaneous opportunities and challenges, entrepreneurs place a
high value on control. Thus, firms demand the dual-class option.
1. Policing Mechanisms and Incentives for Wealth
Maximization
The separation of ownership from control creates an agency
problem: managers will run the firm according to their own int-
erests rather than the interests of the shareholders. Because
agency costs must be contained for resources to be allocated effi-
ciently, shareholders have developed mechanisms designed to re-
duce those costs by policing managers. In addition, corporations
n.231. Eighty-percent of Comcast is owned by the Roberts family. Johnnie L. Rob-
erts, Comcast President Paved Way for Bold Bid by QVC Network, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 1993, at B1.
361 For example, LDDS Communications, the fourth-largest long distance com-
munications company in the United States, has been involved in no less than eleven
acquisitions and three mergers in the last three years. LDDS Communications does
not have two classes of common stock outstanding, but does have the authorization to
issue two classes of common stock. LDDS COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 1992 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 3, 25-26 (1992). The use of dual-class stock is not limited to U.S. firms. Rogers
Communications, Canada's national communications company, and Telefon AB L.M.
Ericsson, a Swedish telecommunications company, have dual-class capital structures.
ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 46 (1992); Stephen D. Moore,
Ericsson Swung Into the Black For 3rd Quarter, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1992, at A9.
362 See, e.g., Anita Sharpe, Turner Stymied By Own Board in Failed Bid, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at B1 (noting Turner Broadcasting purchased New Line Cinema
and Castle Rock Entertainment in stock deals that enabled key shareholders such as
TCI and Time Warner to keep their 23% and 24% respective voting stakes relatively
intact).
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have also used the forces in various markets to help lower the
costs associated with the agency problem.3 63 Michael Jensen has
noted that, "[t]here are only four control forces operating on the
corporation to resolve the problems caused by a divergence [of in-
terest]."3 64 These include: capital markets, legal/political/regula-
tory systems, product and factor markets, and internal control
systems headed by the board of directors. 36 5 While the end goal of
reducing costs is constant, the effectiveness of these mechanisms
fluctuates over time and across firms.
At the "question mark" stage of firm evolution, the product
market plays the most important role in keeping agency costs at a
minimum. 366 In theory, product markets exert competitive pres-
sures that force managers to act in their own interest and thus in
their shareholders' interest as well. Simply put, if a firm's prod-
ucts are unsuccessful in competitive markets, the firm cannot sur-
vive in the long run, and managers end up losing their firm-spe-
cific human investment, not to mention any personal capital
investment. The presence of shareholder/manager groups in
many "question mark" companies is characterized by huge firm-
specific human investment as well as substantial capital invest-
ment. Because of this presence, the shareholder/manager group's
personal interest in the share price appreciation-which is associ-
ated with successful products-minimizes the conflict of interest
problems normally associated with the shareholder/manager rela-
363 BUTLER & RmsTEIN, supra note 87, at 2. These mechanisms may substitute
and compliment the legal rules found in state corporation laws. Id. This goal of ensur-
ing managerial accountability was listed by the SEC as one of the primary goals of
Rule 19c-4. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
364 Jensen, supra note 15, at 850. As Michael Jensen has noted, however, "[t]he
legal/political/regulatory system is far too blunt an instrument to handle the problems
of wasteful managerial behavior effectively .... Substantial data support the proposi-
tion that the internal control systems of publicly held corporations have generally
failed to cause managers to maximize efficiency and value." Id. Moreover, as previ-
ously mentioned, the corporate control market itself is not a strong force for policing
managerial activity in the dual-class firm. See id. at 852-54 (asserting that corporate
internal control systems are ineffective).
365 Id.
366 This role will continue as long as the firm does not have market power, be-
cause a firm with market power will not be driven out of business by competition in
the product market. See H. Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency versus X-Efficiency, 56
Aiu. ECON. REV. 392 (1966); MIcHAEL A. CREw & PAUL R. KIaINDORF7R, THE EcONOM-
ICS OF PmLic UTILrrY REGULATION 8 (1986). If the market is contestable, such as the
airline industry, then this problem (known as "X-efficiency") may be negated by the
threat of entry. See WILuiX . BATMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THE-
ORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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tionship in large corporations.367 Public shareholders can rely on
this to negate the lack of influence the corporate control markets
and labor markets will have on the dual-class firm and thus keep
agency costs from increasing. While the problem with product
markets is that they are often slow to act-when they take effect
it is often too late to save much of the enterprise-their discipline
is inevitable. 68
A corporation's ability to compete effectively in its product
markets is related, among other things, to its ability to raise capi-
tal.3 69 Capital markets serve the function of allocating investor
capital efficiently to participating firms. As mentioned earlier, if
management is to secure initial and future capital, it must offer
attractive terms to investors.3 70 The control group in the dual-
class firm will have a stake in keeping both the access to capital
markets open and the costs of capital down. Misbehavior will
raise the cost of capital, lower current share price, and ultimately
leave the firm uncompetitive. As such, it is neither in the man-
agement's nor the shareholders' interests to see a corporation's
ability to raise capital impaired. 71
Finally, exchange rules and state corporation codes are sup-
ported by a system of common law rules designed to balance the
shareholder/manager relationship. The fiduciary standards ap-
plied to managerial conduct remain applicable in the dual-class
firm. In fact, high-vote shareholders who also serve in a manage-
ment capacity may be held to an even higher standard of care
than would normally be the case.
367 See Flocos, supra note 10, at 1776-77 n.66 (noting empirical studies demon-
strate that, "in the average recapitalizing firm, the management insider group's own-
ership in pure equity terms is very high, on the order of 40% or so.... in marked
contrast to the usual situation in large public corporations, where median equity own-
ership of CEO's ... is... 0.25%."); see also SECOND SEC STUDY, supra note 134, at tbl.
4; Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 13, at 141; Lucian Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1820, 1842 (1989).
368 See Jensen, supra note 15, at 850.
369 See RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 5 (1978). The
competition in the capital market, operating through the market for corporate control,
may be perceived as less direct and less immediately compelling, leaving great poten-
tial for product inefficiency in the long term if the market is characterized as a natu-
ral monopoly; the potential is minimized if the market is competitive. See CRw &
KLEINDORFER, supra note 366, at 8.
370 WINTER, supra note 369, at 5.
371 Id. at 30.
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These three control forces, when combined with the docu-
mented characteristics of the management/shareholder group
and, to a lesser extent, the interplay of family pressure, can be
relied on to influence favorably the agency costs associated with
the dual-class firm.
2. Competition Among the Stock Exchanges
In years past, public companies would initially trade on the
NASDAQ,3 72 and then graduate to the AMEX.373 If the company
grew large enough to meet the capital requirements of the NYSE,
it would eventually decide to list there.3 74 Each exchange had a
distinct market, and competition was weak.
Those conditions have changed dramatically. 5 In terms of
listings and volume, although the AMEX now runs a distant third
to its rivals, it is slowly emerging as the best market for small
companies. 376 The NASDAQ, on the other hand, is now consid-
ered a strong rival to the NYSE. 7
372 The term "over-the-counter market" traditionally has referred to trading done
offthe floor of an organized stock exchange. Macey & Kanda, supra note 322, at 1008
n.5.
373 Bill Graham, Should The AMEX Get More Respect?, 10 CFO 53 (Jan. 1994).
374 In the past, new US companies listed on the American Stock Exchange or that
were traded over-the-counter often had disparate classes of common stock for reasons
cited earlier in this paper. The New York Stock Exchange, as mentioned in Part I,
historically forbade the practice, thus companies that grew large enough to be listed
on the NYSE restructured into a single class form prior to listing. Jenny Chung, Dual
Share Issue Hits Hong Kong Business Today, UPI, July 8, 1987, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI Files.
375 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 373 (noting NASDAQ provides at least one mar-
ket maker with vested interest in company, thus giving companies feedback on share
price and volume). NASDAQ stocks also trade at wider spreads than stocks on a com-
parable exchange-spreads that market makers and brokers profit from. Id. Thus,
brokers (who may get paid for order flow) have incentive to push a NASDAQ stock. Id.
Graham also notes that 'the differences between the AMEX and the NASDAQ may
dwindle in the wake on a long awaited SEC Market 2000 Report." Id.; see also Christi
Harlan, Market 2000 Sets Its Sights on the Present, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1993, at A15
(discussing SEC Market 2000 Report).
376 Graham, supra note 373, at 53.
377 Id. at 55-56. It should also be noted that comparing NASDAQ volume to that
of other exchanges is somewhat deceiving. Bill Graham notes, "[clomparing volume
on NASDAQ to volume on the Big Board or the AMEX is like comparing kiwis and
kumquats". Id. "On an exchange, a specialist matches buyers with sellers; when a
buyer takes 500 shares, the volume is 500 shares." Id. "Buy 500 shares from a NAS-
DAQ market maker, and there is a possibility that volume will jump to 1,500
shares-if the market maker is short the stock and buys it from another market
maker, which in turn may also list the trade." Id.
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The NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASDAQ are all profit-mak-
ing economic organizations; they advertise for listings and provide
services that are not limited to the execution of trades.3 7 8 In addi-
tion, each exchange has quantitative and qualitative listing stan-
dards. Those rules and the reputation each exchange carries in
the public domain convey information to investors, such as the
size and net earnings of listed firms, and the different listing and
accounting standards required of members.3 79 As technology has
developed, however, the distinction between the over-the-counter
securities markets and the organized stock exchanges has become
blurred.38 0 As such, they should be perceived and regulated as
members of a highly competitive industry.8 1
Firms with publicly traded stock typically have shown a
strong interest in having their shares traded on an exchange even
though they are not required by law to do so. Thus, it stands to
reason that exchanges must be offering something of value. 82
Jonathan Macey maintains that organized exchanges provide list-
ing companies with the following benefits: "(1) liquidity, (2) moni-
toring of exchange trading, (3) standard form, off-the-rack rules to
reduce transactions costs, and (4) a signalling function that serves
to inform investors that the issuing companies' stock is of high
378 The NYSE, the NASDAQ, and now even the AMEX, are involved in advertis-
ing battles for stock market supremacy. Graham, supra note 373, at 55-56. Cur-
rently, the NYSE has taken to calling itself the "capital of capital," while the NAS-
DAQ uses the slogan, "the stock market for the next 100 years." Id. The AMEX claims
to offer companies less volatility than NASDAQ, more protection against short-sell-
ers, a wider variety of services for executives, more useful trading numbers, and bet-
ter treatment of investors. Id. at 51-55.
379 See Macey & Kanda, supra note 322, at 1040.
[Ain important attribute of listing on the NYSE is the fact that obtaining a
listing confers prestige on the listing firm .... Because it is costly for buyers
to obtain, interpret and verify information about the firms in which they
may want to invest, such investors will pay to have "reputational in-
termediaries" serve as a filter.
Id.; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 325, at 1040 (discussing decline of NYSE
as dominant provider of reputational capital).
380 Macey & Kanda, supra note 322, at 1008.
381 Id. at 1010.
382 Id. at 1009. The purpose of a well-developed secondary market is to provide
liquidity for investors. See Jonathan Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the
SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 325-27
(noting market liquidity allows investors to dispose of shares quickly and cheaply). In
illiquid markets, investors will discount the price they are willing to pay for shares,
resulting in a concomitant rise in the cost of capital. MAcEY, supra note 16, at 10.
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quality."3 ' These four functions all serve to reduce the agency
costs endemic to the modern corporation. 4
Firms choose an exchange by determining which one will
maximize the value of the firm. They agree to be bound by its
rules; these rules decrease costs by supplying terms that form a
standard contract between members and shareholders which
would otherwise have to be supplied at the firm's expense.
The function of exchange rules also involves what Macey calls
"off-the-rack" rules on matters seemingly unrelated to secondary
market trading.8 5  Often these rules relate to matters of corpo-
rate governance. For example, the NYSE requires listed compa-
nies to have a minimum of two outside directors and to have an
audit committee solely comprised of independent directors. 8 6
Similarly, the NYSE "require[s] that listed firms review and over-
see transactions with related parties on an ongoing basis."38 7 In
addition, the NYSE has pioneered procedures such as: annual
shareholder meetings, requirements in which shareholders are
permitted to vote on key corporate issues, such as mergers, and
requirements that firms distribute audited financial state-
ments. 88 The NASDAQ has at least ten corporate governance
standards to which a company must adhere to qualify for
admission.38 9
Because the services offered by exchanges in matters of corpo-
rate governance are devised in a competitive environment similar
to that seen among states competing for corporate charters, we
can expect the conflicts to be similar and many observations to
crossover. The key question to be asked is also analogous: does
the competitive environment that exists among the SROs resem-
ble a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top"? The SEC, when
formulating Rule 19c-4, was concerned that a "race to the bottom"
would occur in the absence of a uniform voting rule.39 °
The success of an exchange depends on the amount of trading
that takes place on it. As such, exchanges have incentives to
383 Macey & Kanda, supra note 322, at 1009-10.
384 Id. at 1012.
385 Id. at 1022.
386 Id. at 1022-23.
387 Id. at 1023.
388 THE INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SaVICES PROXY VOTING MANUAL, supra
note 162, at 7.19.
389 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURrIES DEALERS, THE NASDAQ FACT BOOK &
Cosn'ANY DIRECTORY, supra note 37, at 37.
390 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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adopt rules that maximize the value of their listed firms and thus
operate to benefit investors. Investor-friendly rules attract more
trades, and thus reduce the costs (and increase the profits) of
those who run the exchanges. 9 1 Competition among organized ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets for listings, as well as com-
petition between exchanges and the equity interests they repre-
sent versus other methods of investing wealth, serves only to
augment these incentives.3 92
There is no reason to expect that off-the-rack rules would be
designed any differently from the rules more closely related to sec-
ondary-market trading once the exchanges were free to do so.' 93
As such, this reasoning would lead us to believe that if dual-class
stock maximizes the value of some listed firms, regulations
prohibiting its use would eventually be replaced with more
facilitative listing standards. As competition among exchanges in-
creases, the exchanges will be forced to respond as any participant
in a competitive market would.
Some have hypothesized that changes in the historical voting
rights listing standard regime would initiate a significant increase
in dual-class use among firms listing on the NYSE and the NAS-
DAQ. Under the current regulatory framework, any firm listed on
the NASDAQ or the NYSE that intends to recapitalize with a
dual-class capital structure could simply move from its current ex-
change to the AMEX,394 but a mass exodus has not occurred.
Moreover, empirical research has not found any significant in-
crease or decrease in share price associated with switching ex-
change membership. 95 The transactional costs of such a move
391 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 294. Exchanges gain, for example,
by adopting rules that minimize the amount of deceit committed by listed firms, be-
cause investors who are misled are less likely to be repeat players. Id. For the same
reason, exchanges have an incentive to adopt rules that require listed firms to disclose
the amount and type of information that investors demand. Id.
392 Id.
393 In fact, recent proposals on dual-class stock and the past rules devised by the
exchanges relating to independent directors are clear evidence that this reasoning is
sound.
394 In 1993, forty-five companies defected to the NYSE from the NASDAQ, mark-
ing the highest number of defections since 1988. Big Board Claims a Win In its Battle
With NASDAQ, supra note 138, at C1.
395 See, e.g., Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm
Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QuAr.
ANAL. 1 (1986); Louis W. Ying et al., Stock Exchange Listings and Securities Returns,
12 J. FIN. QuANr. ANAL. 415 (1977); James C. Van Home, New Listings and Their
Price Behavior, 5 J. FIN. QuANT. ANAL. 783 (1970). While numerous examples can be
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are presumably low. Thus, we can hypothesize that no signficant
increases in dual-class use will take place (if the NYSE or the
NASDAQ allows dual-class recapitalizations) because where its
use would be value maximizing, a dual-class structure will have
already been implemented. The change in rules will only mini-
mally reduce what are already low transaction costs.
Similarly, because we have the experience of the short-term
moratorium that existed on the NYSE during the mid-1980s, we
can confidently predict that a mass exodus of funds from capital
markets will not occur in response to changes in the voting rights
policy.
3. Institutional Investors and Dual-Class Stock
Large shareholders have stronger incentives to monitor man-
agement than do small shareholders. The rise of the institutional
investor represents this truism. It is now well known that "insti-
tutional investors are no longer entirely passive."396 Forsaking
the "Wall Street Rule," large security holder activity has taken
the form of "voice," rather than "exit."397 Changes in the
demographics of equity ownership, 98 combined with the absence
given, it is sufficient to note the following: citing investor anguish and volatility,
Sunair Electronics, Inc., switched from the AMEX to the NASDAQ in 1985, and then
back again to the AMEX in 1992. Graham, supra note 373, at 54-55. Voicing similar
concerns, Thermo Electron Corp. has used the AMEX for nine spin-offs aier using the
NASDAQ for similar spin-offs prior to 1987. Id.
396 See Agents Watching Agents, supra note 193, at 814. Recently, the literature
has been flooded with commentary on the implications of this activism and statistics
on institutional holdings. See, e.g., NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE INsTrrUTIONAL INVEs-
TOR FACT BOOK 4 (1990); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing
Capital Investment System, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept./Oct. 1992 (opposing view on level
of activism of institutions); John Pound, Where Shareholder Activism is Paramount,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1993, at A16 (providing recent example of role of institutional
activism in context of takeover contest).
397 Agents Watching Agents, supra note 193, at 817. Such activity is occurring
even though the market for shares provides an extremely effective exit option. See
A.O. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGA-
NIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). Although this market for shares still exists, its effec-
tiveness is limited to large participants such as pension funds, whose sell-offs can
disrupt the market. Id.
398 In 1950, pension funds held less than one percent of U.S. equities, while insti-
titutional holders as a group held approximately 8%. In 1981, their holdings as a
group rose to 38%. By 1989, pension funds alone owned more than 26% of total equity
securities and institutions held in excess of 45% of total U.S. equities. Rock, supra
note 170, at 447. In 1990, institutional investors held an estimated 53% of outstand-
ing equity instruments with some estimates running as high as 60%. Carolyn Bran-
cato & Patrick Gaughan, Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991 Update, in
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of other higher yielding instruments including "junk bonds," are
also commonly associated with the increase in activity. 99 In addi-
tion, changes in the market for corporate control have initiated
changes in institutional attitudes. Specifically, institutions that
were viewed unfavorably by management groups because of their
perceived short-term focus on profits have increasingly shifted
their focus to long-term share appreciation. Institutional myopia
is increasingly a matter of public perception.40 0 For example, the
California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS"),
with $60 billion in assets, currently owns a portfolio with an aver-
age equity holding period of ten years.4 01
If institutions continue this trend, institutional activism will
increase, and monitoring will become a more cost-effective en-
deavor. 40 2 Furthermore, groups such as the United Shareholders
Association ("USA"), the Council of Institutional Investors, Insti-
tutional Shareholders Services, Inc., the Institutional Voting Re-
search Service, Faulk & Co., and the Investor Responsibility Re-
COLUM. L. SOH. INSTITUTioNAL INVESTOR PROJECT (1991); Porter, supra note 398, at
69; see also Barbara Franklin, SEC Seeks Freer Speech; Shareholder Communications
Proposal Debated, N.Y. TmEs, July 2, 1992. The year 1990 was a banner year for
activism, with shareholders sponsoring more proposals and winning more votes con-
cerning corporate governance than ever before. Klein, supra note 18, at 134. Such
activism has continued unabated. However, the institutional share of U.S. equities
has recently slipped. A survey called the "Brancato Report," found that institutions
held 46.8% of all U.S. equities in 1992, down from a 1990 peak of 50.5%. This study
also found that public-pension funds (considered the most vocal of all institutions)
actually increased their percentage of holdings held in stocks from 39.7% in 1990 to
47.8% in 1992. Leslie Scism, Institutional Share of U.S. Equities Slips, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 1993, at C1.
399 Recent trends in yields among debt instruments may serve to further en-
courage this drift.
400 See Agents Watching Agents, supra note 193, at 862-65 (describing institu-
tional myopia and managerial myopia). But see Porter, supra note 396, at 70 (oppos-
ing Black's position).
401 Letter from Dale M. Hanson, Chief Executive Officer, CalPERS, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, S.E.C. 1 (July 29, 1992) (S.E.C. Public Reference File No. S7-15-
92); see also Scism, supra note 398 (citing survey findings that 1993 stock holdings of
pension funds and other institutional investors had decreased from their peak in
1990).
402 A great deal of faith has been put in institutional activism as a means of solv-
ing the collective action problem and changing the dynamics of the agency relation-
ship. It has been said that, "'[i]nvestor capitalism' would recapture the essential ge-
nius of capitalism by restoring primacy to the interests of the suppliers of capital."
See Rock, supra note 170, at 448 n.9 (quoting A Word With Your Owners, THE ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 12-18, 1991, at 17); The End of Casino Society, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 12-18,
1991, at 60; Martin Dickson, Investors Wake Up To Their Power, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1990, at 18.
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search Center have served to promote investor communications
and access to institutional activity data. These efforts should
hasten the pace of institutional activity.40 3
The Clinton administration, which is more activist in matters
of corporate governance than past administrations, may instigate
further increases in institutional activity. Setting its sights on
corporate pension funds, the Department of Labor is said to be in
the process of drafting a plan that would "prod corporate pension
funds to set up procedures to govern how their holdings are to be
voted."40 4 Corporate pension funds hold more than $2.43 trillion
in retirement money.40 5
Shareholder activism may also occur nonuniformly across
governance issue areas. Specifically, because the diversification
associated with the large stockholdings of institutions creates
economies of scale in monitoring, institutions are more likely to
exhibit increased activity in regard to certain processes and struc-
tural issues. Dual-class stock is clearly a structural issue.40 6
Whether or not this is desirable is a question that is part of an
ongoing debate,407 but the implications of the increased pace of
403 See Rock, supra note 170, at 450-51 (extensivly discussing shareholder
groups); JACOBS, supra note 47, at app. The United Shareholders Association recently
disbanded, citing its successes, especially in regard to recent SEC rule changes. Kevin
G. Salwen, Shareholder Advocate Group to Close Its Doors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1993,
at C1. This group was characterized as representing individual shareholders. Id. Dur-
ing its lifetime, the association used campaigns of bluster and embarrassment to prod
companies to change, often publishing lists of target companies with policies it
deemed unfriendly to shareholders. Id.
404 Kevin G. Salwen & Leslie Scism, Corporate Pensions Face Proxy Rules, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 14, 1993, at C1.
405 Id.
406 See Agents Watching Agents, supra note 193, at 818.
407 See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Em-
pirical Evidence, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 895 (1992); Rock, supra note 170. Recently,
some investors and experts have raised questions about the fairness of institutional
ownership when institutions actively press for change. More specifically, recent
purchases by two money management firms of Borden, Inc. have raised questions
about information disparities between active funds and other shareholders when the
institutions make purchases based on how receptive management is to their concerns.
Leslie Scism, Borden Activists' Success Raises Fairness Question, WALL ST. J., Dec.
15, 1993, at C1. Such issues may arise more frequently in the future if institutions
decide to raise their concerns to management in more private settings than has been
the case in the past. In addition, the methods of shareholder activists are changing.
Leslie Scism, Bottom-Line Activism of Calpers Pays Off, New Study Indicates, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 6, 1994, at C1. This change is often called "relationship investing." Some
have forecasted an increase in this type of investing. See Salwen & Scism, supra note
406, at Cl; Christi Harlan, Ten Companies Are Target for Action, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
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activity and the increase in institutional stockholdings have had
ramifications on the regulatory debate surrounding the use of
dual-class stock.408
To examine institutional investor activity in the context of
dual-class stock proposals, it is necessary to examine the data il-
lustrating the likelihood of institutional shareholdings in firms
containing the characteristics of the "question mark" firms Ronald
Gilson and the Lehn, Netter, and Poulsen study described.40 9 The
data on institutional sentiment toward dual-class use in general
will then be examined and followed by a short analysis of institu-
tional investors and their influence on the collective action
problems normally associated with shareholder voting.
a. The Data
A number of studies reported institutional ownership in firms
proposing dual-class recapitalizations. The first was Professor
Gordon's 1988 study of nineteen companies listed on the NYSE.
He found that only three firms had significant institutional owner-
ship before the recapitalization (blocks of 5 percent or more): Gen-
eral Datacom Industries, Inc., one holder of 5 percent; Kaufman &
Broad, Inc., six holders, totaling 31 percent; the North American
Coal Corp., three holders totaling 17.6 percent; and Helene Curtis
Industries, Inc., one holder of 6.1 percent.41 0 The July 1987 Office
of the Chief Economist study reports a 19.9 percent average
(mean) institutional ownership for its sample of firms and 23.9
percent for the post-moratorium sample of firms. 411 Additionally,
although institutional holdings as shown by this data appear
small, those "holdings greatly increased from about 11 percent
before the NYSE moratorium to about 25 percent" afterwards.41 2
The previously mentioned empirical research describing some
common characteristics of firms in which a dual-class structure is
potentially beneficial is consistent with the results of studies by
1993, at Bi; Susan Pulliam, Calpers Goes Over CEOs' Heads In Its Quest for Higher
Returns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993, at C1.
408 Institutions control over 43% of all NYSE-listed securities; it is estimated that
by the year 2000 pension funds alone will control 50% of all corporate stocks. Bain-
bridge, supra note 39, at 632.
409 A more extensive study of institutional investors and the debate on whether
their activism is on the whole "good" or "bad" for investors and firms is beyond the
scope of this Article.
410 Gordon, supra note 44, at 45 n.147.
411 See SECOND SEC STUDy, supra note 134, at tbl. 4.
412 Id. (cited in Flocos, supra note 10, at 1772).
952 [Vol. 68:863
DUAL-CLASS STOCK
Professor Gordon and the Office of the Chief Economist. Since in-
stitutional ownership generally aggregates in our larger corpora-
tions, we would not expect to see a large institutional presence
before a recapitalization in firms seeking shareholder approval of
a disparate voting rights plan.
Institutional investors' sentiments towards governance pro-
posals in general and supervoting rights stock in particular have
also been collected. A 1987 survey by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center indicates that although dual-class plans usually
pass with a high overall level of voting support-because most
companies have a high level of insider ownership-institutions
oppose such plans more often than any other antitakeover propo-
sal. In 1986, 88 percent of the institutional respondents stated
that they opposed dual-class proposals when presented for vote
and, in 1987, 70 percent opposed the authorization of these pro-
posals. When the institutional investors were broken into sub-
groups, 75 percent percent of investment managers indicated that
they opposed the plans, 73 percent of pension funds voted in oppo-
sition, and 59 percent of an aggregated group of educational insti-
tutions and endowments also voted in opposition.413
A 1990 survey of the Investor Responsibility Research Center,
which divided institutional investors into similar subgroups, indi-
cated similar differentiations in subgroup disapproval figures as
well as corresponding high levels of opposition for unequal voting
right proposals: public pension funds 73 percent, private pension
funds 83 percent, investment managers 55 percent, and founda-
tions and church groups 67 percent.4 14 When those same groups
were asked in 1991 how they would anticipate voting if dual class
proposals came before them, the answers were again different
among the groups: 41 5
FOR AGAINST CASE BY CASE (%)
Public Pension Funds 5 74 21
Corporate Pension Funds 14 43 43
Investment Managers 0 62 38
Colleges, Foundations 6 76 18
413 See SHARON MARCIL & PEG O'HARA, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1987 PROxY SEASON 25 (1987).
414 JEFFREY W. BIERSACH, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1990 PRoXY SEASON 15, tbl. 4 (1990).
415 See ANN YERGER & ELIZABETH LIGHTFOOT, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1991 PRoxY SEASON 31 (1991).
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A 1992 survey asked respondents how they would vote on pro-
posals to establish stock with supervoting rights and stock with no
voting rights. Thus, the survey split up the single-question format
used in prior years. 16 The results were as follows:
FOR AGAINST CASE BY CASE (%)
Public Pension Funds 0 88 12
Corporate Pension Funds 0 40 60
Investment Managers 3 59 38
Colleges, Foundations 12 41 47
These statistics reveal that in firms with a large institutional
presence, dual-class recapitalizations will most likely fail to win
approval unless institutional shareholders find that the proposal
increases value. As noted in Part III of this paper, value-
increasing recapitalizations will seldom occur unless a company
has a significant family or insider shareholder group. In such
firms, institutional ownership is generally modest. As such, for
the majority of firms on the NYSE, proposals for dual-class
recapitalizations should fail to win approval.
In the 1980s, International Business Machines ("IBM") and
Merrill Lynch submitted dual-class recapitalization proposals to
their shareholders - a group comprised of large institutions. The
IBM proposal received the support of only 5 percent of its
institutional stockholders; the Merrill Lynch proposal received the
support of 19.2 percent of its institutional shareholders. Needless
to say, each failed to win overall shareholder approval. In
addition, the shareholders of Seagram Co. defeated a
recapitalization proposal despite the 40 percent controlling
interest held by the Bronfman family, which voted affirmatively
for the plan. 17
In a more recent example of institutional activity in this area,
News Corp., whose American depository receipts trade on the
NYSE, had to withdraw a dual-class recapitalization plan in the
wake of institutional opposition. The plan (a dissemination of
supervoting shares to existing shareholders) was said to be
proposed in order to allow News Corp. to form strategic alliances
through the issuance of shares while preserving the control of its
416 SHARON PAMEPINTO LIGHT, VoTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE IssuEs (1992).
417 See Gary Hector, The Flap Over Super-Shares, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, at
114, 116.
[Vol. 68:863
DUAL-CLASS STOCK
biggest shareholder, Rupert Murdoch.418 Others, however, felt
the plan was designed to oust certain family members from the
company.41 9
In stark contrast to these three proposals are the results from
two recent dual-class proposals that were affirmatively voted for
in 1990 introduced by companies illustrating Gilson's "question
mark" concept: Crawford, Inc. and Century Telephone
Enterprises, Inc. The dual-class recapitalization proposed by
Crawford, Inc., was presented to shareholders as a method by
which the firm could raise additional capital for investment
purposes without diluting the controlling interest of the Crawford
family. The proposal won the approval of 94 percent of its
shareholders. The Crawford family owned 70 percent of the
shares.
The dual-class plan proposed by Century Telephone
Enterprises, Inc., received the approval of 97 percent of the votes
cast. This plan authorized the company to implement a dual-class
recapitalization in the event that Rule 19c-4 was amended or
overturned.420
b. Collective Action Problems and the Institutional Investor
As mentioned in Part III, the scenario of a horde of rationally
ignorant voters, repeatedly misled or coerced by opportunistic
managers, has often guided regulatory policy.42' This has been
particularly true on issues involving voting rights, although corpo-
rate law and SRO listing standards permit a variety of other
transactions that pose similar collective action problems.422 In
addition, while the SEC asserts that such problems are endemic to
the shareholder vote on a dual-class proposal, in actuality the
418 S. Karene Witcher, News Corp. Scraps Its Plan of "Super" Stock, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 9, 1993, at A12 (noting institutions hold approximately 40% of News Corp. stock
while Mr. Murdoch holds approximately 30%).
419 Id.
420 SANDER, supra note 13, at 41.
421 See RomANo, supra note 111, at 88.
422 "Going private transactions, their leveraged buyout variants, and freeze out
mergers each raise the same sorts of concerns." Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 628; see
CLARx, supra note 192, at 504-18; Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restate-
ment of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978). The coercion problems associ-
ated with dual-class use have come up in other circumstances as well. For instance,
the coercive nature of exchange offer recapitalizations is quite similar to the coercion
present in two-tier tender offers. Moreover, the great expense of communication and
coordinated action among dispersed shareholders is significantly related to the SEC
itself. Flocos, supra note 10, at 1770.
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SEC is itself responsible for rules that promote those behavior
patterns. Specifically, the Commission's Rule 14a-2(b)(1) and
Rule 14a-9 generally raise the costs and the effectiveness of share-
holder activism. Under Rule 14a-2(b)(1), most of the SEC's solici-
tation of proxy rules would apply to any shareholder wishing to
contact more than ten other shareholders concerning the recapi-
talization proxy.423 Rule 14a-9 is "applicable to any contact
among shareholders with respect to the recapitalization proxy
vote." The Rule would impose liability on an insurgent share-
holder for statements later deemed to be materially false or mis-
leading.424 Put together, those rules have been cited as "a signifi-
cant cause of the coercive 'prisoner's dilemma' type of collective
action problem to which the Commission [implicitly] points in
prohibiting the exchange-offer form of recapitalization."425
Recent reforms in the proxy rules may prove helpful in allevi-
ating the burdens of shareholders and the collective problems
heretofore mentioned.426 For example, Jacobs notes:
The new rules exempt all parties, whether shareholders or not,
from proxy requirements as long as they do not (1) seek the
power to vote others' shares, (2) have a special interest in the
outcome of the proxy vote other than as a shareholder, or (3)
have a special relationship with the company, such as being a
five percent owner. Only shareholders who own over five million
of the company's stock have to notify the SEC and any stock ex-
change on which the company is listed if they disseminate un-
published materials .... New rules were [also] adopted to pre-
vent companies from "bundling" unfavorable measures with
actions that shareholders desired .... A new procedure was
adopted to allow disgruntled owners to elect a single candidate to
the board without asking fellow shareholders to vote against
management's entire slate .... And companies will now be re-
quired to state in their proxy statement how they tabulate
427proxies.
Further measures are needed, however, because other rules
still exist that discourage cost-sharing, which might otherwise re-
duce cost burdens and fail to promote more active management
423 Id. These proxy rules in turn impose upon the insurgent a host of regulatory
and reporting requirements. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1995).
424 Flocos, supra note 10, at 1770-71; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1995).
425 Flocos, supra note 10, at 1770-71.
426 See JAcoBs, supra note 47, at 55-58.
427 Id. at 57-58.
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monitoring.428 For example, the 13(d) rules and the expansive
definition of "control" for purposes of control person liability -
both of which have a far greater chilling effect on shareholder
oversight than the proxy rules ever had - are desperately in need
of reform to promote further institutional monitoring of corporate
management.4 29
Moreover, changes in those rules will enhance the ability of
institutions (acting collectively) to monitor corporate manage-
ment's behavior and enable institutions to better oppose un-
wanted charter amendments. "Ensuring that institutions must
act together lets them (imperfectly) watch each other, makes repu-
tation an important constraint on institutional self-dealing, and
reduces the downside risk from institutional power."430 Even
without such widescale regulatory change, the changing role of in-
stitutional investors indicates that the collective action problems
associated with shareholder activity may be greatly exaggerated.
Institutional investors own a large percentage of the shares of
most public companies. 431 "First, most institutional investors are
widely diversified .... [In addition,] the large public funds that
have been particularly prominent in corporate governance mat-
ters are largely indexed."432 Yet institutions and the votes they
cast are not entirely free from influence. Specifically, in support of
Rule 19c-4, the SEC cited (what is now well documented) the testi-
mony of institutional investors describing the pressure placed on
the managers of corporate pension funds during the voting pro-
cess.433 In addition, others believe that money managers, like
428 Agents Watching Agents, supra note 193, at 824; see also Bernard S. Black,
Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J. CoRP. L. 49 (1991) [here-
inafter Proxy Reform] (supporting initial 1991 SEC proposals but indicating that pro-
posals themselves do not go far enough).
429 Next Steps in Corporate Governance Reform, supra note 193, at 2.
430 Proxy Reform, supra note 428, at 51 (discussing what are termed "two-halves"
of story); see Rock, supra note 170 (describing first half of story as being that in-
creased concentration of shares makes shareholder activism more rational, making it
easier for shareholders to surmount classic collective action problem that forms basis
for much of corporate law; describing second half of story as being that, while in-
creased role of institutional investors ameliorates the classic collective action
problems, it does so by means of agents - inhouse and outside money managers).
With agents come agency costs, and a new version of the agency problem. Id.
431 Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MicH. L. REV. 520,
523 (1990).
432 Rock, supra note 170, at 473.
433 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 89,220; Flocos, supra note 10, at 1771-
72. The perceived pressure on corporate pension fund managers is well documented
and has heightened the importance of public pension fund managers. See Roberta
1994]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:863
outside directors, but unlike the large individual shareholders
whom institutional shareholders are thought to resemble, have
precious few economic or legal incentives to actively discipline cor-
porate management.43 4 Moreover, recent literature indicates that
such pressure may not be limited to corporate pension funds, but
may pervade the gamut of institutions as well.435 Such problems
and the forecasted increases in their frequency are cause for con-
cern and warrant further study.43 6
Blatant forms of coercion need not, however, be addressed di-
rectly by the SEC or the exchanges because they are undoubtedly
illegal under existing state law.43 7 We can expect institutions to
protect their voting rights feverishly as increased holdings make
the voice option more cost-effective. In addition, when institutions
vote or use less formal forms of persuasion, one can be assured
that they will do so with a full understanding of the issues and
Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993). The problems associated with certain types of institutions
may be behind empirical studies reporting mixed results on the correlation between
institutional presence and the percentage of no-votes cast. See James A. Brickley et
al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J. FiN. ECON.
267, 284 (1988); Pound, supra note 200, at 259.
434 Rock, supra note 170, at 452-53.
435 Roberta Romano has noted that, "corporate managers who threaten private
fund managers or their employers with loss of business as the price of opposition can
just as effectively threaten public funds with economic loss through, for example, local
plant closings." Romano, supra note 433, at 796-97. In addition, one can easily con-
template a scenario whereby insurance companies desiring to continue to underwrite
a company's insurance, or a bank wishing to continue the provision of financial serv-
ices to a firm, may decide to vote with management. Klein, supra note 18, at 133-34.
436 It seems the primary area of disagreement over the role of institutional inves-
tors in matters of corporate governance is largely over the scope and significance of
the agency problems their influence presents to non-institutional shareholders. Ones'
view can take a pessimistic or optimistic form. I must admit to being generally opti-
mistic, at least as related to structural issues that implicate the fundamental issues of
corporate law. On these issues I believe institutions will protect themselves zealously
across the board.
437 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at-630. For example,
[i]n Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., [517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986)] ... a
firm's chief executive officer and largest shareholder threatened to block ac-
quisitions of the firm unless the shareholders approved a dual class recapi-
talization giving him voting control. The Delaware Chancery Court held
that he thereby violated his fiduciary duty as an officer and director of the
firm.
Moreover, the opinion of Chancellor Allen indicated that future cases would most
likely involve review under an entire fairness test. Id.; see also Eisenberg v. Chicago
Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1061-62 (Del. Ch. 1987) (enjoining corporation's self
tender for its preferred shares in part due to coercive threats by management to delist
those shares unless preferred shareholders tendered); Flocos, supra note 10, at 1775.
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values involved. The end result is that only recapitalizations that
increase value will receive adequate shareholder support.
CONCLUSION
The preceding arguments imply that the issuance of limited-
voting shares may or may not be in the best interests of stockhold-
ers. Dual-class recapitalizations can offer incentives for human-
capital investment and decrease agency costs. Decreases will oc-
cur when the recapitalization serves to converge management and
shareholder interests on matters such as risk-aversion and portfo-
lio diversification. Dual-class recapitalizations can also serve,
however, to entrench a specified management group by reducing
the influence of the corporate control market. Luckily, empirical
evidence offers clear guidelines on when a recapitalization with
limited-voting stock will be beneficial to shareholder interests.
Fundamental changes occurring in corporate governance, in
addition to empirical evidence gathered since the great dual-class
stock debate of the 1980s, indicate that much of the support for a
uniform minimum voting-rights listing standard was misguided.
This is because its content did not differentiate between good and
bad recapitalizations. In particular, the vast array of new equity
instruments (which often break apart the traditional components
that embody traditional equity interests), and the changing role of
the institutional investor have made a reevaluation of the use of
dual-class common stock imperative.
The role institutional investors and the exchanges can play (if
allowed) is important. Institutional investors and the competitive
forces that influence the exchanges can be relied upon to carry the
burdens that may result from a uniform change in SEC policy.
Faulty dual-class recapitalizations will be rejected, as will an
exchange policy whose end result is disadvantageous to
shareholders.
Dual-class use should be perceived as an expression of discon-
tent by corporate financiers and entrepreneurs with traditional
capital-structuring methods and the restrictions those methods
impose on decision making and risk taking. Its use in many of the
current equity deals serves to highlight the value limited-voting
stock can have.
In response, the SROs and the SEC should support or adopt
new forms of dual-class regulation (such as that approved by the
AMEX and being drafted by the NYSE), driven not by the theoret-
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ical implications of its use for traditionally large, listed corpora-
tions but for the smaller, start-up firms that largely make use of
it.
